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Section 1 
IN TR OD UC TION 
1 .1  OBJECTIVE 
The concept of a low cost, manned Space Station (SS) or Space Base with a 
10-year mission,and resupply capability via a logistics vehicle implies a re- 
quirement for an onboard maintenance capability never before encountered in 
space operations. Relatively short  mission durations have heretofore allowed 
attainment of success through reliability techniques. Obviously, equipment re- 
liability alone cannot guarantee complete success for a 10-year mission, and 
other approaches must be considered. 
An obvious answer is to take advantage of man's capability to perform on- 
board repair  to enhance subsystem availability. However, man's role aboard a 
10-year Space Station is primarily one of scientific and research experimentation; 
his involvement in other activities must be minimized if the Space Station is to 
achieve its scientific goals effectively. 
Low operational cost implies near autonomous operation. Functions per-  
formed on the ground in ear l ier  programs must now be performed onboard to  
minimize the need for extensive ground support facilities and operations. 
Finally, the availability of an onboard Data Management System (DMS) 
strongly suggests that this hardware and its associated software may be designed 
to perform all the data acquisition, processing and control functions needed for  
automated onboard checkout capability. 
For  these reasons, the development of a capability to perform automated 
onboard failure detection, fault isolation, and recovery is the most important 
step toward achieving extended operation in space. The objective of this task 
is to identify requirements and develop concepts for such a system. 
1 . 2  TASK STUDY APPROACH 
An accurate, in-depth requirements analysis is the key to successful 
development of an automated Onboard Checkout System (OCS) for the Space 
Station. Task 1 objectives were accomplished as follows: 
0 NASA- supplied objectives and guidelines were analyzed to  determine 
their impact on the OCS re@rements. 
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0 A baseline configuration of each subsystem was established for study 
purposes, utilizing the Phase B Definition Study resul ts  as developed 
by MDAC and IBM and modified by NASA direction. This subtask is 
documented in Section 3. 
0 Subsystem and major component failure modes, failure effects, and 
failure ra tes  were established, and subsystem maintenance concepts 
were developed. 
0 Line Replaceable Units (LRUS) were defined for  each subsystem and 
major components thereof. 
0 A strategy w a s  developed for  the checkout of each Space Station sub- 
system by defining the checkout functions required for checkout of 
that subsystem, the degree of integration of these functions into the 
Data Management System, and definition of any special approaches 
required for checkout of redundant elements of that subsystem. 
0 A strategy w a s  developed for the integrated checkout of the Space 
Stations by defining the functions required to isolate a failure to a 
particular sybsystem. 
0 Subsystems and integrated tes ts  were defined to perform the checkout 
functions identified above. Measurements and stimuli required to per- 
form these tests were identified and compiled in a Measurement and 
Stimulus list. 
0 Functional and performance characterist ics required for a Data 
Management System to perform the onboard checkout task were defined. 
Figure 1-1, Task 1 Flow, shows the relationship of the subtasks in ac- 
complishing the total Task 1 objective and also indicates the relationship between 
Tasks 1 and 2. 
1.3 FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The following design considerations derived from the identified guidelines 
and constraints documents a r e  considered fundamental to the OCS: 
0 Growth - The Space Station (crew size - 12) must be capable of growth 
into a Space Base (crew size - 50). The OCS design must reflect this 
requirement by providing a flexible, adaptable, growth-oriented system. 
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Figure 1-1. Task 1 Flow 
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0 Operational Life - The Space Station shall be designed for a minimum 
operational life of 10 years  with resupply of consumables and replace- 
ment items. This operational life may be obtained through long-life 
design, scheduled maintenance o r  repair ,  o r  in-place redundancy for 
critical o r  nonrepairable equipment whose failure could disable the 
Space Station o r  imperil the crew. 
0 Cost - A primary goal of the Space Station Program is minimizing the 
cost of space operations. 
0 DMS Functions - The DMS wil l  provide automatic onboard fault isolation 
to the replaceable element and automatic onboard malfunction notifica- 
tion of the switchable element. 
\ 
0 Minimum Crew Participation - The DMS wil l  support minimum crew 
participation in routine operations to the greatest practical extent. 
Crew responsibilities will  include, where necessary, fault isolation, 
maintenance, calibration, and repair. 
0 Onboard Autonomy - All components associated with enabling the crew 
to recognize, isolate, and correct critical system malfunctions must 
be located onboard and be functionally independent of ground support 
and external interfaces. 
0 Automatic Crew Notification - All systems that incorporate an automated 
fail operational capability wil l  be designed to provide crew notification 
and DMS cognizance of malfunction. 
__ 
0 Replaceable Unit Design - Replaceable units shall be designed to per- 
mit direct visual and physical access  by the crew with connectors and 
couplings for  the ease of removal and replacement. 
0 Baseline Data Management System - The general characterist ics of the 
baseline DMS a r e  as follows: 
Computer - Multiprocessor System containing two multiprocessors 
each with three central processing units and switching to connect any 
C P U  to an input/output (I/O) module. Each CPU has a dedicated mem- 
ory and access to all common memories. One multiprocessor shall be 
capable of acting as backup to the other. 
Data Bus - Digital transmission of all data except audio and video. 
Separate buses, implemented redundantly, a r e  provided for command 
and response data. 
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Displays and Controls - Interactive displays with complete redundancy 
between two control centers. 
Data Acquisition - Remote data acquisition and control with digital 1/0 
over a serial multiplex data bus. Standby redundancy for  noncritical 
parameters and operational redundancy (including sensors) is provided 
for critical parameters. 
Software - High-level executive control of modular packages of soft- 
ware. 
1.4 KEY ISSUES 
Several issues which are considered key to OCS design were identified. 
This study has attempted to explore, at least in part, these key issues. These 
issues are: 
0 Degree of crew involvement required in the onboard checkout process 
0 The maximum practical degree of integration of the OCS functions with 
the Data Management System; i. e,, allocation of OCS functions to the 
DMS and to other subsystems 
0 The role of preprocessors in the onboard checkout process 
0 Special problems caused by the requirement to check out redundant 
elements 
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Section 2 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
2.1 GENERAL 
As part  of Task ' l  of the Onboard Checkout Techniques Study, the onboard 
subsystems of the Space Station have been analyzed. From this analysis have 
been developed requirements for implementation of an onboard checkout capability 
from which checkout hardware and software performance requirements can be 
derived. Space Station subsystems so analyzed are :  
0 Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
0 Environmental Control and Life Support 
0 Electrical Power 
0 Propulsion 
0 Data Management 
0 Structures 
0 R F  Communications 
Summarized herein a r e  the results and conclusions of the subsystem 
requirements analysis. Detailed results of the analysis a r e  contained in Sections 
3 through 7 and in Appendix I .  
2.2 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 
Consideration of the results of the requirements analysis and concepts 
definition task has led to the formulation of certain conclusions. The most sig- 
nificant of these conclusions are summarized in Table 2-1 with substantiating 
information in the indicated sections of this report. 
2.3 STUDY BASELINE 
A baseline configuration was developed for each of the onboard subsystems, 
which was to be analyzed with the goal of developing the basic requirements for 
the Space Station OCS. The baseline configurations selected are primarily those 
derived by the McDonnell Douglas/IBM study team during the Phase B Systems 
Definition Study. Where NASA directed, the baseline configurations include 
features defined by the North American Rockwell (NR)/General Electric (GE) 
Phase B study team. Changes to the MDAC/IBM concepts have been incorporated 
in the GN&C and the Data Management Subsystems. These changes were incor- 
porated in the IBM/MDAC subsystem concept and have become the study baseline 
configuration. 
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Table 2-1. Principal Conclusions 
Conclusion Section 
With the exception of parameter measurements and 
functions can be performed by the DMS. 
generation of certain unique stimuli, required checkout 5 
The amount of crew time involved in the checkout 
process is not significant. See Task 3 report for 
quantitative results.  
An allocation of checkout functional responsibility is 
feasible, which is compatible with the standard 
interface between the Data Management Subsystem 
and the subsystem under test .  
No problems were identified, due to checkout of 
redundant elements, which required capability beyond 
that provided by the baseline DMS. 
No significant checkout applications were identified 
for preprocessors except for hardware limit checking 
capability in remote data acquisition units. 
The checkout task, in t e rms  of data distribution and 
processing requirements, is compatible with the 
proposed DMS performance level when considering 
the total data management task. 
6 
5 
8 
2 .3 .1  GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL 
The McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) Phase B concept employed a general-purpose 
digital computer dedicated to the GN&C Subsystem. This digital computer inter-  
faced with the GN&C sensors and Propulsion Subsystem components through an 
electronic interface assembly and interfaced with the elements of the Data Manage- 
ment Subsystem via the data bus. In accordance with NASA direction, the GN&C 
Subsystem was reconfigured to include five preprocessors instead of a dedicated 
GN&C processor.  preprocessors make up a family of small  peripheral 
coniputers or  preprocessors of a general-purpose digital design. Their per-  
formance capabilities have not been defined. The individual preprocessors 
The five 
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interface with the GN&C sensors  and Propulsion Subsystem components via 
individual 1/0 electronic modules. The five preprocessors a r e  identified as 
follows : 
a 
a Inertial Navigation Preprocessor 
Rendezvous and Docking Preprocessor  
a Control Moment Gyro Preprocessor  
a Reaction J e t  Preprocessor 
Optical Navigat ion/Att itude Preprocessor  
All preprocessors interface with the elements of the DMS via the data bus. 
2.3.2 DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
Significant differences between the IBM/MDAC Phase B concept and the 
NR/GE concept in the area of the Computer Subsystem, Data Acquisition and 
Distribution Subsystem, and the Onboard Checkout Subsystem a r e  summarized 
in Table 2-2. In each case,  the baseline to be analyzed includes the character-  
istics defined by the NR/MSC team. 
2.4 RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES 
A logical approach to the design of an Onboard Checkout System (OCS)  
requi res  the answer to several  pertinent questions including: 
a What will fa i l?  
a 
a 
0 
0 
How often will they fail? 
How will they fail, i. e . ,  what is the failure mode? 
How will the failure manifest itself, i. e . ,  what is the failure effect? 
How will the failure be repaired? 
To attempt to incorporate onboard checkout capability into the Space Station 
design without answering these fundamental questions would surely result  in a 
"shotgun" approach, which is rarely cost effective. Therefore, p r ior  to attempt- 
ing to develop checkout strategy and define checkout tests, the following analyses 
were performed to provide the required answers to these critical questions. 
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Table 2-2. DMS Baseline Differences 
NR/GE Concept IBM/McDonnell Douglas Subsystem Concept 
Data Acquisition 0 Data Terminals 
- Wide-Band Analog 
- Digital 
Data Distribution 0 Coaxial Data Bus 
- 3 Lines 
- Combined Command 
Response Lines 
0 Redundant - Manually 
Switched 
Onboard Checkout 0 Noncritical Functions 
- Single Sensors and 
Electronics for Data 
Monitoring 
0 Critical Functions 
Caution and 
Warning Display 
- Local Display 
- Hardwire to Central 
0 Data Terminals 
- Digital 
0 Coaxial Data Bus 
- 4 Lines 
- Separate Command 
and Response Lines 
0 Operationally Redundant 
0 Noncritical Functions 
- Single Sensors and 
Standby Redundant 
Electronics for  
Data Monitoring 
0 Critical Functions 
- Redundant (Including 
Sensors) into DMS via  
Data Bus 
Caution and Warning 
- Local Hardwired 
2.4.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
A criticality number (failure probability) was generated for each major sub- 
system component. This number is the product of: (1) the component failure rate, 
(2) the anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital time period of six months. 
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component 
over any six-month time period. 
Overall subsystem criticality was determined by an optimization process  
whereby spares  and redundancy a r e  considered in te rms  of a tradeoff between 
increased reliability and weight. These overall subsystem criticality numbers 
which represent the complement of the probability of achieving full subsystem 
specified performance for 180 days a r e  shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1. Subsystem Criticality 
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2.4.2 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
The redirected Task 5, "Reliability, " will provide a more detailed failure 
mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for some subsystems than was possible under 
Task 1. The results of this FMEA a r e  contained in the Task 5 final report. 
2.4.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT DEFINITION 
In an  attempt to answer the question "How will the failure be repaired?" 
and to provide a rationale for the identification of line replaceable units, each 
subsystem was examined to determine specific maintenance concepts applicable 
to that subsystem. General Space Station maintenance guidelines were applied to 
each subsystem to develop specific maintenance concepts for that particular sub- 
system. These concepts a r e  presented in Section 4. 
2.4.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT IDENTIFICATION 
The definition of line replaceable units (LRUs) is keyed to repairing sub- 
systems in an in-place configuration with the LRU being the smallest modular unit 
suitable for replacement. Factors considered in identifying LRUs were: 
Component U s e 
Subsystem Maintenance Concepts 
Safety Aspects 
Component Failure Rate 
Convenient Breakpoints 
Crew Time and Skills Required 
Special Tools Required 
DMS Hardware and Software Complexity Required to Isolate to the LRU 
Physical Size 
Table 2-3 is a summary of LRUs identified from each system. 
2.5 CHECKOUT STRATEGY 
2.5.1 GENERAL 
Each Space Station subsystem was analyzed to determine the functions 
required to verify operational status and to detect and isolate faults within the 
subsystems. Then, based on the individual subsystem requirements these 
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Table 2-3. Line Replaceable Unit Summary 
Subsvstem Types Total 
Propulsion 86 431 
Structures 17 254 
Communications 46 144 
Power 96 1232 
Environmental Control/Lif e Support 97 1175 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 42 154 
Data Management 69 488 
functions were allocated to either the subsystem side or the DMS side of the 
subsystem/DMS interface. Finally, a special effort was undertaken to identify 
special checkout problems caused by redundant subsystem elements. 
2.5.2 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY 
The checkout functions of stimulus generation, sensing, signal conditioning, 
limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation implemented in a combination of 
operational limit and validity checks and functional testing were found to  be sufficient 
to check out the Space Station subsystems. In addition, the Data Management System 
requires the use of software diagnostic modules supplemented with limited meas- 
urements. With the exception of the sensing function, certain specialized stimulus 
generation, and pre-conditioning, all the required functions could be supplied by 
the baseline Data Management System. 
2.5.3 FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION 
Table 2-4 shows a generalized division of functional responsibility between 
the subsystem under test and the DMS. The specific division of functional 
responsibility var ies  with each subsystem, and specific resul ts  for each sub- 
system a r e  contained in Section 5. 
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Table 2-4. Generalized Functional Allocation 
Subsystem Function DMS Function 
Parameter  Measurement Signal Conversion 
Signal Pre-Conditioning Command and Control 
Unique Stimulus Generation Limit Checks 
Direct Limit Checks Trend Analysis, Fault Isolation, 
Display 
2.5.4 REDUNDANT ELEMENT CHECKOUT 
The baseline Space Station subsystems were analyzed to determine the types 
and extent of redundancy employed in the subsystem design. Four types of redun- 
dancy were found to  exist at the level of definition of the subsystem design. These 
a r e  defined as: 
Type I: On-line, independently operating, identical elements 
Type 11: Standby, non-operating elements requiring manual startup and 
switchover or switchover by DMS command 
Type 111: Standby, non-operating elements with internal (to subsystem) 
switchover and automatic notification to  the DMS 
Type IV: Functional redundancy provided by parallel, independent 
systems 
Types I thru 111 can occur at the system o r  component level. A special case of 
Type I is the parallel system with isolation and cross-strapping to  allow inter- 
connection at any point in the system. 
Figure 2-2 indicates the occurrence of these redundancy types by subsystem 
in the baseline Space Station design. 
There a r e  certain general requirements that must be considered for check- 
out of each of these types of redundancy. Type I, for  instance, being completely 
independent, and operating, requires a separate set of instrumentation for check- 
out and additional time must be allowed for its checkout. For  the special case of 
Type I, logic must be provided to isolate the failure and perform the proper isola- 
tion and cross-strap switching. 
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Redundancy Type 
I I1 III IV 
GN&C b b X 
Subsystem 
Propulsion a 
b 
*a  b 
EC/LS a 
*a  
R F  a 
a 
b 
b 
b 
X 
Structure b 
Power a a a 
*a  b b 
DMS a a X 
b 
a Indicates redundancy at system level 
*a  Indicates special case at system level with cross-strapping 
b Indicates redundancy at component level 
Figure 2-2. Redundancy Usage 
For Type 11, provision must be made for startup and test periodically of the 
off-line elements to insure their operation when switched on-line. This requires  
application of power and checkout stimuli (if  required) and dummy loads where 
necessary prior to acquisition of data for checkout. 
For Type 111, in addition to the requirements of Type 11, the DMS must be 
capable of accepting notification of switchover and also must be capable of com- 
manding switchover periodically to insure proper operation when required. 
Type IV, as does Type I, requires separate independent instrumentation 
for checkout. 
2-9 
A special problem common to all types of redundancy is the status keeping 
of equipment as to whether it is off-line, on-line, failed, operating, or non- 
operating. For data handling systems, the handling of data arriving during a 
fault isolation and reconfiguration action and catch up after reconfiguration must 
be considered. 
The application of these considerations to the individual subsystem cases 
is discussed in the individual subsystem checkout strategy portion of this report. 
It has  been concluded, as a result of th i s  study, that the Data Management 
System is capable of managing the problems that ar ise  as a result of the utilization 
of redundant elements in the Space Station subsystems. 
2.6 TEST DEFINITIONS 
2.6.1 GENERAL 
Tests were defined to implement the checkout functions identified to insure 
the on-orbit availability of the Space Station subsystems. This definition included 
test  descriptions, test sequencing and timing where applicable, and the measure- 
ments and stimuli required to perform these tests.  For the Data Management 
Subsystem, a sizing analysis was performed to estimate computer execution t ime 
and memory required to perform the software diagnostics. Fo r  each subsystem, 
typical fault isolation routines were developed to  illustrate th i s  technique. Finally, 
integrated subsystem tests  were defined to  isolate a failure to a specific subsystem, 
and a typical integrated fault isolation routine was developed to illustrate this 
technique. The degree of crew involvement was a special consideration in the 
implementation of these tests. Specific results of these analyses are found in 
Section 6. 
2.6.2 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS SUMMARY 
For the Space Station subsystems ( less  the DMS) continuous critical and non- 
critical parameter status monitoring is used to detect faults. Periodic tes ts  and 
calibrations utilizing pre-programmed routines and employing calibrated stimuli 
to more completely assess  the health of the subsystem were defined at specified 
intervals. Trend analyses to predict impending failures or  dangerous conditions 
were identified along with typical fault isolation routines. For the DMS a 
combination of continuous monitoring tes t s  to detect faults and fault isolation 
tes ts  to isolate faults to a specific component were defined. 
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For  the Space Station subsystems other than the DMS, it was found that the 
tes ts  were accomplished primarily by application of stimuli and measurement and 
processing of performance data by the DMS. On the other hand, the checkout of 
the Data Management Subsystem is accomplished by diagnostic software modules 
supplemented by certain parameter measurement. 
A summary of the data requirements to implement the subsystem checkout 
functions is shown in Table 2-5. 
It was found that the task of insuring overall Space Station availability is 
primarily dependent upon the proper structuring of the individual subsystem tests. 
The ability to test  the subsystem independent of other subsystems is directly 
related to the number and types of interfaces between the subsystems. These 
interfaces must be taken into account so that erroneous or  ambiguous test resul ts  
will not be obtained. Therefore, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests 
a r e  initiated, a higher level of test is required to verify that all interfaces and 
all external conditions that influence the subsystem a r e  proper.  It was found that 
the number of these higher level tes ts  is not extensive due to  the approach of 
minimizing the different types of interfaces between subsystems. The following 
functional subsystem interfaces were identified: 
o GNC/GMS/Propulsion 
o GNC/DMS/RF Communications 
DMS/EPS 
0 GNC/Propulsion 
0 EC/LS/EPS Isotope/Brayton 
0 EC/LS/LOW Thrust Propulsion 
0 EPS/Subsystem 
The GNC/DMS/Propulsion interface was identified as the most complex 
problem for on-orbit testing, and an integrated test flow was developed for soft- 
ware sizing purposes. 
2.6.3 DEGREE OF CREW INVOLVEMENT 
The study has  shown that completely automatic "hands-off" fault isolation 
to the line replaceable unit (LRU) is feasible in approximately 60 percent of all 
cases. In the remaining 40 percent, the crew involvement var ies  f rom a simple 
keyboard input calling up a fault isolation routine to manual fault isolation of the 
LRU with portable test equipment. The concept of requiring the crew member to  
call up the fault isolation routine in certain cases  allows him to exercise his 
judgment as to when fault isolation and reconfiguration will occur so as not to 
interrupt any critical operations which may be ongoing at the time. 
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Manual fault isolation is required for several  failure categories. For 
example, leaks in the pressure  shell will be isolated by the use  of portable ultra- 
sonic detectors. Leaks and blockages in fluid and gas lines cannot always be 
isolated by inplace instrumentation; thus, manual intervention is required. 
Operational tes t s  requiring the participation of the astronaut have also been 
identified. These include communication link tes t s  where operational performance 
is the best indicator of link health and display tes t s  where visual assessment of 
a test pattern is required. 
Repair (if  any) and replacement of failed components of course must be 
done by the astronaut. 
Most of the effort identified during the study with which the crew must 
become involved is associated with fault isolation and periodic checks and cali- 
brations. Although no quantitative assessment of astronaut time involving these 
functions was made, both functions occur relatively infrequently and are not 
expected to occupy a significant amount of crew time. 
2.7 SOLAR ARRAY ANALYSIS 
An analysis was made to determine the requirements for  onboard checkout 
of an Electrical Power Subsystem for Space Station containing a solar  panel a r r ay  
as the prime power generator. This effort was directed by MSC in addition to  the 
analysis of the isotope/Brayton cycle nuclear power generator in the original 
study baseline. The solar a r r ay  power generator analyzed is as described in 
DRL No. MSC T-575, Line Item B, entitled 'Solar-Powered Space Station P r e -  
liminary Design, '' Volume 11. 
The approach taken to  th i s  analysis was to  identify the changes in study 
results obtained from analysis of the original baseline due to the substitution of 
a Solar Array  System for the Nuclear System. These changes were identified 
for each of the subtasks performed on the original baseline subsystems. 
Revisions to component level data were required in the EC/LS, Structures, 
and Electrical Power Subsystems. The high temperature water interface between 
the EC/LS and Isotope/Brayton System was removed, elements were added t o  the 
Structures Subsystem to support the solar a r r ay  power boom, and a new Power 
Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution System was necessary to handle 
the change from an ac to dc power source. These changes, of course, required 
revisions to the LRU listing and the criticality analysis and FMEA. 
Except for specific maintenance concepts identified for the electrical power 
source, the concepts defined for the isotope/Brayton configuration are also applic- 
able to the solar a r r ay  configuration. 
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A capability for replacing the entire Space Station power boom module is 
provided in the NR baseline design. The probability of utilizing this capability 
would be extremely remote i f  individual solar panels were designed for replace- 
ment. Without this feature, there  is a high r i sk  of needing a new boom before 
the expiration of ten years. It is recommended, therefore, that the individual 
solar panels be replaceable e 
Measurements Stimuli 
System 
Total Power Supply 
Power Others Power Others 
Changes were also required in the measurements and stimuli required to 
implement automatic checkout in the EC/LS, Structures, and Electrical Power 
Subsystems, These changes a r e  detailed in Appendix I. Table 2-6 shows the 
impact of the solar  a r r ay  approach on the checkout data requirements. 
Average Data Bus 
Rate (BPS) 
Without With 
Limit Limit 
Check Check 
The large increase in measurements and stimuli is due to  requirements for 
measurements and control signals to  each cell of the multi-cell batteries of the 
Solar Array System. 
An additional integrated test has been identified since active DMS control is 
required for orientation of the solar a r r ay  panels. This function involves a DMS 
interface with the Electrical Power and Structures Subsystems. 
2.8 DATA WNAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The sum of the data handling and processing requirements determined from 
Task 1 and Task 2 was compared against the specified performance levels of the 
2- 14 
baseline Data Management Subsystem. This comparison was made to  identify in- 
adequacies in the baseline DMS. The DMS was analyzed with respect to  the 
following conditions: 
0 Computer execution speed 
0 Memory s ize  
0 Data bus loading 
a Flexibility 
With respect to these parameters,  no inadequacies were found to exist in 
the baseline Data Management Subsystem. 
An a rea  of special emphasis concerned the need for preprocessors  in the 
DMS. Two cases  were considered, i. e.,  the case where preprocessors  already 
exist in the subsystem (GN&C), and the case where preprocessors  would have to 
be added (all other subsystems). Based on the relatively light loads placed on 
the DMS components by the checkout task, no requirement for  preprocessors  
was identified where none exist in the baseline subsystems. In the GN&C Sub- 
system where preprocessors exist for operational purposes, their presence 
could be used for  checkout purposes to the extent that operational data is used by 
the checkout programs. However, this may not be cost effective due to additional 
software costs. A comparison of this type was not possible due to  lack of defini- 
tion of the proposed GN&C preprocessors,  and the question remains unanswered, 
A more viable option is the consideration of remote hardware limit-checking 
capability provided by the Remote Data Acquisition Units as a preprocessing 
function. Analyses have shown (Tables 2-5 and 2-6) that remote limit-checking 
reduces the data bus traffic where large amounts of data at high sample r a t e s  
must be limit checked (Solar Array Battery data for example) and more significant- 
ly reduces the load on the central  data processor at the cost of some additional 
hardware in the RDAU. This technique remains a preferred option although the 
savings in processor and data bus traffic must be traded against the hardware 
penalties for implementing the remote limit check capability. 
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Section 3 
BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
3 . 1  GENERAL 
This section describes the baseline Space Station subsystems which were 
analyzed to define onboard checkout requirements. In order to assess require- 
ments for onboard checkout, descriptions at the subsystem level and the assembly 
level are required, as well as the major interfaces between subsystems. 
The assembly level description for each of the subsystems (MSFC-DRL- 
160, Line Item 13) provided the primary working document for subsystem analy- 
sis. To reduce documentation, these documents have been incorporated by 
reference into this report. Therefore, where no significant differences exist 
from the Phase B definition, this report contains a brief subsystem description 
and an identification of the referenced document containing the assembly level 
descriptions for that subsystem. Where significant differences do exist, such as 
in the Data Management Subsystem, and the Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
(GN&C) System, the subsystem level description includes these changes in  as 
much detail as is available. MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 19, provided the major 
subsystem interface descriptions for analysis of integrated test requirements. 
3 . 2  GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
3 . 2 . 1  SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The GN&C Subsystem provides the following functions: 
0 
0 
0 
0 Navigation 
0 
0 
Orbit maintenance and change control 
Zero- g operation stabilization and attitude control 
Artificial-g operation dynamics and orientation control 
Command and monitor of rendezvous and docking 
Experiment pointing support and positioning control 
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The GN&C Subsystem senses and generates the commands and data for  these 
functions, and the Propulsion Subsystem and a par t  of the GN&C Subsystem (the 
control moment gyros) generate the actuation forces and torques for executing 
these functions. The sensing of Space Station position and its relative range and 
range rate with respect to other spacecraft are provided through the guidance and 
navigation functions, and the sensing of the Space Station attitude and angular ra tes  
a r e  provided through the controls function. 
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystem is shown in Figure 3-1. 
This subsystem consists of stellar-inertial sensors,  horizon sensors,  landmark 
trackers,  range and range rate  sensors ,  interface electronics, control logic and 
jet driver electronics, control moment gyros (CMGs) and associated electronics, 
and GN&C preprocessors. 
The GN&C Subsystem must accommodate both the artificial-g and zero-g 
operations of the Space Station. In the artificial-g mode of operation, the GN&C 
Subsystem provides spin control and wobble damping of the rotating Space Station. 
The horizon crossing indicator sensor provides an attitude reference for  the spin 
plane of the artificial-g mode. 
nals necessary for  the wobble damping function. In the zero-g mode of operation, 
the GN&C Subsystem provides autonomous navigation, rendezvous command, 
traffic control, automatic docking, and stabilization and control of the Space 
Station. 
The attitude gyro package provides the rate  sig- 
The autonomous navigation scheme utilizes the stellar inertial reference data 
and the automatic landmark tracker augmented with the drag accelerometer. The 
navigation is accomplished by automatically tracking known and unknown landmarks 
several  times each orbit. The landmark tracker is similar in operation and mech- 
anization to a gimbaled star tracker.  The drag accelerometer accounts for anom- 
alies due to Space Station orientation and docked module changes which contribute 
to navigation e r ro r s .  
Both ground tracking and onboard subsystems wil l  provide the navigation 
information for  the first few years  of the Space Station Program. The ground- 
generated data will be transmitted onboard f o r  evaluation of the autonomous 
navigation system performance. A s  the confidence in autonomous operation is 
increased through this parallel operation, the ground tracking is to be phased out. 
The rendezvous and traffic monitor functions a r e  accomplished through the 
use of a communication/ranging system for ranges up to 1, 000 nmi and with laser 
t rackers  within 110 nmi of the Space Station. The laser t rackers  a r e  gimbal 
mounted to provide spherical coverage around the Space Station. 
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Figure 3- 1. Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystem 
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For docking, each docking port is equipped with a laser  docking transmitter/  
receiver to provide for automatic docking capability. 
Attitude and rate  information for attitude control and experiment support is 
determined by both Earth-centered and inertial orientations. 
In all operating modes and orientations, the gyros provide the high-frequency 
rate  and attitude information necessary to 'supplement the data from the stellar 
sensors and the horizon sensors.  The horizon sensors  a r e  used for  initial ac- 
quisition of the Earth-referenced coordinates. 
reference which is used when fine pointing or inertial attitude information is not 
required . 
They also provide a coarse Earth 
A more accurate Earth-centered reference is obtained in the horizontal 
orientation through the use of the strapdown star sensors.  The star sensors  
provide the long-term, drift-free inertial reference data while the gyros provide 
the short-term, high-frequency attitude and rate  information. The passive star 
sensors a r e  used while the Space Station is maintained in an Earth-centered 
orientation. The constant rotational rate required of the vehicle to maintain this 
type of orientation provides the scanning motion for  the star sensors ,  which a r e  
completely passive and provide no tracking or  scanning capability of their own. 
The sensors themselves provide inertial attitude data which is transformed into 
Earth-centered attitude information by use of the navigation parameters. By this 
method, both inertial attitude and Earth-centered attitude are derived from the 
passive star sensors while the vehicle is in the horizontal or other Earth-centered 
orientation. This Earth-centered orientation is considered to be the most re- 
sponsive to experiment and subsystem requirements. 
The gimbaled s ta r  t rackers  a r e  primarily utilized whenever the Space Station 
is required to maintain an inertial orientation. Because of the lack of angular ro- 
tation of the Space Station in th i s  orientation, the sensors must provide their  own 
tracking and scanning capability to acquire and track the desired reference stars. 
Primary attitude control actuation is provided by control moment gvros 
(CMGs). A CMG configuration utilizing four double-gimbaled CMGs, each having 
a momentum capacity of 1, 100 ft-lb-sec, was selected for the isotope/Brayton- 
powered Space Station. Both high and low-thrust propulsion systems a r e  utilized 
by the GN&C subsystem for CMG desaturation and backup attitude control capa- 
bility. The reaction jet driver electronics provide the interface with the Propul- 
sion Subsystem. 
Computational capability is provided by the Space Station operations multi- 
processor and the GN&C preprocessors. The preprocessors and the multi- 
processor provide the link between the sensors ,  which a r e  used to determine 
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the vehicle angular position, and the actuators, which a r e  used to maintain or 
change the vehicle angular position. 
necessary data formatting in addition to routine data processing for the individual 
sensor subsystem. The Space Station operations multiprocessor performs the 
data processing necessary for all guidance, navigation, and attitude control 
functions. The interface electronics assemblies control the flow of information 
from the sensors to the GN&C preprocessors and condition all sensor inputs to 
standardized levels. The output from the GN&C preprocessors is then routed to 
the operations multiprocessor via the Space Station Data Bus. The interface 
electronics assemblies perform a s imilar  function for  output information f rom the 
computer to the control actuators. 
The GN&C preprocessors perform the 
3.2.2 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS 
Descriptions of the GN&C Subsystem assemblies are provided in the Space 
Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 4, Utility Services. 
descriptions include discussions of major assemblies, physical characterist ics,  
block diagrams, and interfaces. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is incorporated by 
reference into this  report as a detailed description of the GN&C Subsystem major 
assemblies and wil l  become the primary working document for  fur ther  analysis. 
These 
3 . 3  ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM 
3 .3 .1  SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The EC/LS Subsystem provides cabin atmosphere control and purification, 
water and waste management, pressure suit  support, and thermal control for  the 
entire Space Station. 
The atmosphere is nearly that at sea  level; however, in accordance with the 
guidelines and constraints, the system is designed t o  operate in  a variable atmos- 
phere of 10.0 to  14.7 psi, with a partial pressure of oxygen constant at 3.1 psi, 
regardless of the total pressure. 
Two 12-man subsystems a r e  provided, one for the compartment (defined 
as a volume of space enclosed by pressure-resistant structure) which includes 
decks 1 and 2 ,  and one for  the compartment that includes decks 3 and 4. The 
tunnel can be referenced to either subsystem. 
The subsystem provided has full H 0 recovery; that is, more water is re- 2 covered in the Space Station than is required for  drinking and washing. The sub- 
system also has partial 0 recovery; the shortage is made up by water contained 
in the food. 2 
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The EC/LS Subsystem provides methane and unreacted CO to the Propul- 2 
sion Subsystem which uses  these gases as propellants for  orbitkeeping and control- 
moment gyro desaturation. 
The total heat generated in the Space Station is rejected to space through a 
segmented radiator integrated with the micrometeoroid shield independently of 
the heat distribution between compartments. 
The assemblies provided in decks 1-2 and decks 3-4 each have the capa- 
bility to support 12 men. The tunnel atmosphere can be interchanged with either 
system through the valving and interconnecting ducting; however, the atmosphere 
for  decks 1-2 and that  for decks 3-4 a r e  not intermixed normally through the 
ventilation system. Cross-linking between assemblies is provided, however, to 
allow one assembly to serve as an installed spare  for  the other. 
If a major emergency occurs, such as a f i re ,  decompression, or  massive 
contamination, it will affect only the atmosphere in half of the Space Station. The 
crew will always be able to live in the other compartment within the time limit 
established by the amount of consumables on board at the time of the emergency. 
This concept also easily accommodates the 24-man crew during the overlap period. 
The thermal control circuits a r e  also designed to be completely independent so  
that if f ire disables the heat-transport loops in either compartment, it does not 
affect the entire Space Station. 
Cooling and heating requirements a r e  satisfied independently for each of the 
Space Station common modules and to minimize the probability of a full loss of the 
Thermal Control System. However, controls a r e  also provided whereby these 
heating and cooling loads may be accommodated independently of their distribution 
between common modules. As a limit, either common module system can accom- 
modate full crew and electrical loads. Because all critical electrical equipment 
is duplicated within the two common modules, thermal control capability is es- 
sentially duplicated. One limitation is that total available radiator area is neces- 
s a ry  to reject total cooling loads under design environmental conditions. For 
this reason and because radiator failures may be difficult to repair ,  full redun- 
dancy is provided in the radiator circuitry. Segmentation and circuit isolation 
further protect against major Thermal Control System loss. 
3 .3 .2  ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS 
Descriptions of the EC/LS Subsystem assemblies a r e  provided in the Space 
Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 3, Crew Systems. These 
descriptions include block diagrams, discussions of assembly groups, assemblies 
and major subassemblies, physical characteristics summary, and interface de- 
scriptions. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is incorporated by reference into this 
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report as a detailed description of the EC/LS Subsystem assembly group, assem-' 
blies, and major subassemblies will become the primary working document for 
further analysis. 
3 . 4  RF COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
3 . 4 . 1  SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The Communications Subsystem comprises all equipment necessary for  
transmitting and receiving, tracking and ranging, command, multiple voice and 
television information, and broadband experiment data. The major RF sub- 
system equipment consists of K -band high gain and VHF/S-band/K -band low 
gain (omnidirectional) antennas, preamplifiers, receivers,  transmfiters with 
appropriate switching and multiplexing units, signal interface modems, and 
ranging unit. 
U 
The Communications Subsystem provides a radio frequency (RF) interface 
between the Space Station and the ground stations, either directly o r  indirectly, 
through a Data Relay Satellite System (DRSS), independent f ree-f lying experiment 
modules (FFM), and logistics vehicles (LV). 
The transmission and reception of television, multiple voice, and digital 
information between the Space Station and ground stations through the DRSS will 
be provided by a K -Band System. This link employs three uplink and downlink 
K -band RF c a r r i s s  operating at frequencies between 13 and 15 GHz. The K - 
Band System consists of (1) four high-gain parabolic reflectors for  normal opera- 
tion, (2) transmitters and receivers,  and (3) signal interface modems that sum, 
separate,  and condition the incoming and outgoing signals. 
U U 
In addition to the DRSS link, direct communications to the ground at S-band 
are required during the early mission phases. Uplink and downlink voice, digital 
data, and ranging capability wil l  be provided by an S-band transponder compatible 
with the MSFN. An S-band F M  transmitter is provided on the Space Station to 
permit an Apollo-type television signal, o r  wide-band real-time or  stored data 
to be transmitted to the existing MSFN facilities. The S-band circuits transmit 
and receive through a low gain antenna system. 
The Communications Subsystem provides the capability for  simultaneously 
receiving up to 10 channels of video and digital data and transmitting command 
and ranging information from and to the F F M s  at K -band. One of the four high 
gain antennas is utilized to support the F F M s  while in the normal stationkeeping 
loop. During docking and undocking operations, the K -band Low Gain Antenna 
System provides the required coverage. 
U 
U 
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Two-way voice, data, and ranging communications between the Space Station 
and the Logistics Vehicles a r e  provided by transmitters and receivers in the VHF 
frequency range. A Low Gain Antenna System at VHF is utilized to provide es- 
sentially spherical coverage. This system also provides voice and low data ra te  
communications between the SS and DRSS during artificial gravity and contingency 
operations, Duplex voice and biomedical data reception capability from two crew- 
men engaged in extravehicular activity (EVA) has been provided at VHF. 
The Communications Subsystem equipment has been broken down into eight 
assembly groups and has been grouped primarily according to function as listed 
below: 
1. 
2. 
3. Free-Flying Module 
K -Band High Gain Antenna 
VHF/S-Band/K -Band Low Gain Antenna 
U 
U 
4. Data Relay Satellite System 
5. DRSS/FFM Common 
6. Ground (Direct) 
7. Shuttle 
8. Extravehicular A.ctivity 
The RF communications assembly groups interface directly with the analog 
distribution bus. 
mands from command decoders. 
to remote data acquisition units (RDAUS). Serial digital data s t reams a r e  ac- 
cepted from and provided to data terminals and modems which interface with the 
digital distribution bus. 
modems a r e  described under the Data Management Subsystem Description. 
The operation of the subsystem is controlled by discrete com- 
Monitor and checkout information is provided 
The command decoders, RDAUs and data terminals, and 
3 4 . 2  ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS 
Descriptions of the Communications Subsystem assemblies are provided in 
the Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 2,  Space Station 
Electronics. 
subassemblies, physical characteristics summary, control inputs, monitor out- 
puts, and a table of interface characteristics. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is 
incorporated by reference into this report as a detailed description of the RF 
These descriptions include block diagrams, discussions of major 
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Communications Subsystem major assemblies and subassemblies and will become 
the primary working document-for further analysis. 
3 . 5  ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 
3 . 5 . 1  SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The function of the Electrical Power Subsystem is to generate, condition, 
control, and distribute electrical power to the Space Station power-consuming 
subsystems. 
This section describes the isotope/Brayton cycle EPS and specifies its 
characteristics, design parameters, and overall performance. 
The Electrical Power Subsystem consists of four major subassembly 
groups: 
0 Power Source Assembly Group 
0 Energy Storage Assembly 
0 Power System Management Assembly 
0 Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution Assembly Group 
The Isotope/Brayton Power System employs radiative transfer from the 
isotope heat source a r r a y  to  the Brayton cycle heat exchanger. This arrange- 
ment permits Power Conversion System (PCS) module replacement without cutting 
high temperature lines. The central element is the PCS-heat exchanger module, 
which has been designed not only for long system lifetime, but also to  allow rapid 
changeout of a failed module. 
The output of the power source assembly group is 29.8 kWe of 1200-Hz, 
120/208-vac, three-phase electrical power, with 14.9 kWe provided by each PCS. 
The electrical power is delivered to separate source buses, which represent the 
initial elements of the transmission, conditioning, and distribution assembly 
group. 
The energy storage assembly provides stored energy for following the 
variable vehicle power loading while maintaining constant Brayton cycle power 
loading, provides emergency power for a minimum of 1 hour for crew escape 
or  Station reactivation, and provides initial power for Station activation. 
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The power management assembly provides control and display functions 
for  all EPS assemblies and interfaces with the Central Control Stations, the Data 
Management Subsystem, and the Onboard Checkout System. 
In addition to the 29.8 kWe total of electrical power, which corresponds 
to 25 kWe average available at the ac and dc load buses, 4 . 0  kWt of thermal 
power (2.0 kWt f rom each heat source) is extracted as waste heat at 250 F for  
use by the EC/LS Subsystem. 
EPS is 25 kWe plus 4 kWe, o r  29 kW at the load buses. This performance is 
uniquely available f rom this system. 
0 
Consequently, the equivalent rating of the I/Br 
The heat source is a Pu-238 isotope IRV radiantly coupled to a Brayton 
Cycle Conversion System generating 14. 9 kWe at the alternator terminals after 
losses fo r  PCS control, monitoring, and pumping. 
Thermodynamic energy not converted to electricity is transferred f rom 
the Xe-He Brayton cycle working fluid to a recirculating FC-75 liquid radiator 
loop through a heat rejection heat exchanger. The mechanical losses of the 
Combined Rotating Unit (CRU) and the generator losses  a r e  transferred to a 
parallel cooling loop through a separate heat exchanger. 
Conversion of thermal power to electrical power is performed by a re- 
cuperated Brayton cycle loop using a single-shaft CRU with a Rice alternator 
operating at 36,000 rpm. 
a r e  established by the operating temperature ratio (heat sink heat exchanger 
temperature versus heat source heat exchanger temperature), and the projected 
PCS performance is based on extrapolation of Brayton B engine test data. PCS 
parasitic losses (pump and electrical power control) a r e  deducted from the al- 
ternator output. The overall system efficiency of 25.8 percent is based on iso- 
tope heat production (end-of-life) and power available a t  the electrical load bus 
for subsystems and experiments. 
The indicated performance and state point conditions 
3 .5 .2  ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
Descriptions of the Electrical Power Subsystem assembly groups and 
assemblies a r e  provided in the Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, 
Volume I, Book 1, Electrical Power. These descriptions include discussions 
of the assembly groups and assemblies , physical characteristics, block diagrams 
and drawings, and design characteristics. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2,  is in- 
corporated by reference into this report as a detailed description of the Electrical 
Power Subsystem assembly groups and assemblies and wil l  become the pr imary 
working document for further analysis. 
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3.6  PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM 
3 .6 .1  SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The Space Station Propulsion System is required to perform the following 
functions: 
0 Provide attitude control, maneuvers, and docking functions prior 
to initial operations 
0 Perform spin/despin maneuvers for the artificial-g experiments 
0 Provide attitude control (wobble damp) during artificial-g 
experiment periods 
0 Perform orbit-keeping 
0 Provide control during docking maneuvers 
0 Provide backup attitude control 
To accomplish these functions, a two-system propulsion subsystem was  
selected. A low-thrust, resistojet thrustor system using biowaste gases 
(CH , CO as propellant will  perform orbit-keeping and can, if desired, de- 
4 
saturate tzk CMGs. All other functions will be performed by a high-thrust, 
monopropellant hydrazine (N H ) system. 2 4  
The use of a biowaste resistojet system for orbit-keeping minimizes re- 
supply, provides a useful method of biowaste disposal, minimizes contamination, 
and produces a near zero-g acceleration. A hydrazine high-thrust system fo r  
high torque, high impulse functions minimizes contamination and maximizes 
ease of maintenance. 
The large quantities of propellant required for  spin/despin maneuvers 
(6250 pounds per maneuver) prohibits initial loading, which necessitates resupply 
capability to be included in  the design. 
by bulk fluid transfer from the Advanced Logistic System (ALS) cargo module. 
This resupply can best be accomplished 
The Low-Thrust Propulsion System consists of five major assemblies: 
0 Collection and Storage Assembly 
0 Water Supplement Assembly 
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0 Propellant Flow Control and Selection Assembly 
0 Thruster Assembly 
0 Power Distribution and Control Assembly 
The High-Thrust Hydrazine Subsystem consists of seven major assemblies 
o r  assembly groups: 
0 High Presssure  Storage Assemblies 
0 Pressure Control Assembly 
0 Propellant Tankage Assemblies 
0 Thruster Modules 
0 Resupply Assemblies 
0 Purge/Cleaning Assembly 
0 Propulsion Fault Isolation and Detection Assemblies 
3 .6 .2  ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTION - 
Descriptions of the Propulsion Subsystem assemblies and assembly groups 
a r e  provided in the Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 
4 ,  Utility Services. These descriptions include discussions of the major assem- 
blies and assembly groups, block diagrams and drawings, and interfaces. DRL 
13, Volume I, Book 2, is incorporated by reference into this report  as a detailed 
description of the Propulsion Subsystem major assemblies and will become the 
primary working document for  further analysis. 
3 .7  DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3 . 7 . 1  SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The DMS consists of the necessary equipment to transfer,  s tore ,  and pro- 
cess  data to and from users  and subsystems. A s  such, it acquires and conditions 
a wide variety of input data from experiments, vehicle subsystems sensors,  up- 
linked ground communications, and astronaut-activated controls. 
Figure 3-2 depicts the DMS baseline configuration. Individual subsystem 
descriptions a r e  provided because of the differences between the study baseline 
and the MDAC/IBM Phase B configuration. 
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Figure 3-2. Data Management Subsystem Baseline 
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The DMS Computer Subsystem is comprised of: 
0 One - Space Station Operations Multiprocessor (3 CPUs) 
0 One - Space Station Experiment Multiprocessor (3 CPUs) 
0 Shared Main and Auxiliary Memories 
0 Bulk Data Storage 
0 Switching Matrices 
Figure 3-3 depicts a functional block diagram for  the Computer Subsystem. 
A lower level functional diagram of the individual Computer Subsystem com- 
ponents is given in Figure 3-4. 
The six processors  (CPUsl a r e  identical in size and architecture and can 
provide a backup capability for one another. The main memory (256 K words) 
and the auxiliary memory (2.5 M words) a r e  shared between all the CPUs and 
can be individually addressed through the memory switch matrix, by any of the 
six CPUs. These memories will be primarily used for the storage of subroutines 
and data that require rapid access  from the CPUs. In addition, these memories 
can be addressed directly from the data bus €or direct  storage of uplinked pro- 
gram modifications and acquired data. 
lithic memory units and the auxiliary memories a r e  a combination of high speed 
magnetic tape, incremental tape, and magnetic disc units. 
The main memories a r e  high speed mono- 
The bulk data storage uses ultra high density magnetic tape recorders  and 
is configured to meet large data volume storage requirements with a relatively 
slow access speed. Its use is primarily for  recording digital data before onboard 
processing or  before return to earth for ground processing. As such, it will  be 
the last level of memory in the Processing Subsystem and will s tore  infrequently 
used information not requiring rapid access,  such as maintenance procedures, 
spare  parts inventories, or information that may be stored off line. The bulk 
data storage consists of the following elements: 
0 Tape Transports 
0 Tape Transport Controllers 
0 Digital Buffer and Control Unit 
0 Re cor d/Reproduce E le c tronic s 
0 Switching Matrices 
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The Data Acquisition and Distribution Subsystem is comprised of the following 
elements: 
e Data Bus 
0 Digital Data Bus Terminals 
0 Remote Data Acquisition Units 
0 Local Monitor and Display Units (LMDU) 
This subsystem is used by the DMS to distribute all necessary commands and 
acquire all required data or  command responses for  Space Station operation, 
experiment control/monitoring, and f o r  all OCS functions. Additionally, the 
data bus is used f o r  the distribution of all intercommunication and entertainment 
audio and video signals. 
The data bus consists of redundant coaxial command and response lines 
(4 total) linking together all primary elements of the DMS.’ A total data rate 
greater than 50 megabits per second should be considered for this application. 
Twisted wire  pairs o r  other suitable transmission lines are used for  secondary 
data distribution common to individual data bus terminals and transmission of 
warning alarm signals to and from LMDUs. 
The digital data bus terminals a r e  configured for modularity and interface 
commonality. 
interfaces each with individual bit rates of 1 MHz or less. Each interface is 
isolated to prevent propagating a data source failure to another interface. A 
switchable modem is used as  the data bus interface. The switching feature per- 
mits the modem to interchange its command and response lines such that an off- 
line data dump to a selected subsystem (i. e. , bulk data storage) can be effected 
with the stated data bus configuration (i. e. , separate command and response 
lines). Clock logic is modular and divides the data bus clock to the frequencies 
required by the subsystem/experiment interfaces. Buffer storage is also modular 
and may be provided for any o r  all inputs individually. This feature allows storage 
to be tailored to a particular interface data rate. The DMS control would effi- 
ciently utilize this  storage by (1) sending a control word to cause the terminal to 
sample its inputs, and at a la ter  time (2) sending a control word to request a data 
dump. An additional interface is provided to address the stimuli generators and 
other required discrete signal outputs. The terminal would be used, via a DMS 
control word, to energize a particular stimuli generator channel, o r  provide a 
control function (discrete signal) output. A self-check feature is provided to allow 
OCS fault isolation to a particular unit. 
This terminal is designed to handle eight standard four-wire 
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The Remote Data Acquisition Unit can be considered as a subsystem/ex- 
periment preprocessor and is designed to interface directly with the digital data 
bus terminal. The RDAU performs five functions on analog and digital signals. 
These are:  signal conditioning, multiplexing, A/D conversion (analog only), limit 
checking, and digitizing to format the data into the standard digital format fo r  
transmission to the data bus. Signal conditioning is accomplished through a pro- 
grammable gain amplifier or  both programmable gain amplifier and a precon- 
ditioning (ahead of the multiplexer) network. The RDAU inputs may be discrete 
(on-off) o r  analog signals, but must be preconditioned to the proper working vol- 
tage prior to multiplexing. The A/D converter output is digitally compared with 
high and low limits extracted from a self-contained read/write memory. If the 
measured parameter exceeds either limit, the return data is flagged so  the DMS 
processor is aware of any failures or  out-of-tolerance conditions. The l imits can 
be changed and adjusted to changing operational conditions by appropriate com- 
mands from the DMS/OCS processors.  
Operation of the RDAU is under direct control of the DMS processor which 
transmits control information via the data bus using a standard word format con- 
taining the address of the RDAU and the appropriate instruction codes. Three 
operating modes a r e  provided as described below. 
0 Compare Mode - The device sequentially scans the input channels and 
compares the digitized measurements with upper and low limits stored 
in the device memory, No action is taken unless an out-of-limit con- 
dition is detected, in which case an e r r o r  message is formatted fo r  
transmission to the DMS processor. The stored limit values may be 
changed at any time under processor control. Individual channels may 
also be inhibited from generating e r r o r  messages. These capabilities 
allow the limit check profile of each RDAU to be adjusted to accom- 
modate changing operating modes or  conditions of the equipment. 
0 Sequential Output - The device sequentially scans the input channels 
and transmits the digitized measurements to the processor. Limit 
checking is inhibited. 
0 Single Channel Output - The device selects a single input channel whose 
address is specified in the control word and transmits the digitized 
value to the processor. The channel may be sampled once or re- 
petitively. Limit checking is inhibited. 
RDAU inputs may be either discrete (on-off) or  analog signals, but must 
be preconditioned to a specified voltage range. The baseline configuration 
accepts discrete inputs of 0 or  5 Vdc and analog inputs in four ranges of 0-20 mV, 
0-50 mV, 0-100 mV, and 0-5V. Other voltage levels may be accommodated if 
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required, at the expense of additional signal conditioning circuitry in the device. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the ability to  accommodate the development 
and evolutionary growth expected to occur in the Space Station dictates the necessity 
to establish standard interface specifications which do not impose unreasonable 
constraints on either the Data Acquisition System or the data sources. Precon- 
ditioning of data at the source satisfies this requirement by providing an easily 
definable interface which is compatible with established instrumentation practices, 
The RDAU basic configuration is a device with 32 analog and 32 discrete channels. 
Other configurations of varied capability a r e  also provided to attain a n  optimum 
distribution. The RDAU contains a self-test capability to allow fault isolation to 
the replaceable unit. A possible self-test concept is to provide calibration vol- 
tages, divided from the RDAU power input, into the input of the multiplexer. 
This would give an indication as to the operational status of the unit. 
The LMDU, shown in Figure 3-5, is primarily a n  RDAU with local cri t ical  
parameter display capability. It accepts both caution and warning functions and 
contains the necessary circuitry to: (1) monitor these critical functions continu- 
ously for out-of-tolerance conditions, (2) cause immediate activation of self- 
contained and external a larm indications, and (3) acquire caution and warning 
function data for nor mal checkout operations. Limit checking of cri t ical  function 
inputs is performed using the same methods and circuitry employed by the RDAU. 
Unlike the RDAU, however, the LMDU activates local a la rms  which are directly 
wired to the monitor circuitry. Transmission of critical function data to the cen- 
tral caution and warning displays is on the DMS data bus. In contrast to caution 
parameter limits, which can be changed by remote control, the stored limits for 
warning parameters are adjustable only by local manual replacement of individual 
memory modules. Detection of out-of-limit warning function activates audio and 
visual a la rms  located within the unit and, under CPU control, those located exter- 
nal to the unit. These include alarms in the Space Station's primary and secondary 
control centers, and as required i n  other LMDUs. Once initiated, caution and 
warning alarms remain active until reset .  A capability is provided for selectively 
inhibiting individual functions to accommodate changing operational conditions. 
All critical functions are also redundantly monitored via the normal DMS/OCS. 
The Space Station caution and warning function is considered a part of the 
O C S ,  but is implemented as a separate and redundant system for reliability. 
Critical measurements a r e  monitored and out-of-tolerance indications are pro- 
vided primarily through the use of Local Monitor and Display Units .  Warning 
functions a r e  those which, i f  out of tolerance, could present an immediate threat 
to crew life. Caution functions are those which, i f  out of tolerance, could resul t  
in major degradation of Space Station performance unless specific crew action is 
taken. 
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Figure 3-5.  LMDU Block Diagram 
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A functional block diagram of the caution and warning function is shown i n  
Figure 3-6. The redundancy of the monitoring elements can easily be seen from 
this diagram. Detection of a n  out-of-tolerance condition causes the activiation of 
both visual and audible a la rms  to  notify the crew. Annunciator panels and LMDUs 
with appropriate displays are located in each crew compartment, where required, 
and on the central command and control consoles. The displays are coded (by 
color, tone, etc. ) to differentiate between the caution and warning levels of alarm. 
A manual override is provided for the audible alarm. 
The Image Processing Subsystem, as shown i n  Figure 3-7, provides onboard 
capability to: 
0 Provide quick look at experiment resul ts  
0 Calibrate/align experiment instruments 
0 Monitor and control experiments 
The Image Processing Subsystem is configured to  process 1923 images per  
8 hours, image content 2.5 x 106 bits each. The digital computer associated with 
this subsystem has tentatively been defined as the DMS Experiment Multiprocessor 
and is intended to be used for statistical evaluation of image data as well as de- 
rivation of annotation information. Requirements for Fourier transformations 
and convolution processing, in  respect to  additional special purpose digital pro- 
cessing equipment, a r e  being analyzed. 
An experimenter's station is provided which consists of an  experimenter's 
console and display. The console communicates with the experiments it controls 
and with the computer and analog processor (adjustable multichannel filter). Each 
station display will have two CRTs for comparing images driven by the working 
video storage o r  by the computer. 
The central element of the system is the Experimenter's Console which 
contains displays for film and image information generated in  analog form. The 
functions controlled from the console include: 
0 Adjustment of viewing instruments 
0 Annotations and editing functions for stored, processed, and 
transmitted image infor mation 
e Control of processing functions in a n  interactive manner 
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Figure 3-6. DMS/OCS Caution and Warning Functions 
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Figure 3-7. Image Processing Subsystem Functional Block Diagram 
3-23 
Film may be directly viewed using the film viewerheader;  This device, 
which provides for single-and multiple-frame analysis, consists of a screen for 
viewing or scanning, controls for image magnification and rotation, and a frame 
counter. 
The film scanner is employed to transform film images into a n  electrical 
signal. For this purpose, the unit employs a high resolution flying spot scanner 
which may be programmed to vary the electronic sweeps and scans of the unit in  
order to reduce nonlinearities or obtain data only on particular a r eas  of interest. 
The Command/Control and Display Subsystem (CCDS) is comprised of the 
following basic elements. 
0 Operations CCDS Center 
0 Experiment CCDS Center 
0 Portable Display and Control Units 
These units provide the primary human interface to the DMS/OCS. 
The Operations CCDS Center will be the primary central  command post for 
Space Station operations. This station provides monitoring and control capability 
of a l l  subsystem "housekeeping" activities, mission planning, and personnel/ac- 
tivities scheduling. This station will play a central, active role  during all rendez- 
vous and docking phases with other spacecraft and experimental modules and during 
ground communications for command and data transfer. 
The Experiment CCDS Center is a centralized operation center for monitor- 
ing and management of the experiment program. In addition, this station is capa- 
ble of providing emergency/backup vehicle and subsystem control capability i n  the 
event the crew is forced to evacuate the Primary Command and Control Center 
because of a major emergency condition. Because of this, the Experiment CCDS 
Center is located i n  a n  environmentally isolatable compartment. 
Displays and controls required at the experiment/Secondary Command and 
Control Center are basically the same as  those required by the primary center, 
in addition to  dedicated experiment displays and controls to permit complete mon- 
itoring and control capability over the experiment program. 
In addition to the primary and backup control centers, a number of small 
portable devices a r e  provided which contain alphanumeric displays and input key- 
boards. These devices may be plugged into the data bus at various locations 
throughout the Space Station and thereby provide an  operator with limited control 
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and display capability from remote locations. An example of their use would be in  
certain fault isolation situations where the operator finds it advantageous to oper- 
ate from a position adjacent to the equipment under test rather than from the ten- 
ter  location. 
The command/control and display stations, Figure 3-8, contain three multi- 
purpose CRT display devices (one primarily allocated to OCS functions) and two 
keyboards which provide backup redundancy. This dual design allows onboard 
checkout to be accomplished from th is  station by a second crew member on a non- 
interference basis while sharing common displays, readouts, status lights, etc. , 
if  necessary. Some special OCS peculiar displays such as status indicators, as 
well as special purpose OCS controls such as mode and function switches, are in- 
tegrated into the console in such a way as to permit access  by the OCS operator 
without interference with other console operations. The prime interface for dis- 
plays and controls to the Space Station is through the DMS multiprocessor com- 
puter via the data bus. The prime control/display devices providing the interface 
with the computer a r e  mode select switches, computer keyboard unit, and multi- 
purpose CRT displays. The keyboard and associated mode select pushbutton 
switches provide access  to and control of nonprogrammed computer operations 
and the CRT displays computer-generated alphanumeric/graphic information and 
stored/processed data. A secondary "hardwire" interface is provided for those 
functions, such as local controls and dedicated displays, which are wired directly 
and do not require transmission via the data bus. Intercom and Command Control 
Television (CCTV) control is provided by the Command/Control and Display Console 
(CCDC) via analog interface units. 
The GN&C preprocessors a r e  included within the DMS only to  the extent of 
their interconnection with the data bus through required data bus terminals. 
preprocessors and associated data bus terminals have been coilfigured for the 
GN&C Subsystem. These preprocessors provide the capability of operationally 
interfacing the individual GN&C sensors  and controls via required interface elec- 
tronic assemblies to the operations multiprocessor. In addition, it is anticipated 
that a significant amount of data for matting and "housekeeping" computations will 
be accomplished by these preprocessors, thereby relieving the overall operations 
multiprocessor load. Specific assignments of data formatting and computation to  
the individual GN&C preprocessors have yet to be determined. 
Five 
It is assumed that the preprocessors wi l l  be simplex, dedicated digital 
computers with a self-test capability. Specific signal conditioning for inputs and 
outputs to the GN&C sensors  and controls will  be accomplished by the interface 
electronics assemblies, a part of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control System. 
The preprocessor-to-data-bus interface will be through a standard data bus 
terminal. 
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3.7.2 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS 
Subsystem block diagrams and descriptions of the Data Management Sub- 
system assemblies not included here a r e  provided in  the Space Station MSFC- 
DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 2, Space Station Electronics. These 
descriptions include block diagrams, discussion of major subassemblies, physical 
characteristics, and interface descriptions. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is in- 
corporated by reference into this report  as a detailed description of the DMS as- 
semblies and, except where modified by this document, will become the primary 
working document for further analysis. 
3.8 STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM 
3.8.1 SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The Space Station structure consists primarily of four subsystem areas 
which wi l l  require checkout support. They are: 
0 Basic Structure 
0 Docking Mechanisms 
0 Spacecraft Access 
- Hatches 
- Airlocks 
- View Por ts  
0 Antenna Deployment Mechanisms 
3.8.1.1 Structure 
The basic Space Station structure provides the necessary pressurized habitat, 
equipment support, meteoroid protection, radiators, insulation, and docking inter- 
faces. Attainment of the required volume for the accommodation of crew, experi- 
ments, and subsystems within a 110,000-pound weight limit demands that the 
structure design be optimized. The structure must a lso have adequate factors of 
safety to satisfy the long life (ten years) requirements. The design uses  state-of- 
the-art materials, design, and fabrication techniques. 
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The external cylindrical pressure shell and the center tunnel structure a r e  
2219 aluminum alloy with integrally machined waffle stiffeners on the external 
shell  and integral stabilizing rings on the tunnel. Each two-deck module is closed 
at each end with a toroidal dome membrane. The equipment in each module is 
supported by the deck structure located halfway between the domes. The deck is 
formed by a radial  a r r ay  of beams extending from the center tunnel to the external 
pressure shell. The thrust loads in  the center tunnel structure are carried t o  the 
external pressure shell structure through a conic structure at the forward end of 
the station. 
ECS radiator, thermal insulation, meteoroid protection, and a pressure 
shell are integrated into a 4.5 inch thick sandwich design. The external surface 
of 0.020-inch beaded aluminum sheet serves  the dual function of being both the 
primary meteoroid bumper and the radiating surface for the ECS radiator. An 
inner, 0.010-inch corrugated aluminum sheet provides additional meteoroid pro- 
tection and limits insulation blanket damage over the 10-year life. The two 
bumpers a r e  supported by 1 section aluminum extrusions which contain dual pas- 
sages for the ECS radiator fluid. The 0. 110-inch, waffle stiffened pressure shell 
forms the interior surface of the sandwich. Tes ts  of this design at the MDAC 
light gas gun facility have indicated that the no meteoroid puncture probability of 
the pressure shell is 0.985 for ten years. 
3.8.1.2 Docking Mechanism 
The docking mechanism accomplishes the physical alignment of the vehicles, 
attenuates the relative closing velocities, and captures and rigidizes the two ve- 
hicles. In addition to the mating of the two vehicles, the system must accomplish 
the disconnection, detachment, and separation of the spacecraft from the Space 
Station. 
The conceptual design prepared for the docking mechanism and shock ab- 
sorber/actuator is described as follows. A gas spring is used for energy absorp- 
tion so that the pressure can be varied to accommodate wide variations in  the 
masses of the vehicles to be docked. A floating piston separates the gas from a 
low temperature hydraulic fluid. A s  the shock absorber strokes, the hydraulic 
fluid flows through a one-way valve and drives the floating piston down the shock 
absorber, doing work against the gas pressure. When the compression stroke is 
completed, the one-way valve prevents the shock absorber from springing back. 
A small  bypass orifice permits it to re turn at a slow, controlled rate to its initial 
extended length. The gas spring pressure can then be reduced for retracting the 
frame to the stowed position. 
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3.8.1.3 Access Hatches, Airlocks, View Ports  
In the evolution of the Space Station configuration, the requirement for crew 
access to the various compartments, docked modules, external portions of the 
station, and consideration of redundant transfer paths in case of emergencies is 
essential for crew safety considerations. While normal crew activities and access  
to experiment and cargo modules will  be accomplished in a shirtsleeve environ- 
ment, some contingency operations wi l l  require pressure suit and airlock transfer 
capzbilities. 
The requirement for two separately pressurized volumes has been provided 
by the two-deck, common module design approach; in addition, the 10-foot-di- 
ameter center tunnel provides a third pressure volume. The expendables com- 
partment is normally unpressurized except for shirtsleeve access  for maintenance 
and repair. The forward portion of the center tunnel can be used as an  airlock i f  
necessary . 
Each deck will  have a 5-foot-diameter clear opening access  hatch into the 
tunnel. These hatches wil l  be open for the normal traffic flow, but, in  cases of 
emergency, may be closed and sealed against fire, contamination, or depressur- 
ization in one of the common modules. If one of the common modules is depres- 
surized, the tunnel environment will  be referenced to the other common module 
environmental control system. Using pressure suits, the crew may then reenter 
the depressurized module for inspection and repair  through the fixed airlock. 
This airlock will  a lso permit access to  the outside of the Space Station from either 
of the common modules for normal EVA activities. 
3.8.1.4 Antenna Deployment Mechanism 
The Space Station requires four 15-foot diameter communications antennas 
to provide high-gain R F  acquisition and continuous tracking of relay satellites. 
These antennas a r e  stowed during launch under the nose fairing together with the 
artificial-g telescoping spoke. Upon reaching orbit and ejection of fairings, the 
antenna mounting booms shall be extended and locked in operating position until 
artificial gravity operation. The antenna mounting boom requires the capability 
of being retracted and locked i n  a low inertia position during the artificial gravity 
mode. The antenna shall have a two-axis gimbal positioner located at the antenna 
end of the mounting boom. The azimuth axis shall be parallel to the Space Station 
Z axis. Each antenna shall be capable of scanning 360 degrees in azimuth and 
from +75 degrees to -10 degrees in elevation. During maintenance, the antennas 
shall be retracted to air lock ports where the back side of the antenna is accessible 
to intervehicular astronauts. The antenna locations shall be 45 degrees off the 
major Y-Z axes. The antenna masts are fixed length and actuated by an electric 
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motor drive t ra in  located at the hinge line. Flexible power and signal leads must 
be provided at the hinge to provide power to the antenna drive and to transmit 
position signals. In addition, a swivel type waveguide must be provided at the mast 
hinge line. 
3.8.2 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS 
Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 8, Volume V, Book Mechanical, 
contains a description of the mechanical subsystem elements sufficiently detailed 
for checkout requirements analysis purposes and will  become the primary work- 
ing document for this purpose. MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 8, Volume V, Book 6, 
is incorporated into this report  by reference. 
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Section 4 
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES 
4 . 1  CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
A s  a guide to emphasis in subsequent checkout technique studies, an analysis 
has been made of the overall subsystem and major component criticality (failure 
probability) of the Space Station subsystems and equipment. A s  an input to the 
Checkout Requirements Analysis Task, this data along with the failure mode and 
effects data will be useful in determining test priorit ies and test scheduling. 
Additionally, this data will aid in optimizing checkout system design to ensure 
that confidence of failure detection is increased in proportion to added system 
complexity and cost. 
4.1.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
A criticality number (failure probability) was generated for each major 
subsystem component. This number is the product of: (1) the component failure 
rate (or  the reciprocal of mean-time-between-failure), (2) the component's 
anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital t ime period of six months, or 
4,380 hours. Six months was chosen as the time period of interest to  allow one 
missed resupply on the basis of normal resupply occurring at three-month intervals. 
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component 
over any six-month time period. 
For visibility, the major components of each subsystem analyzed have been 
ordered according to the magnitude of their criticality numbers.' This number, 
however, should not be considered as an indication of the real r isk involved, since 
it does not take into account such factors as redundant components, subsystem 
maintainability , and the alternate operational procedures available. 
Overall subsystem criticality has  been determined by a computerized 
optimization process whereby spares  and redundancy a r e  considered in t e rms  of 
a trade-off between increased reliability and weight. This determination, there- 
fore, reflects not only the failure probability of subsystem components, but also 
the probability that a spare  or  redundant component may not be available to 
res tore  the subsystem to operational status. The methodology used is described 
in Section 9,  Long-Life Assurance Study Results, DRL 13 (Preliminary Subsystem 
Design Data), Volume I11 (Supporting Analyses), Book 4 (Safety/Long Life/Test 
Philosophy) f rom the MDAC Phase B Space Station Study. Component-level failure 
mode and criticality data a r e  presented in subsequent paragraphs. 
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4 . 1 . 2  SUBSYSTEM CRITICALITY DATA 
4.1.2.1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Subsystem has a six-month 
reliability of 0.998 and requires 1,000 pounds of spares  for i ts  achievement. An 
ordered ranking of GN&C component criticality is provided in Table 4-1. 
4.1.2.2 Propulsion 
The Propulsion Subsystem six-month reliability prediction with 600 pounds 
of spares is 0.992. The two independent low thrust systems with inherent replace- 
ment capability of many critical components provide a high degree of assurance 
that orbit -keeping functions will be sustained for a ten-year period. No single or  
credible combination of failures can cause loss of the Propulsion System. 
The criticality ranking of Table 4-2 indicates that the two-stage C02 and 
CH4 pumps a r e  the most critical. An additional spare  unit may qualify here  and 
greatly reduce the overall r isk of failure. 
4.1.2.3 Environmental Control and Life Sumort 
The Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (EC/LS) has a six- 
month reliability of 0.997 and requires 1,780 pounds of spares  for its achievement. 
An ordered ranking of EC/LS component criticality is provided in Table 4-3. 
Two completely independent EC/LS subsystems exist onboard the Space 
Station, either of which is capable of supporting the crewmen for extended periods 
of time. Table 4-3 ranks EC/LS components in an artificial worst case environ- 
ment reflecting nonexistence of any backup system, but also provides conditional 
criticalities assuming the availability to  both the backup subsystem and spares.  
4.1.2.4 R F  Communications 
The optimized six-month reliability prediction for the Communications 
Subsystem is 0.9972 with 562 pounds of spares.  This value assumes optimum 
performance of all components with no alternate paths of reception and trans- 
mission allowed. This value cannot be obtained directly from the criticality 
numerics given in Table 4-4. 
Loss of digital data transmission to ground via relay satellite would require 
either communicating directly with the ground until the failed component was r e -  
placed, o r  storing digital data for transmission at  a later t ime. This concept is 
reflected in the "conditional loss criticality" column of Table 4-4. 
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4.1.2.5 Structures 
Reliability for  the Structural and Mechanical Subsystem for six months is 
0.995 and requires 75 pounds of seals and meteoroid patches to achieve. This 
equates to a subsystem criticality numeric of 5 x 10-3 for each six-month orbital 
interval. This value implies that there is a 0.5 percent r isk that adequate spares  
will not be available when required or that a puncture in the pressure shell will 
occur that cannot be repaired. Component-level criticality numbers in Table 4-5 
were estimated directly since conventional mean- t ime -between -failur e numerics 
a r e  not appropriate for structural components. 
4.1.2.6 Electrical Power 
The optimized six-month reliability for the Electrical Power Subsystem 
(EPS) is 0.997 and requires 1,300 pounds of spares  for i ts  achievement. An 
ordered ranking of EPS component criticality is provided in Table 4-6. 
4.1.2.7 Data Management Subsystem 
The Data Management Subsystem has a six-month reliability of 0.998. This 
figure is based upon the currently projected potential reliabilities of the compon- 
ents (some of which a r e  in the early development stage),critical failure definitions 
based upon preliminary DMS functional definitions, and adequate sparing. 
Criticality numbers for units which a r e  internally redundant cannot be established 
at this t ime since the actual values will depend upon detail design. No single 
failure or credible combination of failures can cause loss of the major DMS 
functions. Table 4-7 provides the ordered ranking of DMS components. 
4 . 2  FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
A preliminary FMEA was performed under Task 1 to allow work to proceed 
on subsequent subtasks of the Requirements Analysis and Concepts Task. However, 
resources available under Task 1 did not allow the analysis to be completed to  the 
depth desired. Redirection of Task 5, "Reliability, has released additional funds 
to increase the depth of this analysis. The preliminary analysis completed under 
Task 1, therefore, will not be reported here. The revised and improvised FMEA 
will be reported under Task 5. 
4 . 3  MAINTENANCE CONCEPT ANALYSIS 
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to 
facilitate their preservation o r  restoration to an operational state with a minimum 
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment. 
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The maintenance concepts defined here shall be used as guidelines in 
defining Line Replaceable Units in a subsequent subtask. 
4.3.1 GENERAL SPACE STATION MAINTENANCE POLICY 
It is a Space Station objective that all elements be designed for a complete 
replacement maintenance capability unless maintainability design significantly 
decreases program or system reliability. This objective applies to all sub- 
systems wherever it is reasonable to anticipate that an accident, wearout, o r  
other failure phenomenon will significantly degrade a required function. Estimates 
of mean -time -bet weenLf ailur e, or accident/f ailur e probability , a r e  not accepted 
as prima facie evidence to eliminate a particular requirement for maintenance. 
Should the accident/failure probability be finite, the hardware is to be designed 
for replacement if it is reasonable and practical  to do so. 
A s  a design objective, no routine or  planned maintenance shall require use 
of a pressure suit [either EVA or internal vehicular activity (IVA)] . Where 
manual operations in a shirtsleeve environment a r e  impractical, remote control 
means of affecting such maintenance or repa i rs  should be examined. However, 
EVA (or pressure suit IVA) is allowable where no other solution is reasonable, 
such as maintenance of external equipment. 
Time dependency shall be eliminated as a factor of emergency action insofar 
as it is reasonable and practical to  do so. This includes all program aspects of 
equipment, operations, and procedures which influence crew actions. When time 
cannot be eliminated as a factor of emergency action, a crew convenience period 
of 5 minutes is established as the minimum objective. The purpose of the con- 
venience period is to provide sufficient time for deliberate, prudent, and unhurried 
action. 
4.3.2 ONBOARD MAINTENANCE FACILITY CONCEPTS 
In addition to OCS/DMS capabilities, other onboard maintenance support 
facilities provided on the Space Station include: 
0 Special tools for mission-survival contingency repa i rs  such as soldering, 
metal cutting, and drilling, as determined from contingency maintenance 
analyses, although repa i rs  of this type a r e  not considered routine main- 
tenance methods. 
0 Protective clothing or protective work areas for planned hazardous 
maintenance tasks (such as those involving fuels, etc. ). 
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Automated maintenance procedures and stock location data for both 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair  activities. 
Real-time ground communication of the detailed procedures, update 
data, and procedures not carried onboard. 
Onboard cleanroom-type conditions by "glove box" facilities compatible 
with the level at which this capability is found to be required. 
Maintenance support stockrooms o r  stowage facilities for spares  
located in an a rea  that provides for ease of inventory control and 
ready accessibility to docking locations or transfer passages. 
4 . 3 . 3  SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS 
Space Station subsystems utilize modular concepts in design and emplace- 
ment of subsystem elements. Subsystem modularity enhances man's ability to  
maintain, repair, and replace elements of subsystems in orbit. Providing an 
effective onboard repair  capability is essential in supporting the Space Station's 
ten-year life span since complete reliance on redundancy to achieve the long life 
is not feasible. The need for a repair  capability, in turn, require6 that a mal- 
function be isolated to at least its in-place remove-and-replace level. The level 
of fault isolation is keyed to the LRU, which is the smallest modular unit suitable 
for replacement. The identification of subsystem LRUs is addressed as a 
separate, but interdependent, part  of the Onboard Checkout Study. 
Specific subsystem maintenance concepts, of course, depend upon examina- 
tion of the subsystems. These concepts are discussed in subsequent subparagraphs. 
General subsystem-related maintenance guidelines that have been established for 
the Space Station a re :  
0 It is an objective to design so that EVA is not required. However, EVA 
may be used to  accomplish maintenance/repair when no other solution 
is reasonable. 
0 Subsystems will be repaired in an in-place configuration at a level that 
is acceptable for safety and handling, and that can be fault-isolated and 
reverified by the integrated OCS/DMS. This level of maintenance is 
referred to as line maintenance and the module replaced to effect the 
repair is the LRU. 
0 A limited bench-level fault isolation capability will be provided on the 
Space Station, but is only intended for contingency (recovery of lost 
essential functions beyond the planned spares  level) or for development 
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purposes. Limited bench-level support is also provided in  the form 
of standard measurement capabilities which a r e  used primarily to 
reduce the amount of special test equipment required. 
e Subsystem elements, wherever practical, will be replaced only at 
failure or  wearout. Limited-life i tems that fail with t ime in a manner 
that can be defined by analysis and test  will be allowed to operate until 
they have reached a predetermined level of deteriorated performance 
prior to replacement. Where subsystem downtimes for replacement or  
repair  exceed desirable downtimes, the subsystem will include backup 
(redundant) operational capability to permit maintenance. Expendable 
i tems (filters, etc. ) will be replaced on a preplanned, scheduled basis. 
4 . 3 . 3 . 1  Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) 
The GN&C assemblies will be designed fo r  maintenance at the modular level 
except for the precision sensor assemblies. The sensor assemblies, in general, 
will be replaced as a unit because of the tight mechanical tolerances involved in 
the assembly packaging. The instrument gyros shall be replaceable individually 
from the gyro assembly; and all gyros shall be interchangeable. Onboard cali- 
bration of the gyros shall be used to define their sensitive axis alignment. 
The various control and interface electronics shall be contained in 
standardized plug-in modules. 
The control moment gyros shall be located in pressurized (or pressurizable) 
compartments for ready access  to maintenance. CMGs shall be designed for 
component repair/replacement capability. 
Trackers  and sensors  mounted externally shall be designed for retraction to 
permit repair  and replacement in a pressurized volume (shirtsleeve). To provide 
access to  the sensor for maintenance, the sensor mount is remotely hinged into 
the unpressurized sensor bay. A hatch is positioned over the opening, sealed, and 
the sensor bay is pressurized. Then, an access  hatch is opened f rom the common 
module to  allow sensor maintenance. Sensor alignment and calibration a r e  pro- 
vided by the calibration base, which is a structurally rigid elerrlent with alignment 
monitoring reflectors on the inside end and calibration targets on the outside end. 
After replacement and positioning of the sensor in i t s  operational configuration, 
the alignment monitor determines the calibration base alignment. The sensor is 
then pointed to acquire the targets on the calibration base while the corresponding 
sensor outputs a r e  read off for calibration. 
The laser docking t rackers  shall incorporate indicators at the docking safety 
officer station to indicate substandard performance with regard to cri t ical  
parameters subject to maintenance control. 
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4 . 3 . 3 . 2  Propulsion 
The Propulsion Subsystem design incorporates specific maintenance or 
related provisions to satisfy the provisions of the general Space Station main- 
tenance policy. The subsystem is designed for shirtsleeve maintenance, when- 
ever possible, and no EVA shall be required. 
Maintenance removal and replacement a r e  by components and/or assemblies; 
i. e . ,  no component adjustment and/or disassembly of components are necessary. 
No scheduled maintenance (remove and replace) is planned with the exception 
of filters. Critical failure modes have safeguards (backup/redundancy o r  auto- 
matic fault isolation) designed into the subsystem. 
The need for removal and replacement is determined by evaluation of: 
e Leak and functional checks 
e Actual life history of component and/or assemblies 
e Performance checks 
0 Past development results/history 
Safety provisions and/or procedures for normal crew maintenance opera- 
tions a r e  provided; for example, 
e Propulsion subsystem assemblies are housed/installed in un- 
pressurized (pressurizable) compartments. 
0 Propellant leak detection capability is provided in the compartments. 
e Decontamination/cleaning methods/procedures for "breaking" into the 
subsystem (i. e. , propellant removal from lines, components, filters, 
tanks, etc. ) shall be established. 
Reliability shall not degrade below the design reliability established. The 
design reliability is provided by: 
e Maintenance/replacement of components and assemblies to  meet 
design reliability requirements over a ten-year period. 
e Safety factors/working s t r e s s  levels that satisfy ten years  of 
operation/fatigue, creep, corrosion, etc. , wherever practical. 
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0 More redundancy and/or automatic fault isolation for critical malfunc- 
tion which affect safety of operations. The safety design feature must 
allow a missiqn operation to be completed (degraded performance al- 
lowed). This a lso allows maintenance t o  be scheduled whenever it is 
required. 
The subsystem maintenance and operational approaches listed above will 
normally provide an autonomous Propulsion Subsystem with the reliability and 
safety needed for a ten-year mission. These features allow a balanced subsystem 
design approach to be taken to obtain the high reliability and safety needed without 
excessive redundancy/backup and the resulting complexity, volume, and weight 
penalties. 
4 . 3 . 3 . 3  EC/LS 
The EC/LS Subsystem represents the largest maintenance workload and the 
greatest potential for commonality in design for maintenance. The EC/LS Sub- 
system will, for the most par t ,  be maintained at the component level, such as a 
fan or a valve. 
Consideration has been given to electrical design approaches that allow 
removal of electrical solenoids, transducers, etc. , with complete isolation f rom 
the pneumatic and/or fluid systems. Attach fittings permit easy removal and 
installation of devices with minimum use of screws and bolts. 
Filter elements are designed to  permit exchange without releasing liquids 
or noxious gasses.  The electrolysis cell stack is designed to be repaired at a 
module or subassembly level. If a single membrane fails, the entire module is 
replaced. Tanks a r e  replaceable and a r e  of a size that will pass  through the 
passageways to the logistics docking port. 
Two radiator control and two radiator recirculation assemblies are installed 
in the forward pressurizable equipment deck and two each in the unpressurized 
a rea  between Decks 2 and 3. Both of these a r e  maintainable in a shirtsleeve 
environment. 
Acceptable repair  t imes a r e  limited to 30 percent of the cri t ical  (maximum 
possible) downtime to maximize the probability of repair .  Note that cri t ical  down- 
tiines for the EC/LS Subsystem will be very long, generally because of the two- 
compartment design. 
Downtime allowable includes t ime for  recognizing and locating the problem, 
isolation time, 'replacement/repair time, delay time in initiating maintenance, 
recharge and/or res ta r t  t ime, and checkout time to determine if the system is 
performing correctly. 
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To minimize crew e r ro r ,  installation of replacement components or modules 
is planned as one-way-possible positioning. Labeling and coding should be employed 
liberally to aid maintenance. 
System design will emphasize commonality to reduce the number and types 
of spares  and, thus, crew training requirements. 
Maintenance ends ordinarily at the component level. However, consideration 
will be given to possible emergency repairs  below the component level by use of 
standard par ts  where feasible. 
Components shall be designed to be replaceable by one man, Modules, if 
required, may be replaced by two men. 
External (outside the vehicle) maintenance will be at a higher level than 
internal maintenance (i. e . ,  module, subsystem, or system rather  than component 
replacement ) . 
Hazardous maintenance (atmospheric contamination) and external maintenance 
(radiators) will be performed in a pressure suit, and subsystems are designed to 
permit this kind of maintenance. 
Components are isolated, removed, and replaced as follows: 
o Low-Pressure Air  Line - Simple clamp removal, no isolation required 
0 High-pressure Gas - Manually operated, isolation valves 
0 Fluid Lines - Special low leakage, component bypass maintenance 
disconnects 
Small components can be removed and replaced simultaneously, with the 
loss of a maximum of 0.1 cc of water, by an installation tool that pushes the 
replacement components into the manifold. The replacement component, i n  turn, 
pushes the failed component into an  empty sleeve. Large components are replaced 
by using the installation tool (plug) to remove the component and plug the manifold. 
All  equipment deemed critical to Space Station operation is duplicated so that 
cooling can be provided by either core module coolant water circuit, This system 
redundancy, together with the large core module atmosphere volumes, generally 
precludes the need for rapid fault isolation and repair .  
4 e 3 . 3 . 4  RF Communications 
The R F  Communications System is comprised of the High-Gain and Low- 
Gain Antenna Systems, transmitters and receivers,  and modems which interface 
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the transmitters and receivers with the analog distribution bus. Except for the 
High-Gain Antenna System which has the parabolic reflector, feeds, positioner, 
and low noise preamplifiers located at the end of a boom, and the low-gain antenna 
radiating elements which a r e  located on the surface of the pressure shell, the R F  
communications assemblies are located in either pressurized or pressurizable 
compartments. 
The high-gain parabolic antennas are designed to be rotated into the end 
docking port for maintenance. This requires the maintenance to  be performed in 
a space suit, but in a more compatible work position. The maintenance must be 
planned in less  than three-hour task elements because of portable life support suit 
(PLSS) use limits. 
Although undesirable, the Low-Gain Antenna System elements require re- 
placement by EVA. These elements a r e  currently inaccessible from the interior 
of the station. 
The transmitters,  receivers,  and interface modems are packaged in 
multiples of the 1.25-inch width of the standard 8 - x %inch electronic module 
described in DRL 13, Volume 1, Book 2, Space Station Electronics. Where possible, 
the assemblies have been sized so as not to exceed more than four standard widths. 
A notable exception is the S-Band power amplifier. Adherence to this packaging 
concept should facilitate maintenance and handling. 
4 . 3 . 3 . 5  Structures 
The structure is designed to permit on orbit maintenance of all leaks and 
punctures. Hatch mechanisms including seals, tracks, and ro l le rs  are replace- 
able. The external hatch seals  can be replaced in a pressurized volume by first  
docking a module to allow the docking well to be sealed and pressurized. The new 
seal  can be tested for leakage prior to de-docking the module by pumping down the 
dock area.  The same method is used to permit repa i rs  of the docking s t ru ts  and 
retraction mechanism. EVA is required for replacement of docking seals. 
Meteoroid punctures are repairable with internal patches on the smooth inner wall 
surfaces. Trade studies indicate that over 50 percent of the cabin wall is easily 
accessible. The low probability of puncture does not warrant weight for providing 
rapid access to the remaining wall areas .  Access is possible with removal of 
equipment but the interior arrangement penalty for instantaneous access  is not 
merited. 
Inflatable door seals  and door lock mechanisms fo r  tunnel doors and interior 
doors for the EVA airlock a r e  replaceable in a shirtsleeve environment. Windows 
may be replaced by use of a portable seal  and mechanical a r m  box, without losing 
pressure.  Leaks at the telescoping joints in the spoke will be sealed by local 
plugging. Mechanical drives for the PCU handling fixture, the cargo transfer 
fixture, isotope reentry vehicle (IRV) rotation mechanism, and experiment despin 
module a r e  repairable by component replacement. 
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4 . 3 . 3 . 6  Electrical Power 
The major maintenance activity for the Electrical Power Subsystem is 
associated with circuit breakers,  switches, inverters, battery chargers,  voltage 
regulators, etc. These a r e  replaceable items, and also contain replaceable 
function modules, such as electronic circuit cards.  Provisions a r e  made for 
switching in spare voltage regulators, battery chargers,  etc. , to permit main- 
tenance o r  replacement at connector plugs as required, except where flat wire 
circuits a r e  used in consoles. The inverters, voltage regulators and battery 
chargers a r e  bolted to cold plates using allen-head-type bolts and will require 
closely-controlled flat surfaces for contact to assure  heat transfer.  
Two spare  power conversion systems (PCS) for the two operating PCSs of the 
Isotope/Brayton Electrical Power System a r e  installed in the power module (part  of 
the core module), along with the remote handling mechanisms, carriages,  and 
closed circuit TV viewing links used for transferring the PCS during installation 
o r  interchange. The PCS has a 2 1/2-year design life. PCS exchange can be 
performed either remotely or  locally; however, work in this unpressurized com- 
partment must be accomplished in a space suit. The isotope reentry vehicle, 
including the heat source (HS), must be placed in the passive heat dump mode for  
dissipation of HS energy to space during the PCS transfer.  ZRV deployment for  
heat dumping is accomplished by rotation of the IRV hinge mechanism and IRV 
support ring out of the Space Station port and away from the heat source heat 
exchanger (HSHX) into a position 90 degrees (or more) away from the radiator in 
which it is cooled by radiation to space. The IRV/heat source is held in operating 
position by solenoid-operated shear pins which a r e  positively retracted during the 
deployment sequence. (Subsequent to launch if PCS power is lost, the pins fail in 
a retracted position. ) 
In the event of an abort or to release the IRV and heat source from the Space 
Station for  recovery, the shear pins a r e  first released and the IRV/heat source is 
moved to the deployed position by preloaded springs. Then the IRV/heat source is 
removed from the Space Station at the hinge attachment to  the support ring, using 
a number of explosive (squib-actuated) nuts. 
- 
When normal recovery by an  advanced logistic system is to  be accomplished, 
a remote manipulator on the Crew Cargo/Tug Module wil l  extract the deployed 
IRV/heat source from the mounting and t ransfer  it, first to the recovery support 
cradle, and then t o  the ALS cargo door opening while still contained within the 
recovery support cradle. A l l  operations wil l  be conducted to  incur minimum 
exposure to the crew from the unshielded IRV/heat source, using remotely con- 
trolled manipulators and closed circuit TV observation. 
4 . 3 . 3 . 7  Data Management Subsvstem (DMS) 
The DMS components a r e  primarily electronic and, as such, are designed for 
maintenance by replacement of the standard electronics module (previously) 
described) or  multiples thereof. 
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Large data and program storage devices, i. e . ,  tapes and discs,  a r e  electro- 
mechanical devices which will be derivatives of present day commercial equipment. 
These electromechanical devices a r e  subdivided for maintenance into modules. 
such as: 
0 Basic memory element modules 
e Mechanical modules 
o Electronic modules 
o Power supply modules 
Electronic modules for  these devices a r e  standard books or multiples unless 
operational or maintenance requirements dictate otherwise. 
The image processing components a r e  electromechanical-optical devices and 
a r e  subdivided for maintenance into the following: 
0 Mechanical/optical modules 
Electronic modules 
o Power supply modules 
Again, the electronics will be electronic book type modules. The command/ 
control and display group contains a conglomerate of equipment. Most electronics 
will be contained in the standard module. The cathode-ray-tubes will be container- 
ized so  that they can be handled in space with a minimum of hazard from implosion. 
Those peculiar circuits that require critical alignments to get the CRT to  function 
will be packaged as a part  of the CRT container. Alphanumeric displays, key- 
boards, function switches, and display light groups may also contain integral 
electronics to facilitate pre-installation adjustment, minimization of interface 
lines, and control of electromagnetic radiation. Where these factors are not 
pertinent, the electronics will be packaged in the standard book type modules. 
All  data management components will be located in pressurized (or pres-  
surizable) compartments for shirtsleeve maintenance. 
4 . 4  LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS 
General guidelines and cr i ter ia  for the definition of LRUs were established 
and these along with the maintenance philosophies reported in Section 4-3 were 
used to determine at what level line maintenance would be performed. For the 
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Space Station Subsystems ( less  DMS) specific justification applicable to LRU 
selection for the particular subsystem under examination was derived from the 
guidelines and these justifications a r e  presented along with the LRU listing. In 
the case of the DMS, a functional partitioning of the major subsystem components 
based on the ability to create a viable isolation method to that functional level was 
performed, The "functional LRUs" were then considered in the light of the standard 
electronic packaging scheme and actual LRUs were defined and listed. The method 
employed and the results achieved a r e  discussed for both cases in the following 
sections. 
4.4.1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS (LESS DMS) 
The definition of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) is keyed to repairing sub- 
systems in an in-place configuration with the LRU being the smallest modular unit 
suitable for replacement. General factors considered in identifying subsystem 
LRUs include: (1) maintenance concepts developed and defined in Section 4.3; 
(2) the component-level failure r a t e s  delineated in the criticality analyses of 
Section 4.1; (3) the amount of crew time and skill required for fault isolation 
and repair; (4) resultant DMS hardware and software complexity; and (5) subsystem 
weight, volume, location, and interchangeability characteristics. Listings of LRUs 
and more specific justification for their selection follows. 
4.4.1.1 Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Guidance, Navigation,and Control (GN&C) Subsystem LRUs are listed in 
Table 4-8. Their selection is influenced largely by the specialized functional 
characteristics of GN&C components and the state-of-the-art in their  packaging. 
Sensing devices used in the GN&C Subsystem a r e  mainly electromechanical 
or electro-optical in nature, and a r e  generally configured with a sensor and a 
separate electronics package. In addition, most precision sensing devices are 
mounted on or within a specially designed structure for tight alignment tolerances 
and environment control. Gimbal-mounted tracking sensors,  for example, are 
replaced as a unit with the gimbals since the tight mechanical tolerances for the 
gimbals a r e  expected to be only maintainable on the ground. 
Electronic assemblies which interface with the sensors,  actuators, and data 
acquisition equipment of the Data Management Subsystem consist of groups of 
similar or  identical circuits. These a r e  modularized and replaced at the module 
level to take advantage of having a common spare configuration for several  functions. 
Control Moment Gyro Assemblies (CMGs) a r e  large electromechanical devices 
which a r e  constructed for long life operation with tight mechanical tolerances. The 
only on-orbit repair  capability planned for these assemblies is the replacement of 
torquer-resolver units. The mechanical tolerance level required for long CMG life 
requires further breakthroughs in design technology before bearings and rotor can 
be considered as being replaceable on orbit. 
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Table 4-8. Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Wan t  ity 
LRU Standby, 
Redundant 
Required 
Horizon Detector 
Gyro Assembly 
Gyros 
Gyro Electronics Assembly 
Gyro and Accelerometer Mount Assembly 
Gyro Power Supply 
Horizon Sensor Assembly 
Horizon Sensors 
Horizon Sensor Mount Assembly 
Star Sensor Assembly 
Star Sensors 
Star Sensor Mount Assembly 
Star Tracker Assembly 
Star Trackers  
Tracker Electronics Assembly 
Tracker Mount Assembly 
Landmark Tracker Assembly 
Landmark Tracker 
Tracker Electronics Assembly 
Tracker Mount Assembly 
Accelerometer Assembly 
Accelerometer 
Accelerometer Electronics 
Rendezvous Tracker Assembly 
Tracker Assembly 
Gimbal Mount Assembly 
Electronics Assembly 
Docking Tracker Assembly 
Tracker Assembly 
Tracker Electronics Assembly 
2 
4 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
7 
7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Table 4-8. Guidance, Navigation, and Control (Continued) 
LRU 
Quantity 
Standby 
Redundant 
Required 
Alignment Monitor Assembly (Sensors) 
Signal Transceiver 
Signal Receiver 
Alignment Monitor Assembly (Experiments) 
Signal Receiver 
Signal Source 
Interface Electronics Assembly 
Inertial Sensor Buffer Module 
Horizon Sensor Buffer Module 
Stellar Sensor Buffer Module 
Landmark and Alignment Sensor Buffer Module 
Laser  Tracker Buffer Module 
CMG Control Buffer Module 
Reaction Je t  Control Buffer Module 
Data Control Module 
Je t  Driver Electronics Assembly 
High Thrust Jet Driver Module 
Resistojet Control Module 
Backup Control Electronics Module 
CMG Assembly 
CMG Rotor Gimbal Assembly 
Torquer Assembly (Inner Gimbal) 
Torquer Assembly (Outer Gimbal) 
CMG Electronics Assembly 
CMG Rotor Control Modules 
CMG Torquer Control Modules 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
2 
4 2 
4 2 
4 2 
4 2 
4 2 
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4.4.1.2 Propulsion 
Line replaceable units for the low thrust portion of the Propulsion Subsystem 
are listed in Table 4-9. High Thrust Propulsion Subsystem LRUs are listed in 
Table 4-10. Although considerable operational redundancy exists within the sub- 
system, the only elements that can be categorized 'ds "standby redundant" are the 
low-thrust flow control assembly and the high-thrust p ressure  control assembly. 
Pr imary cr i ter ia  used in the selection of Propulsion Subsystem LRUs were 
component packaging, replacement frequency, and crew time and skill require- 
ments. Also considered were the factors of par ts  commonality, DMS and instru- 
mentation impacts, and LRU usage within the subsystem. Each subsystem 
component was analyzed to determine first if replacement might be necessary 
and second, if necessary, the optimum level of replacement in t e rms  of minimizing 
impacts upon both crew and equipment. In all cases ,  the LRU has been selected 
so that a redundant capability exists to allow subsystem operation with an LRU 
removed. Some performance degradation or partial loss of flexibility is, of 
course, permitted in this situation. 
Except where components are packaged together to  minimize mechanical 
joints and connections, most Propulsion Subsystem LRUs are individual com- 
ponents. Another exception is the power distribution and control assembly. Lower 
level replacement is anticipated for this LRU when more detailed design informa- 
tion becomes available. 
4.4.1.3 Environmental Control and Life Support 
A list of LRUs for the Environmental Control and Life Support (EC/LS) 
Subsystem is provided in Table 4-11. Replacement is at the component level 
primarily for efficiency of sparing and maintenance. It is at the component level 
where: (1) EC/LS elements a r e  expected to require periodic replacement, 
(2) the number of EC/LS functions interrupted when maintenance is performed 
is acceptable, (3) only conventional tools a r e  required, and (4) normal fabrication 
breakpoints exist. Lower level replacement would cause a disproportionate 
increase in instrumentation and in the complexity of tools and skills required. 
Higher level replacement would result in increased spares  weight and volume 
due to a decrease in commonality of spares.  For  the EC/LS Subsystem, 
component-level LRUs offer a good compromise for the advantages and dis- 
advantages of lower and higher level replacement. 
4.4.1.4 RF Communications 
A listing of LRUs for the R F  Communications Subsystem is provided in 
Table 4-12. 
4-29 
Table 4-9. Low-Thrust Propulsion 
LRU Quantity 
Collection/Storage Assembly 
Compression Pump 
Aropellant Storage Bottle 
Fil ter 
Relief Assembly 
Tank Isolation Valve 
Control Valve Assembly 
Low Pressure  Mixing Valve 
High P res su re  Mixing Valve 
Water Supplement Assembly 
Storage Bottle 
Water Vaporizer 
Thermal Control Assembly 
Fill/Drain Valve 
Tank Isolation Valve 
Flow Control Valve 
Pressure  Control Valve Assembly 
Flow Control Assembly 
Regulator Assembly 
Regulator Isolation Valve Assembly 
Cross-feed Valve Assembly 
Thruster Assembly 
Module Isolation Valve 
Thruster Assembly 
Power Distribution and Control Assembly 
2 
2 
P 
8 
8 
1 
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Table 4-10. Hi-Thrust Propulsion 
LRU Quantity 
P r e s s  Storage Assembly (3000 psia GN2) 
Storage Sphere 2 
Burst Disk 2 
Isolation Valve 2 
P res su re  Transducer 2 
Temperature Transducer 2 
2 Relief Valve 
Hi-Press Manifold 
Isolation Valve 
Vent Valve 
Pressure  Transducer 
Filter Assembly 
Disconnect Assembly 
P r e s s  Control Assembly 
Regulator 
Isolation Valve 
P r e s s  Switch (hi/lo) 
Fil ter 
Lo-Press Manifold 
Isolation Valve 
P r e s s  Transducer 
Vent Valve 
Disconnect A ss e mbly 
Propellant Storage Assembly 
Prop Tanks (Metal Bellows) 
Relief Valve 
Burst Disk 
Isolation Valves (Prop and Ullage) 
P r e s s  Transducer 
Temperature Transducer 
Qty Gauging (Assembly/System) 
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Table 4-10. Hi-Thrust Propulsion (Continued) 
LRU Quantity 
Propellant Manif old 
Isolation Valve 
Fill Valve 
Vent Valve 
Purge Valve 
P r e s s  Transducer 
Fil ter Assembly 
Prop Dump Assembly (Nonpropulsive 
Disconnect Ass  e mbly 
Prop Decomposition) 
Thruster Modules 
Thruster Assembly 
Isolation Valve 
Filter Assembly 
P r e s s  Transducer (liquid) 
P r e s s  Transducer (Comb Chamber) 
Temperature Transducer (Comb Chamber) 
Purge Assembly 
P r e s s  Sphere 
Regulator 
Isolated Valves 
P r e s s  Transducers 
Resupply Assembly (Stat ion) 
Isolation Valve (P res s  and Props) 
Umbilical Hoses 
Disconnect A s s e  mbly 
Fi l ters  
Miscellaneous Assembly (allocation) 
Heaters 
Thermostats 
Temp e r at ur e Transducer 
Piping Assembly 
a. 
12 
10 
4 
10 
12 
1 2  
50 
50 
30 
50 
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Table 4-10. Hi-Thrust Propulsion (Continued) 
LRU Quantity 
Cargo Module Resupply Subsystem 
P r e s s  Resupply 
Storage Spheres 
Relief Valve and Burst Disk Assembly 
Isolation Valve 
Regulator 
Press Transducer 
Temperature Transducer 
Disconnect and Umbilicals 
Propellant Resupply 
Prop Tanks 
Isolation Valves 
Relief/Burst Assembly 
P r e s s  Transducer 
Temperature Transducer 
Disconnects and Umbilicals 
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Table 4-11. Environmental Control and Life Support 
Quantity 
LRU -
Standby 
Required Redundant 
~ 
High Pressure Gas  Tank 
Flow Restrictor 
Shutoff Valve, Solenoid W Manual OR 
Quick Disconnect 
3-Way Valve, Electrically Operated 
Electric Heater 
Pressure  Regulator with Relief 
Pressure  Control 
0 2  Sensor 
3-Way Valve, Pressure  Actuated 
Shutoff Valve, Manual 
Relief and Dump Valve 
Low Pressure  Tank 
Pressure  Regulator 
Compressor 
Heat Exchanger, Liquid to Gas 
Check Valve 
A i r  Bypass Valve 
F an 
Pump 
Condensing Heat Exchanger 
Temperature Controller 
Temperature Sensor 
Adsorption Cannister 
C02 Sensor 
12 
30 
27 
96 
34 
20 
2 
1 
P 
1 
276 
2 
9 
5 
9 
2 
40 
2 
20 
33 
8 
7 
8 
19 
8 
2 
7 
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Table 4-11. Environmental Control and Life Support (Continued) 
LRU 
Quantity 
Standby 
Required Redundant 
Catalytic Bed 5 
Shut -Off Valve, Solenoid 69 
4-Way Valve, Electrically Operated 26 
Pressure  Relief Valve 22 
Valve Sequence Controller 2 
C02 Demand Control 2 
Pressure  Switch 4 
Flow Regulator 2 
C02 Conversion Controller 2 
Cold Plate 20 
Water Electrolysis Controller 1 1 
Gas -Liquid Separator 14 
Electrolysis Module 12 12 
Temperature Control Valve 19 7 
Fluid Tank 10 10 
Regenerative Heat Exchanger 9 1 
Urine Water Recovery Controller P 1 
Conductivity Sensor 2 2 
Quantity Sensor 8 8 
Evaporator 1 1 
Chemical Injector 2 2 
Bacteria Filter 26 6 
3-Way Valve, Manual 18 
Feed Tank 1 1 
Wash Water and Condensate Recovery Control 1 1 
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Table 4-11. Environmental Control and Life Support (Continued) 
Quantitv 
LRU - Standby 
Redundant 
Required 
Solids Sensor 
Reverse Osmosis Cartridge 
Water Storage Control 
Water Cooler 
Potability Test Kit 
Urine Collector 
Fecal Container 
Fecal Deflector and Motor 
Fecal Collector Control , 
4-Way Valve, Manual 
Fecal Collector Seat Cover and Seal 
Pressure Gauge 
Portable Life Support System (PLSS) 
Oxygen/Coolant Umbilical 
IVA Control Module 
Oxygen Manifold 
Coolant Manifold 
Coolant Accumulator 
Coolant Water Fil ter 
Liquid -t o -Liquid Heat Exchanger 
Thermal Control System Controller 
Thermal Capacitor 
Temperature Sensor 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
12 
12 
8 
16 
12 
12 
5 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
12 
8 
2 
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Table 4-12. R F  Communications 
~~~ 
Quantity 
LRU - Standby Required Redundant 
Transmitter/Receiver/Modem/Group 
S -Band Video Receiver 
Video Receiver Modem 
S-Band Data Receiver 
S-Band P M  Receiver 
KU-Band F M  Exciter 
F M  Xmtr Modem 
S-Band F M  Receiver 
Receiver Modem 
KU-Band PA 
KU-Band P M  Exciter 
S -Band P M  Transponder 
Transponder Modem 
S-Band Power Amp 
S-Band F M  Exciter 
Transmitter Modem 
VHF Voice Ranging T/R 
Ranging Modem 
Voice Modem 
VHF Data T/R 
VHF-FM T/R 
Modem 
Low-Gain Antenna Group 
VHF Antennas 
VHF Diplexers 
VHF Multiplexer, Power Dividers and Switches 
S-Band Antennas 
S-Band Triplexer and Switches 
KU-Band Antennas 
Ku-Band Pr eamp/Mixer /Diplexer /Swit ches 
S -Band Multiplexer and Circulator 
Ku -B and Waveguides 
VHF/S-Band Coaxial Cables 
10 
10 
10 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
6 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
8 
2 
2 
8 
8 
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Table 4-12. R F  Communications (Continued) 
Quantity 
ERU Standby 
Redundant Required 
High-Gain Antenna Group 
Main Reflector/Feed 
Acquisition Reflect or/Feed 
Pseudo Monopulse Comp/Mod. 
Positioner 
Drive Motors 
Drive System 
E le c t r onics 
K,-Band TDA/Mixer/L. 0. 
R F  Switches (External) 
R F  Switches (Internal) 
Ku-Band Quadriplexers and Circulators 
KU-Band Diplexer 
S-Band Quadriplexer and Power Divider 
S-Band Diplexer 
Ku -Band Waveguides 
4 
4 
8 8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
2 
8 
4 
1 
4 
P 
4 
8 
8 
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The transmitters (exciters and power amplifiers), receivers,  and interface 
modems are selected as assembly-level LRUs largely because of packaging, 
reliability, and electromagnetic interference (EMI) considerations. These 
assemblies a r e  packaged in multiples of the standard module size fo r  mounting 
in the integrally-cooled mounting racks. Initial reliability estimates indicate that 
the power amplifiers are the most critical of this group of assemblies. Lower 
level modularization of the power amplifiers, however, is not practical  because 
of restrictions caused by the physical dimensions of the Traveling Wave Tube 
(TWT), thermal cooling requirements, and sensitivity to  changes in power supply 
voltages. It is planned, therefore, that the TWT and power supplies be mated and 
adjusted as a unit on the ground. Furthermore, lower level modularity would 
increase the number of connectors required, thereby decreasing overall reliability 
and creating potential sources of EMI. Another problem encountered with a lower 
replacement level is module-to-module tolerance buildup. This concept was 
attempted, for  example, on an S-Band transponder for another program and 
resulted in modules not being interchangeable that were supposed to be inter- 
changeable. 
The primary considerations used in the selection of LRUs for  the High- and 
Low-Gain Antenna Systems a r e  somewhat different f rom those used for t rans-  
mitters, receivers,  and modems. Antenna system LRUs typically do not require 
thermal cooling and a r e  consequently located largely on the basis of minimizing 
R F  transmission line losses. The reliability of multiplexers, power dividers, 
coaxial cables, and the low-gain antenna elements is relatively high. The majority 
of the problems associated with Low-Gain Antenna (omnidirectional) Systems, if 
encountered, usually occur during initial installation and checkout. This is also 
t rue for similar components of the High-Gain Antenna System located within the 
pressure shell. 
The most difficult maintenance and replacement problems are posed by the 
portion of the High-Gain Antenna System located at the end of the mast. If a failure 
occurs in the drive system, the drive system is replacetl W%s rcty to eliminate 
alignment problems. The drive motors, on the other hand, can be replaced 
separately in the event of failure. Redundant electronics are utilized wherever 
possible to  minimize the high-gain antenna downtime 
4.4.1.5 Structures 
Selection of LRUs for the Structures Subsystem is based primarily upon 
specific failure characterist ics of subsystem comments. The selection has a lso 
been based upon a replacement level which can be accomplished with ordinary 
tools and skills, and without a requirement for precision alignment and/or special 
processes,  environment, or facilities. The analysis has resulted in the LRU list 
shown in Table 4-13. 
4-39 
Table 4-13. Structures 
- - 
LRU Quantity 
Docking Mechanism Shock Struts 64 
Docking Por t  Inflatable Seals 14 
Hatches and Airlock Doors Inflatable Seals 18 
Inflatable Airlock 1 
View Por t  Window Assembly 25 
Hatch Temperature Indicators 32 
Hatch Pressure Indicators 32 
Hatch Assembly 16 
Despin Module Drive Unit 1 
Cable Deployment Module Drive 1 
Docking Port  Seal Latches 32 
Antenna Boom 4 
Antenna Boom Drive Unit 4 
Cargo Handling Hoist 2 
Cargo Hoist Cable 2 
Electric Drive Unit, Isotope System Handling 2 
Handling Aids, Isotope System 4 
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The LRUs defined fall into the following general failure categories: 
e Soft Pa r t s  subject to scuffing, wear, puncture, possible age degradation,' 
or  other surface marring. Examples include hatch seals, s t ruts  with 
"0" rings, the inflatable airlock, and view port windows. 
e Items subject to physical damage from outside physical impact/collision 
(e.  g . ,  docking) or  misuse. Examples include docking latches, the 
antenna boom, the complete hatch assembly, and isotope unit handling 
aids. 
e Functional electromechanical units which, during the ten-year life of 
the Space Station, could experience unexpected wear or internal part  
failure. Examples include the despin module antirotation drive unit, 
the antenna boom drive unit, the cargo handling hoist assembly, and 
the electric drive unit used in handling the isotope. 
4.4.1.6 Electrical Power 
Discussion of the LRUs identified for the Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) 
is divided into two parts.  The f i rs t  is concerned with EPS transmission, condition- 
ing, and distribution equipment, while the second addresses the Isotope/Brayton 
System. 
4.4.1.6.1 Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution 
The EPS transmission/conditioning/distribution (T/C/D) LRUs are listed in 
Table 4-14 and consist of conductors, conductor terminations, relays, circuit 
breakers, l imiters (fuses), power conditioners, and power control and instrumen- 
tation elements. 
Main ac  power feeder circuits a r e  comprised of individual 4-conductor cables 
having relatively large cross-sectional areas .  Both single-cable and multiple- 
cable circuits a r e  employed. Spare cables complete with terminations are laid in 
place ready for connection into selected circuits in the event of a conductor/cable 
failure. This minimizes handling of large -gauge conductors and limits subsystem 
down time to the affected power circuit. 
Differential and reverse  current relays, circuit breakers, and switches 
(either electromechanical or solid state) a r e  multiple usage i tems installed in 
panels and other higher-level bussing assemblies. They a r e  selected as L R U s  to  
reduce spares  requirements and to minimize load circuit interruptions or power 
curtailment for either scheduled or unscheduled replacements. 
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Table 4-14. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution 
LRU -
Quantity 
Required Redundant 
~ 
Alternator Feeders 
Alternator Feeder Circuit Breakers 
Alternator Feeder/Source Bus Differential 
Alternator Feeder/Source Bus Phase - Balance 
Protection Relays 
Protection Relays 
Transmission Cables 
Source Bus to Distributor - No. 2 1200 Hz 
Distributor No. 2 to Distributor No. 1 - 1200 Hz 
Transmission Cables 
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Differential 
Protect ion Relay s 
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Phase-Balance 
Protection Relays 
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Current Breakers 
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Power Switches 
1200 Hz Transmission Cable Limiters (Fuses) 
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Differential 
Protection Relays 
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Phase-Balance 
Protect ion Relays 
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Power Switches 
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Selector Switches 
Main 1200 Hz Distributor Bus Circuit Breakers 
1200 Hz Feeders to  Distribution Panels (Load Buses) 
1200 Hz Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers 
1200 Hz Load Line Circuit Breakers 
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Differential Protection 
Relays 
2 
2 
2 
12 
4 
8 
2 
6 
12 
5 
3 
17 
2 
2 
2 . 0  
4 
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Table 4-14. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution (Continued) 
LRU 
Quantity 
Required Redundant 
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Bus Sectionalizing CBs 2 - 
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Bus Power Switches 12 ~(4) 
Main 28 Vdc Distributor Bus Reverse Current Relays 12 ~(4) 
28 Vdc Bus Tie Cable 1 l(1) 
28 Vdc Feeders to Distribution Panels (Load Buses) 10 8(4) 
28 Vdc Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers 10 8(4) 
28 Vdc Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers 2 - 
28 Vdc Load Line Circuit Breakers 
260 Vdc Link Bus Differential Protection Relays 
260 Vdc Link Bus Circuit Breakers 
,260 Vdc Link Bus Power Switches 
260 Vdc Link Bus Reverse Current Relays 
260 Vdc Bus Tie Cable 
260 Vdc Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers 
Main 400 Hz Distributor Bus Power Switches 
400 Hz Square Wave Bus Tie Cable 
400 Hz Square Wave Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers 
400 Hz Square Wave Feeders to Distribution Panels 
400 Hz Square Wave Distribution Feeder Circuit 
Breakers 
400 Hz Square Wave Load Line Circuit Breakers 
400 Hz Sine Wave Bus Tie Cable 
Z 500 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
6(5) 
1 
2 
12 
12 
,” 25 
1 
Z 75 
for essential 
loads only 
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Table 4-14. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution (Continued) 
Quantity 
Required Redundant LRU -
400 Hz Sine Wave Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breakers 
400 Hz Sine Wave Feeders to Distribution Panels 
400 Hz Sine Wave Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers 
400 Hz Sine Wave Load Line Circuit Breakers 
Main 60 Hz Distributor Bus Power Switches (Single Pole) 
60 Hz Bus Tie Cable (Single Phase) 
60 Hz Bus Tie Cable Circuit Breaker (Single Pole) 
60 Hz Feeders to Distribution Panel (GPL Only) 
60 Hz Distribution Feeder Circuit Breakers (GPL Only) 
60 Hz Bus Sectionalizing and Load Line CBs (GPL Only) 
600 Hz Starting Bus Circuit Breakers (Interlocked) 
600 Hz Starting Bus Selector Switch 
600 Hz Transmission Cable from M-G in Distribution 
Center No. 1 to Starting Bus in Distributor Center No. 2 
600 Hz Transmission Cable to Alternator No. 1 
600 Hz Transmission Cable to Alternator No. 2 
600 Hz Motor Generator (M-G) Set 
Motor -Generator Input CBs (23 Vdc) 
Regulated Transformer-Rectifiers (28 Vdc) 
High-Voltage Rectifier Regulator (260 Vdc) 
400 Hz Square Wave Inverter 
400 Hz Sine Wave Inverter 
60 Hz Sine Wave Inverter (Single Phase) 
2 
12 
12 
Z 25 
2 
1 
1 
1 
z10 
S f 0  
1 
1 
1 
f 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
P 
f 
1 
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Table 4-1 4. Electrical Power Transmission/Conditioning/Distribution (Continued) 
LRU 
Quantity 
Required Redundant 
Launch and Ascent/Emergency Inverter 
(400 Hz Sine Wave) 
(28 Vdc) 
Launch and Ascent/Emergency Inverter Input CBs 
Battery Charger Regulator 
Battery 
Battery Switching Unit 
Buck Regulator (Regulates battery discharge voltage) 
Battery Emergency Override Control Circuit Breaker 
Power Control Modules (Power Management Assembly) 
Inst rumentat ion Sensors 
Signal Conditioning Units 
1 
1 1 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
TBD TBD 
TBD TBD 
TBD TBD 
(1) Laid-in spare  
(2)  Operating redundancy 
(3) Bus No. 2 only 
(4)  Standby redundancy 
(5) Combined requirements €or 400 Hz sine wave and square wave buses. 
Includes two square wave sine wave bus t ie switches interlocked with 
outputs of emergency inverters. 
LRU may be at the component level in the noted modules. (6) 
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Power conditioners (transformer -rectifiers, inverters, buck regulator 8 ,  
etc.)  a r e  typically "black box" end items. On-line redundancy is employed in the 
operation of these units. The T/C/D system is designed to permit quick replace- 
ment of these items in order to maintain operating redundancy/system reliability 
at required levels. 
The design of power conditioning equipment generally lends itself to mod- 
ularization and fault detection to the module level. Replacement of modules within 
power conditioners should be considered as an alternate to the "black box" LRU 
level where module commonality would permit economies-in-spares provisioning, 
Typical LRUs for T/C/D instrumentation include sensors  and signal con- 
ditioners €or status display and power protection and control. The uniqueness of 
many T/C/D sensing devices in terms of location and rating (e .g . ,  current t rans-  
formers in transmission circuits, as well as distribution circuits, with primary 
ratings ranging from over 50 amperes to less than 1 ampere) establish these items 
as LRUs. Selected logic, amplification and possibly computational modules 
associated with power control a r e  also candidate LRUs. 
4 . 4 . 1 . 6 . 2  Isotope/Brayton 
A listing of the isotope/Brayton LRUs i s  given in Table 4-15. Their selection 
is predicated on nuclear safety, life, and reliability considerations. They are also 
restricted to those assemblies and components which are readily replaceable and 
which a r e  within the purview of projected crew skills and available tooling. 
Isotope recovery requirements for nuclear safety dictate that the complete 
isotope reentry vehicle (IRV) heat source assembly be a line replaceable unit. 
Radiation hazard prevents any subassembly o r  component within the IRV heat 
source from being replaced. Therefore, all critical components and instrumen- 
tation a r e  installed with adequate on-line and standby redundancy or alternate 
modes of operation to provide acceptable performance for the life of the IRV 
heat source. Typical examples are:  (I) the dual hinges that allow the IRV heat 
source to open on either side for emergency cooling; and (2) the critical heat 
source temperature instrumentation having triple redundant sensors  at both the 
capsule and on the Be0 heat sink. 
The Brayton Power Conversion System (PCS) is hermetically sealed for 
operation in the space environment. The complete PCS is replaceable as well as 
those PCS components that do not require the opening of working fluid lines. Re- 
placeable components a r e  therefore limited to surface thermocouples, solenoid 
valve electrical assemblies, and mounting fixtures. Replacement of internal com- 
ponents; e. g . ,  rotating unit, heat exchangers, pressure gauges, and valve bodies, 
would require cutting and welding lines that operate at high temperatures and 
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Table 4-1 5. Electrical Power Isotope/Brayton System 
LRU 
Quantity 
St andby 
Redundant Required 
~ 
Isotope Reentry Vehicle Heat Source 
Power Conversion System 
Solenoid Valve Electrical Assembly 
Insulation 
Surface Thermocouple 
Mounting Attachment 
Heat Rejection System 
Pump Motor 
Transducers 
Cold Plate 
Diversion Valve 
Pump Motor Electrical Switch 
Insulation 
Gas Management System 
Heater Contactor 
Gas Storage Bottle 
Transducer 
Solenoid Valve Electrical Assembly 
Electronic Monitoring and Control Assembly 
Signal Conditioner Module 
Speed Control and Dissipative Load Bank Unit 
Voltage Regulator Exciter 
Shield Assembly 
Shield 
Shield Retraction Cable 
Shield Retraction Sheave 
Shield Retraction Drive 
2 
2 
1 2  
26 
TBD 
- 
8 
44 
6 
8 
8 
2 
2 
4 
10 
2 
2 
2 
1 
6 
13 
TBD 
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pressure.  Extensive inspection, testing, and gas recharging would also be 
required before the system could be put back on-line. Attendant skills, tooling, 
and gas management capacity a r e  not available in the baseline system to allow 
replacement at this level. 
Unitized construction of the cooling tubes, meteoroid bumpers, and space- 
craft structure as well as the length of radiator cooling tubes preclude classifying 
the Heat Rejection System as a line replaceable unit. In view of this, all com- 
ponents of the Heat Rejection System (e.g., sensors,  pumps), with the exception 
of the radiator tubes, a r e  made line replaceable. In addition, extensive redundancy 
is employed in the baseline system because of the complexity of removal and r e -  
placement of heat rejection components. 
Gas Management System components a r e  replaceable if they a r e  upstream 
of the solenoid valves that isolate this system f rom the PCS. The jacking gas 
supply is paralleled with the second onboard Gas Management System during re- 
placement to provide a continuous source of jacking gas to protect the journal and 
thrust bearing. 
The electronic monitoring and control assembly is divided into three separate 
modules (Voltage Regulator/Exciter , Speed Control, and Signal Conditioning) which 
a r e  independently packaged. The speed control portion is further divided into three 
LRUs, one to sense each phase of the 1200 Hz, 120 V, 12.5 kWe alternator output 
and apply or  remove parasitic loading to maintain constant frequency under varying 
load and alternator output conditions. Each control circuit loads all three phases 
simultaneously. Each replaceable unit provides a total of six kilowatts of para- 
sitic load so any one control circuit can be in the OFF position without affecting 
overall system performance. 
The retractable shield is used for nuclear radiation reduction and is capable 
of being retracted to allow a thermal radiation path from the heat source to the 
inside of the spacecraft for emergency cooling. At  launch, the heat shield contains 
5 inches of LiH to meet the dose cr i ter ia  for the first 2 1/2 years.  Additional 
shielding of 3 inches of LiH and 0.2 inch of depleted U238 is required to meet the 
dose cr i ter ia  for the period from 2 1/2 to 10 years.  
4.4.2 DMS SUBSYSTEM 
From the baseline DMS, the LRUs were defined and partitioned from the 
physical and functional considerations relative to  each respective subsystem, 
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4 . 4 . 2 . 1  Functional Partitioning 
Primary selection was generally on the basis of functional fault isolation 
capabilities. An approach was taken (Section 6.1, Volume 11) whereby automatic 
(OCS) or  semiautomatic (OCS/manual) methods could be employed to diagnose and 
isolate subsystem faults to a reasonable functional level. This functional level was 
chosen on the basis of experience and familiarity with the subsystem. The 
approaches presented in Section 6.1 could be expanded to greater levels of detail, 
even to the individual piece part level, but the requirements in te rms  of hardware 
and software necessary to implement these would increase exponentially. A 
reasonable rationale for the determination of the level of functional partitioning 
was defined as that functional level which is required for the intended normal 
operation of the subsystem without the necessity for considerable built-in test 
circuitry. Some functional LRUs defined herein include a degree of self-check 
capability. This was found to be required in te rms  of implementing the functional 
diagnostic/isolation approach derived without postulating additional separate "test 
boxes. If  
4 . 4 . 2 . 2  Phvsical Partitioning 
Consideration was also given to the physical aspects of LRU definitions, in 
te rms  of the standard electronic book module defined in DRL 13, Volume I, Book 
2. It appears that such a module, o r  a basic group of several modules, would be 
an ideal LRU in respect to replacement, logistics, ease of handling, etc. ,  con- 
siderations. Indications a r e  that a majority of the LRUs presented herein could 
be packaged in one o r  more "basic" modules. The Remote Data Acquisition Unit 
(RDAU) and Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU) electronics appear to be the 
smallest defined LRUs and would probably be packaged two to a basic module. 
These assessments a r e  based on initial unit power estimates and module capabilities 
in addition to a "subjective" sizing of the circuitry required for a particular function. 
In the Command/Control and Display Consoles (CCDC), consideration was given to 
the packaging aspects of the control and display assemblies. These assemblies 
would be treated as separate LRUs, along with all their associated electronic 
circuitry. Due to the peculiar nature (keyboards, display lights, e tc . )  of these 
assemblies in respect to a "basic" module, they would be packaged as separate 
removable units. This would greatly enhance the isolation and maintainability of 
these assemblies. 
4.4.2.3 Functional LRU Definition 
In order to define a workable fault diagnostic/isolation scheme certain hard- 
ware requirements and subsystem functional diagrams were postulated. These 
requirements and functional diagrams a r e  reasonable, in view of present and future 
technology, and a r e  in concert with the overall baseline DMS philosophy. A 
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detailed description of certain of these functional elements can be found in Section 
3 "Baseline Subsystem Descriptions. '' The other functional elements are described 
in DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, Space Station Electronics. 
4.4.2.3.1 Computer Subsystem 
The overall Computer Subsystem is comprised of the following functional 
elements : 
0 Operations Multiprocessor 
0 Experiment Multiprocessor 
e Shared Memories 
e Bulk Data Storage 
The multiprocessor elements can be further broken down into the following 
elements, each of which is considered a functional LRU: 
Data Bus Controller (DBC) - A device, not unlike a data bus terminal, 
which is used by the DMS/OCS multiprocessors to issue commands to 
and receive data from the data bus. 
Switch Matrices - These a r e  multiple channel switching circuit com- 
plexes which a r e  completely transparent to any coding scheme. 
Input/Output Circuitry - These are multiple channel interface circuits 
which perform parity checks on all incoming data. 
Logic and Control Circuitry - This is the main arithmetic-control 
element of the CPU. 
Dedicated Memory - This is a memory which is peculiar to a given 
CPU. It cannot be addressed directly from any other DMS/QCS element. 
It is a high speed rapid access element which is used to store the 
immediate operating and executive routines for that CPU. 
Power Supply and Distribution - This power source provides all 
required operating power for the 1/0, logic and control, and dedicated 
memory. 
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The shared memories, main and auxiliary, can be broken down to a lower 
level of isolation (LRU definition) by supplementing the automatic diagnostics 
described in Section 6.1 with manual procedures. 
The following replaceable elements should be considered as actual LRUs. 
Electronics section - Contains I/O, logic, control circuitry, etc. 
Mechanical section (where applicable) - Contains disk drives, tape 
transports,  etc. 
Memory element - Contains solid-state memory, disks, magnetic tape 
ree ls ,  etc. 
Power section - Contains power supplies, distribution, etc. 
The bulk data storage elements can be further broken down into the following 
elements, each of which is considered a functional LRU: 
Digital Buffer and Control (DBC) - This unit provides the input/output 
and control functions €or the bulk data storage facility. It decodes 
commands from the CPU and s e t s  up the proper write/read channels 
through the various switch matrices. 
Record/Reproduce Electronics (R/R) - This element is a multichannel, 
switchable write/read unit. It conditions the data for transferral to and 
from the magnetic tape storage medium. 
Switch Matrices - These a r e  multiple-channel switching circuit com- 
plexes which route signals (data or control) to appropriate hardware 
elements. 
Tape Transport Controller (TC) - These are the control circuits for the 
individual tape transports.  They provide all the required read/write tape 
control under command from the DBC. 
Tape Transports (TT) - These are the magnetic tape drives. The tape 
drive motors and associated electromechanical elements comprise these 
units . 
Power Supply and Distribution - These units provide all the required 
power €or the bulk data storage facility, with the exception of the DBT. 
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4 . 4 . 2 . 3 . 2  Data Acquisition 
The Data Acquisition Subsystem is comprised of the following elements, 
each of which is considered a functional LRU. 
It should be noted that the sensor assembly and the function under test are 
integral par ts  of the subsystem/experiment group and as such a r e  not considered 
as data acquisition elements. 
0 Data Bus Terminal (DBT) - A device used to interface various sub- 
systems and experiments (including RDAU and LMDU) to the data bus. 
0 Remote Data Acquisition Unit (RDAU) - This unit accepts analog and 
discrete inputs from various subsystems/experiments, converts these 
input to digital data, and interfaces directly with a data bus terminal. 
e Stimuli Generation Unit (SGU) - This device, upon command from a data 
bus terminal, provides different calibrated signals (stimuli) to various 
subsystems/experiments. This is the only unit which is used primarily 
for diagnostic purposes. 
4 . 4 . 2 . 3 . 3  Command/Control and Display 
The Command/Control and Display Console (CCDC) is comprised of the 
following assemblies: 
Alphanumeric Display Assembly - Display for computer-generated 
digit a1 data. 
Status Light Assembly - Display for computer-generated digital data. 
Used to indicate operational conditions. 
Dedicated Displays - Contingency displays hardwired to appropriate 
subsyst ems/experiments. 
Command Buffer and Control Unit - Provides control for the digital 
multiplexer in addition to buffering all the commands from the CCDC 
control panels. Contains a self-test feature. 
Digital Multiplexer - Combines all the CCDC control commands for 
inputting to the Command Buffer and Control. 
Hand Controller Assembly - Used for providing continuously variable 
human input information to the computer. Used in conjunction with the 
Mode Select Switches. 
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Mode Select Switch Assembly - Used to establish the logic that 
determines the function of the multifunction pushbuttons. 
Multifunction Switch Assembly - Provides for the single selection 
of a group of commands. 
Monofunction Switch Assembly - Provides for the selection of 
individual commands. 
Computer Keyboard Assembly - Used for directing computer 
operations or modifying/correcting existing software routines. 
These assemblies can be further broken down into the following elements 
which are considered as functional LRUs. 
Display Control and Buffer Unit - Provides control for the Display 
Switch Matrix in addition to buffering all display data to the CCDC. 
Display Switch Matrix - A multichannel switching matrix which routes 
display data to  the appropriate displays. 
Refresh Buffer - Provides the necessary storage capability for the 
CRT displays. 
Display Control - Provides the primary control of what is being 
displayed on the CRTs. Can select between digital data or analog 
information for display. Control of video/Command Control television 
(CCTV) on the CRT displays is provided by this function. 
CRT Display Assembly - An integral unit containing the CRT and all 
necessary video control €unctions. 
Warning Annunciator Assembly - Contains an integral audio a la rm 
along with all required visual displays for critical warning function 
alarming. 
Caution Display Assembly - Display for all critical caution functions. 
Discrete Controls - Contingency controls hardwired to appropriate 
subsy stems/experiments. 
Microfilm Viewer Assembly - This unit provides the means to view 
stored microfilms. 
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Microfilm Viewer Control - Provides the required control €or micro- 
film retrieval and viewing. 
Microfilm File - Microfilm storage. 
Analog Interface Unit - This unit provides the capability for analog 
information (CCTV video, intercom audio, etc.)  to  be transferred to  
and f rom the CCDC. It interfaces the data bus with the CCDC circuitry. 
Channel Select and Analog Control - This unit provides the channel 
selection capability for CCTV and intercom distribution in addition to 
providing control for all CCDC analog functions. 
CCTV Panel Assembly - Primary setup and control point €or all 
Space Station CCTV distribution. 
Intercom Control Panel - Primary setup and control point for all 
Space Station intercom distribution. 
Audio Tape Assembly - Audio tape control and deck assembly. 
Video Tape Assembly - Video tape control and deck assembly. 
Illumination Control Assembly - Provides Space Station ambient light 
control in addition to CCDC panel illumination and lamp test  capabilities. 
CCDC Power Supplies - These units provide all the required power €or 
the CCDC. An overall power system rationale has  yet to be developed, 
The Portable Display and Control Unit (PDCU) is comprised of the following 
elements all of which a r e  considered functional LRUs. 
Display Assembly - Contains the refresh buffer, CRT display control, 
and CRT display assembly 
Computer Keyboard Assembly 
Optional Pluggable Features 
- Hand controller assembly 
- Multifunction switch assembly 
Power Supply - Provides all required power €or the PDCU 
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4.4.2.3.4 Image Processing 
The Image Processing Subsystem is comprised of the following elements, 
which a r e  considered functional LRUs. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
* 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Display Control - Provides the primary control of what is being 
displayed on the CRTs. 
CRT Display Assembly 
Film Viewer - Provides the capability to manually view processed 
films. Consists of a screen for viewing or scanning, controls, and 
frame counter. 
Film Scanner - Transforms film images into electrical analog signals. 
Image Digitizer - Converts analog signals f rom the film scanner and 
vidicon outputs into digital data. 
Adjustable Multichannel Filter - Provides the analog processing 
capability. The working analog storage function is an integral part  
of this unit. 
Permanent Analog Storage - Provides tape recording capability for 
the storage of analog data. 
Analog Control Assembly - Provides all the required control for the 
operation of the adjustable multichannel filter , display control, and 
permanent analog storage in respect to analog image data. 
Digital Control Assembly - Provides all the required control for the 
various digital components in the subsystem. 
Working Digital Storage - Provides a rapid access  storage capability 
€or digital information via the digital control assembly or the Data 
Bus Terminal. 
Permanent Digital Storage - Provides tape recording capability for 
the storage of digital data. 
Display Conversion - Used to convert digital data received from the 
computer into analog signals €or viewing on the CRTs. 
Annotation and Editing Assemblies - Provides the capability €or annota- 
ting and editing processed film, digitized images, or analog information. 
Specific hardware requirements €or these functions have yet to be defined. 
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4.4.2.3.5 GN&C Preprocessors  
A typical functional diagram for the GN&C preprocessors is shown in 
Figure 4-1. This figure is intended to be representative of the five GN&C pre- 
processors.  These GN&C preprocessor elements a r e  simplex dedicated digital 
computers with self-test capability, and a r e  considered functional LRUs. 
4.4.2.4 LRU Definition 
The LRUs  defined in this section a r e  listed in Table 4-16 by their respective 
subsystems and a r e  a result of the degree in which a software/hardware system 
(OCS) can effectively isolate malfunctioning elements (see Section 6) in addition to 
the physical considerations of packaging and accessibility within a given equipment 
complex. 
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Figure 4-1. GN&C Preprocessor Typical Functional Diagram 
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Table 4-16. Data Management Subsystem 
Quantity Item 
Computer Subsystem 
Data Bus Controller 2 
Data Bus Switch Matrix 2 
Memory Switch Matrix 2 
Data Bus 1/0 2 
Shared Memory I/O 2 
CPU Logic and Control 6 
Dedicated Memory 6 
CPU Power Supply 6 
Shared Memory Electronics Section 2 
Shared Memory Mechanical Assembly 2 
Shared Memory Power Supply 2 
Memory Elements 16 
Bulk Data Storage 
Digital Buffer and Control 
Record/Reproduce Electronics Assembly 
Transport Switch Matrix 
Controller Switch Matrix 
Tape Transports 
Tape Transport Controllers 
Bulk Data Storage Power Supply 
Data Acquisition 
Data Bus Terminal 
RDAU (or LMDU) 
Stimuli Generation Unit 
Command/Controls and Display 
Display Control and Buffer 
Display Switch Matrix 
Refresh Buffer 
Display Control 
CRT Display Assembly 
Warning Annunciator Assembly 
Caution Display Assembly 
Alphanumeric Display Assembly 
Status Light Assembly 
Dedicated Displays 
30 
250 
40 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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Table 4-16. Data Management Subsystem (Continued) 
Item Quantity 
Command Buffers and Control 
Digital Multiplexer 
Hand Controller Assembly 
Computer Keyboard Assembly 
Mode Select Switch Assembly 
Multifunction Switch Assembly 
Monofunction Switch Assembly 
Discrete Controls 
Microfilm Viewer Assembly 
Microfilm Viewer Control and File 
Analog Interface Unit 
Channel Select and Analog Control 
CCTV Panel Assembly 
Intercom Control Panel Assembly 
Audio Tape Assembly 
Video Tape Assembly 
Illumination Cont r ol A s s  e mbly 
CCDC Power Supplies 
Portable Display and Control Units 
Display Assembly 
Computer Keyboard Assembly 
Optional Pluggable Functions 
Power Supply 
Image Processing 
Display Control 
CRT Display Assembly 
Film Scanner 
Film Viewer 
Image Digitizer 
Adjustable Multichannel Filter 
Permanent Digital Storage 
Working Digital Storage 
Pe r  inanent Analog St orage 
Digital Control Assembly 
Analog Control Assembly 
Display Conversion 
Annotation and Editing 
GN&C Preprocessor 
GN&C Preprocessors 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
31 
1 
1 
1 
5 
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Section 5 
O C S  CHECKOUT STRATEGIES 
5.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY 
Prior  to any further requirements analysis, it is necessary to  develop a 
checkout strategy for all Space Station subsystems to  meet the checkout objectives 
of the Space Station OCS. The objectives of the Space Station OCS can be sum- 
marized as follows: 
T o  increase crew and equipment safety by providing an immediate 
indication of out-of-tolerance conditions 
To improve system availability and long-life subsystems assurancy 
by expediting maintenance tasks and increasing the probability 
that systems wil l  function when needed 
To provide flexibility to accommodate changes and growth in both 
hardware and software 
To minimize development and operational r i sks  
Specific mission or vehicle-related objectives which can be imposed upon 
subsystem level equipment and subsystem responsibilities include: 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
OCS should be largely autonomous of ground control. 
Crew participation in routine checkout functions should be minimized. 
The design should be modular in both hardware and software to 
accommodate growth and changes. 
OCS should be integrated with, or have design commonality with, 
other onboard hardware or software. 
The OCS should use a standard hardware interface with equipment 
under test to facilitate the transfer of data and to make the system 
responsive to changes. 
Failures should be isolated to  an LRU such that the faulty unit can be 
quickly removed and replaced with an operational unit. 
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o A Caution and Warning System should be provided to facilitate crew 
warning and automatic "safing" where 'required. 
o Provisions must be included to select and transmit any part o r  a l l  
of the OCS test  data points to the ground. 
To attain these objectives via the use of a n  Onboard Checkout System which 
is integrated with the Data Management System, checkout strategies have been 
developed which a r e  tailored to each Space Station subsystem. 
Special emphasis has been applied to  a strategy for checkout of redundant 
elements peculiar to each subsystem. The degree to which each of these functions 
is integrated into the DMS is also addressed. 
5 . 1 . 1  SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS (LESS DMS) 
Each major Space Station subsystem was examined with respect to the re- 
quired checkout functions. The checkout functions associated with each subsystem 
a r e  identified and analyzed as to their impact on the onboard checkout task. The 
functions considered a r e  those necessary to verify operational status, detect and 
isolate faults, and to verify proper operation following fault correction. Specific 
functional requirements considered include stimulus generation, sensing, signal 
conditioning, limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation. 
5 .1 .1 .1  Guidance, Navigation. and Control Subsvstem 
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Subsystem contains the 
sensors, including gyroscopes, accelerometers, horizon sensors,  star trackers,  
and landmark trackers, and the associated electronics required to' provide attitude 
stabilization and navigation for the Space Station. The subsystem also includes 
laser devices for rendezvous and docking. 
5. 1.1. 1. 1 Checkout Functions 
Checkout and fault isolation of the GN&C Subsystem involves a combination 
of operational limit and validity checks and functional testing. Normal operational 
monitoring utilizes the inherent self-verification capability of the subsystems 
which accrues from redundant and complementary attitude and navigational sensing 
features. Items such as gyros, accelerometers, horizon sensors, star sensors,  
s ta r  trackers,  and landmark t rackers  a r e  implemented redundantly, allowing 
cross-correlation of outputs from the multiple units. 
sensors a r e  complementary to each other, allowing an  additional dimension of 
correlation. Star tracker outputs, for example, can be checked against landmark 
tracking data for validation. 
Further, certain of these 
Fault isolation is accomplished by majority voting 
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techniques and by input/output functional testing using combinations of normal 
operational functions and artif icial  test stimuli. Examples of the latter include a 
simulated star source which is part of the s tar  tracker assembly, torquing coils 
for stimulation of gyro outputs, and sensor output simulation signals for verifica- 
tion of downstream electronics. Other forms of operational monitoring include 
limit testing and trend analysis of selected performance parameters. 
0 Stimulus Generation - Checkout stimuli are required to  perform periodic 
subsystem functional tes ts  and calibrations and to aid in fault isolation 
to  the LRU level. Typical stimuli include gyro torquing signals, simu- 
lated detector outputs for the horizon sensors,  s tar  sensors, star 
trackers,  landmark trackers,  accelerometers, and various tes t  stimuli 
for the associated electronics packages such as the jet driver logic. 
These are in  addition to the normal control signals such as switching 
and gimbal commands. 
0 Sensing - A detailed listing of measurement requirements is included in  
Appendix I .  
e Signal Conditioning - Measurement signal conditioning is required to  
normalize the sensor outputs listed above. The required conditioning 
circuitry is provided as an integral part of the sensor assembly or in 
the Interface Buffers which provide the interface between the attitude 
and navigational sensors and the preprocessors. 
e Limit Checking and Trend Analysis - Continuous o r  periodic limit 
checking is required on a small  number of parameters such as gyro 
temperature and CMG rotational speed, vibration, and bearing temper- 
ature. Trend analysis of the CMG functions is expected to  be meaning- 
ful in  predicting wearout or failure of these units. 
5. 1 . 1 .  1 . 2  Redundant Element Checkout 
Redundancy in the GN&C Subsystem is predominantly in the form of installed 
and operational equipment such as redundant accelerometers, horizon sensors,  
star trackers,  etc. The redundant equipment is normally on line and is imple- 
mented in  such a way that it can be tested independently without disturbing sys-  
tem operation. It therefore presents no special problems from the checkout 
standpoint. An exception is the spare  CMGs, which a r e  installed in a standby 
(nonoperating) condition. The standby units must be tested periodically to a s su re  
availability. This periodic test will consist of a partial spin-up and gimbal check. 
Full speed spin-ups a r e  not planned because of the long time (several  hours) r e -  
quired to  achieve rated speed and because full speed is not necessary to  verify 
operation. 
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5.1.1.1.3 Integration with Data Management Subsystem 
All control functions as well as the test  sequencing and fault isolation for 
the GN&C Subsystem a r e  performed by the DMS computer. Test stimuli generators 
and measurement signal conditioning a r e  contained in  the GN&C Subsystem. The 
subsystem interfaces with the DMS through the GN&C interface buffers. These 
buffers receive control information from the DMS in digital form and provide the 
necessary logic, signal routing, digital-to-analog conversion, and other functions 
required to  control the GN&C equipment. The buffers also provide the multiplex- 
ing and analog-to-digital conversion required to  translate the GN&C equipment 
outputs to digital formats compatible with the DMS interface. 
5.1.1.2 Propulsion Subsystem 
The Propulsion Subsystem consists of two major elements, one being the 
low thrust resistojet system and the other the high-thrust monopropellant Hydra- 
zine System. Both systems interface with the GN&C Subsystem and the Data Man- 
agement Subsystem for control. In addition, the low-thrust system interfaces 
with the EC/LS Subsystem for biowaste propellants. 
5.1.1.2. 1 Checkout Functions 
Checkout functions associated with the Propulsion Subsystem include con- 
tinuous monitoring of critical parameters, short interval limit and status checking, 
and longer interval periodic in-depth testing to ascertain overall system health. 
The continuously sampled parameters include storage tank, regulator outlet, and 
manifold pressures,  biowaste compressor pump speed, and heat exchanger temp- 
erature.  Other critical parameters, such as thruster head temperature and re- 
sistojet heater power, also require high rate  monitoring, but only at selected 
times, i. e., during thruster operation. Less critical system parameters includ- 
ing valve positions, propellant quantities, and secondary pressures  and tempera- 
tures a r e  checked on a low rate  or as-required basis to verify system status. 
In-depth testing is performed on a scheduled periodic basis or in  conjunction with 
fault isolation and includes functional tes ts  of valves, regulators, pumps, and other 
active components. Fault isolation is accomplished by combinatorial analysis of 
operating conditions and by functional testing. 
e Stimulus Generation - Functional testing and fault isolation of the Pro- 
pulsion Subsystem utilize the normal operating controls, such as valve 
actuation commands to  establish the desired test conditions and to  
initiate functions to be tested. No additional stimulus requirements 
have been identified. 
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0 Sensing - The sensing requirements associated with the Propulsion 
Subsystem a r e  contained in Appendix I. 
o Signal Conditioning - Signal conditioning is required for all sensor outputs 
which do not fall within the standard measurement capability of the Re- 
mote Data Acquisition Units. The exact quantity and type of conditioning 
channels required a r e  dependent upon sensor selection. Parameters  
such as valve position and event measurements are normally imple- 
mented as directly compatible bilevel voltages and require no special 
conditioning . 
Limit Checking - There a r e  two types of limit checking required by the 
Propulsion Subsystem. The first is the continuous limit checking re- 
quired in  the case of cri t ical  but relatively static parameters, examples 
of which a r e  tank, regulator output and manifold pressures,  and heat 
exchanger temperatures. Out-of-limit conditions in  these parameters 
indicate the need for relatively expedient relief or corrective action 
such as pressure venting which, depending upon the circumstances, 
may be either manually or automatically initiated. A second class  of 
limit checking is associated with dynamic functions to which significant 
limits apply only during certain operating conditions, such as during 
thruster firing. Examples include thruster heat temperature and cham- 
ber pressure. Detection of an  out-of-limit condition in  these cases  
generally dictates termination of the operation or switching to an alter- 
nate mode. I t  is apparent from the foregoing that the requirement 
exists for selectively enabling and disabling the limit check on various 
parameters. 
o Trend Analysis - Trend analysis has potential benefit in predicting end 
of life for wearout items in the system. The most promising application 
is in association with the biowaste resistojet thrusters.  These units 
operate at very high temperatures using corrosive propellants, and 
therefore must be replaced from time to time. Typical failure modes 
include corrosion of the electrical heating elements and erosion or 
blockage of the nozzles. Long-term analysis of thruster power con- 
sumption, temperatures, and pressures  are expected to yield inform- 
ation indicative of such failures. Trend analysis of another form is 
utilized to keep track of propellant and pressurant usage in  both the 
low-thrust and high-thrust systems as an  aid to controlling resource 
utilization and resupply operations. 
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5.1.  1 . 2 . 2  Redundant Element Checkout 
Redundancy in the low-thrust system is provided by two parallel systems 
from the EC/LS interface to the thrusters. These parallel systems each contain 
the valving, compression pumps, regulators, and storage tanks necessary to  
allow independent operation. Cross  feeds and isolation valves a r e  provided to  
allow interconnection of the two systems at various points i f  desired. This design 
also allows the two systems to  be checked out and operated independently and al- 
lows bypassing or  isolation of defective components for purposes of repair  or 
replacement. The thrusters feature functional redundancy in that multiple thrust- 
e r s  or  thruster pairs a r e  capable of supplying any desired moment to the vehicle. 
These multiple units a r e  a lso capable of independent checkout. Checkout of the 
redundant elements is therefore readily accomplished and presents no unique 
problems. 
The high-thrust system also features redundancy in the form of multiple 
storage tanks, pressure regulators, land thrusters. The storage tanks and thrust- 
e r s  a r e  isolatible by valving and may be exercised independently. The High 
Pressure Nitrogen Regulation System contains parallel regulators, one primary 
and one on standby, with automatic switchover via pressure switch interlock. 
Switchover to  the secondary regulator may also be initiated by command, thus 
enabling checkout of the baclcup unit. 
5.1.1.2.3 Integration with Data Management System 
The checkout interface between the Propulsion Subsystem and the DMS con- 
sists of the measurement parameters listed in Appendix I. All measurements at 
the interface a r e  in the form of normalized 0-20 mVdc, 0-5 Vdc, o r  0-28 Vdc. 
No special test  stimuli a r e  required. Test  sequencing and controi as well as 
operational control and display, a r e  provided by the DMS. 
5.1.1.3 Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem 
The Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (EC/LSS) is perhaps 
the most critical of the onboard subsystems in  that its proper operation is essential 
to the habitability of the Space Station and to  the lives of the crew. The subsystem 
therefore features a high degree of reliability which is achieved through conserva- 
tive design and through redundancy and backup provisions. Major elements of the 
subsystem a r e  the atmosphere supply and control, atmdsphere reconditioning, 
water management, waste management, IVA/EVA, and thermal control systems. 
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5.1.1.3.1 Checkout Function 
The EC/LSS is a mechanical and chemical subsystem and as such involves 
some rather unique checkout and fault isolation considerations. Probably the most 
apparent of these is the extremely wide spectrum of sensing requirements. These 
range from the relatively common, such as voltage, temperature, and pressure, 
to the uncommon which include P H  factor and conductivity of water. Other signifi- 
cant characteristics of the subsystem from the checkout standpoint are its large 
size, wide physical distribution, and its complexity. 
The subsystem performance parameters, (pressure, temperature, flow, 
quantity, etc. ) a r e  predominatly analog in nature and a r e  associated with con- 
tinuous process operations rather than events. Such parameters lend themselves 
well to limit checking as a means of status monitoring and fault detectiofi, and this 
technique is used extensively. Some trend analysis is also utilized to  evaluate 
performance of limited life i tems such as filters. Fault isolation is accomplished 
primarily through combinatorial analysis of operating conditions. 
0 Stimulus Generation - No external stimuli other than those required for 
operational control a r e  required €or checkout of the subsystem. 
0 Sensing - Detailed measurement requirements are included i n  
Appendix I. 
e Signal Conditioning - Many sensors  wil l  impose requirements for sig- 
nal conditioning to convert their outputs to a form compatible with the 
data acquisition equipment. The exact quantity and configuration will 
depend upon the type of sensors  selected, but may include s t ra in  gauge 
and temperature probe conditioning, frequency to  DC conversion, etc. 
plus scaling, amplification, and buffering circuitry. The required 
circuitry is provided as an integral part of the sensor assemblies or 
in associated electronics assemblies. 
e Limit Checking - The EC/LSS involves a large number of fluid process 
functions such as temperature and pressures  which must be monitored 
to  assure  the proper operation and safety of the subsystem. This re- 
quirement leads to the extensive use of a limit checking technique. 
The applicable limits include both absolute limits, such as those as- 
sociated with safety, and operational limits which may vary in accord- 
ance with particular operating modes or conditions. Certain parameters 
have significant limits in both categories and therefore require a dual 
limit check. The variable aspect of the operational limits necessitates 
the capability €or selectively altering the limit cri teria in  real time. 
5- 7 
In terms of data processing requirements the large number of limit 
functions associated with the EC/LSS is offset to some extent by the 
relatively low ra tes  involved. The majority of these functions are 
dynamically stable and a r e  not subject to high rates of change. The 
sampling rate  may therefore be quite low (i. e., one iteration/second or 
minute) even on the more critical functions which involve crew safety. 
Detection of an  out-of-limit condition i n  any of the EC/LSS parameters 
will lead to some form of relief or  corrective action, either automatic- 
ally or by the crew. The nature of the required action will in  some 
cases  be directly deducible, but more commonly must be determined 
through fault isolation techniques. A typical situation will  involve a 
two-stage reaction, first to relieve the condition and then to correct  it. 
An example is the detection of a sudden pressure decay in a freon coolant 
loop, indicating a possible rupture. Immediate and automatic action 
would be taken to isolate the loop to minimize further loss of fluid. 
This would be followed by automatic switchover to the alternate loop to 
maintain thermal conditioning. 
be initiated to localize the problem and determine repair  action. 
Fault isolation precedures would then 
e Trend Analysis  - Trend analysis techniques will  be utilized where ap- 
plicable to accomplish predetection of potential failures or  hazardous 
conditions and as an aid to the detection and diagnosis of abnormal 
conditions. Examples of predetection include monitoring of t race con- 
taminants in the atmosphere to detect buildup trends and monitoring of 
C02 absorption bed moisture level to project useful life. The application 
of trend data to fault detection and diagnosis is illustrated by the use of 
nitrogen repressurization history to detect abnormal cabin repressuriza- 
tion ra tes  which may be indicative of a leak in the vehicle pressure 
shell. Still another form of trend analysis is utilized in monitoring and 
forecasting consumables usage as an  aid to resource management and 
resupply planning. 
e Fault Isolation - Fault isolation wil l  be accomplished primarily through 
comparison of the operating system performance parameters with pre- 
determined limits and by combinatorial analysis of input/output measure- 
ments and related functions. Redundant element substitution will also 
be utilized where applicable. 
5.1.1.3.2 Redundant Element Checkout 
The EC/LSS features a high degree of redundancy at both the functional and 
LRU levels. Functional redundancy includes separate and independent forward 
and aft compartment atmosphere supply and control, water management, waste 
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management, and thermal control systems, each fully capable of supporting the 
12-man crew. Crossover connections a r e  provided between compartments to  
permit assemblies in either compartment to serve as spares  for those in the other 
compartment. Lower level redundancy is provided in  the form of parallel and/or 
se r ies  redundant storage tanks, pressure regulators, pumps, valves, filters, 
etc. In all cases the redundant systems/assemblies/components are isolatible by 
valving or switching and a r e  capable of being operated and tested as independent 
elements. They therefore present no unique problems from the checkout stand- 
point other than the requirement that they be exercised periodically i f  not normally 
on line. 
5.1.1.3.3 Integration with Data Management System 
The data acquisition interface between the EC/LSS and the DMS is defined 
by the measurement list in Appendix I. Signal conditioning is provided by the 
EC/LSS to  convert the measurement sensor outputs to  a standardized 0-20  mVdc, 
0-5 Vdc, or  0-28 Vdc level. The DMS must provide the computation capability 
necessary to apply calibration coefficients and convert to  engineering units. The 
DMS also provides the tes t  control, sequencing, and fault isolation logic. 
5 . 1 . 1 . 4  R F  Communications Subsvstem 
The R F  Communications Subsystem (RFCS) contains the receivers,  trans- 
mitters, power amplifiers, transponders, modems, and antenna systems to pro- 
vide radio frequency communications between the Space Station and the ground, 
DRSS, Shuttle, free-flying experiment modules, and EVA crewmen. The sub- 
system operates i n  the s, Ku, and VHF bands. 
5.1.1.4. 1 Checkout Functions 
Fault detection in the R F  Communications Subsystem utilizes both operation- 
a l  monitoring and specific functional tes t  routines. The operational monitoring 
takes place continuously while the system is in use and involves both the onboard 
and ground crews to  a great extent. Assessment of system performance is made 
in  much the same way one "checks out" his home communications equipment such 
as telephone and television, i. e. by listening to or looking at the output. Such tests 
are somewhat gross and subjective of course, and must be augmented by functional 
tests which include more precise qualitative analysis of performance. These 
functional tes ts  may be performed on a scheduled periodic basis or as an  aid to 
fault isolation i n  the event of a malfunction. Checkout of portions of the system 
wi l l  also be required prior to initiation of certain operations, such as a rendez- 
vous and docking. ' Functional tests generally involve the injection of calibrated 
test  stimuli and evaluation of equipment response. 
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0 Stimulus Generation - Checkout of the various S-band, &-band, and 
VHF receivers requires the capability to inject R F  tes t  stimuli of the 
appropriate frequency and modulation characteristics into the receiver 
front ends and measure the corresponding receiver outputs and Auto- 
matic Gain Control (AGC) levels. Testing of transmitters and of the 
receiver and transmitter modems requires the injection of modulating 
tes t  signals of the appropriate type and format. Stimulus requirements 
a r e  included in  Appendix I. 
0 Sensing - Sensing requirements associated with the RFCS a r e  tabulated 
in Appendix I. 
The 0-5 Vdc range given for the AGC, R F  power, and Voltage Standing 
Wave Ratio (VSWR) levels are conditioned sensor output levels rather 
than "raw" signal ranges and reflect the selected RFCS design approach 
of providing integral signal conditioning at the LRU level, Similarly, 
the bilevel status indicator parameters represent a variety of "raw" 
parameters including mode selections, switch positions, presence of 
primary power, and presence of input and/or output modulation. The 
selector switch position parameters indicate the position of multiposi- 
tion switch elements such as channel selectors and antenna switches. 
These parameters a r e  internally encoded such that a twelve-position 
switch, for example, is represented in  the form of a four-bit binary 
word. 
0 Signal Conditioning - The measurement signal conditioning for the RFCS 
is included as an integral portion of the subsystem at the "black box" o r  
LRU level. The measurements a r e  therefore directly compatible with 
the data management subsystem. 
0 Limit Checking - Limit checks of the continuous or random type have 
limited applicability in the RFCS. This is due to  the fact that the ma- 
jority of the significant subsystem performance parameters, such as 
R F  output power, a r e  meaningful only when the equipment is actually 
transmitting or, as in  the case of receiver sensitivity (AGC) measure- 
ments, when a calibrated input signal is present. Limit testing oppor- 
tunities a r e  therefore largely confined to periodic tes t  situations where 
the necessary conditions can be established. 
o Trend Analysis - Application of trend analysis techniques to selected 
RFCS measurements is potentially useful in detecting degradation and 
impending failures in such equipment as transmitters and receivers.  
In particular, the R F  power output and VSWR of the transmitters 
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and the AGC level of the receivers a r e  good performance indicators and 
a r e  amenable to such analysis. Care  must be exercised, however, to  
assure  proper correlation between these measurements and the various 
factors which influence them. Meaningful receiver sensitivity data, for 
example, is highly dependent upon accurate calibration of the input test 
signal. The maintenance of sufficiently accurate calibration of test 
stimuli and measurement equipment over a long t e rm orbit a1 mission 
is a problem not previously encountered in the space program and will 
require careful consideration. 
5 . 1 . 1 . 4 . 2  Redundant Element Checkout 
Redundancy in the RFCS is in the form of functional redundancy, as typified 
by the capability to communicate with the ground either directly or via DBSS, and 
in duality of systems as in  the case of the dual antenna systems. These dual or 
functionally overlapping a reas  of equipment a r e  independent of each other, however, 
and therefore do not constitute redundancy in the normal switchable or parallel 
equipment sense. A s  such, no unique checkout problems exist. 
5 . 1 . 1 . 4 . 3  Integration with Data Management Subsystem 
Stimulus requirements for the RFCS include modulated S-band, Ku-band, 
and V H F  R F  signals, analog signals, and digital inputs. The R F  signals in par- 
ticular a r e  relatively complex and are unique to  the subsystem. These are there- 
fore generated by equipment internal to  the subsystem. The control of these 
signals is a function of the DMS. The various analog signals (i. e. audio, video, 
etc. ) required for modulation testing a r e  likewise generated internally under DMS 
control. Digital test  inputs required for checkout of the PM modems and exciters 
a r e  supplied directly by the DMS via the data bus. 
Measurement sensors  and signal conditioning for the Communications Sub- 
system are provided as an  integral part of that subsystem. The signal interface 
between the RFCS and the DMS is in the form of standard 0-5 Vdc signals for each 
measurement. 
5 . 1 . 1 . 5  Structures 
The Structures Subsystem consists of the basic Space Station structure (shell, 
bulkheads, etc.) and the associated equipment such as meteoroid shields, hatches, 
air locks, docking systems, antenna booms, and artif icial  gravity systems. 
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5.1.1. 5.1 Checkout Functions 
Checkout functions associated with the Structures Subsystem are relatively 
few and simple. These are primarily related t o  the verification of compartment 
integrity, hatch and docking port status, and to the deployment of the high gain 
antennas and artificial gravity systems, The checkout task is characterized by 
low measurement data rates, absence of special test stimulus requirements, and 
by comparatively uncomplicated computation requirements. 
Stimulus Generation - No stimuli, other than normal operational control 
signals, a r e  required for checkout of the Structures Subsystem. 
Operational control requirements, as tabulated in  Appendix I, consist 
of discrete commands for sea l  pressurization and similar functions. 
Sensing - Sensing requirements of the Structures Subsystem are almost 
entirely limited to measurement of mechanical parameters, such as 
door, latch and actuator position and to the measurement of gas pressure 
in compartments, seals, and associated tankage. These requirements 
a r e  listed i n  Appendix I. 
Signal Conditioning - A minimum of special signal conditioning is re- 
quired since many of the measurements, particularly the position 
measurements, a r e  implemented in a manner (i. e . ,  with limit switches) 
which is directly compatible with the Data Acquisition System. Con- 
ditioning may be required €or the pressure transducers, depending upon 
the type selected, and for the rotational sensor. Such conditioning, 
where required, performs conversion and scaling of the sensor outputs 
and provides a standard 0-5 Vdc output to the Data Management System. 
Limit Checking - Periodic o r  continuous limit checking is required for 
selected pressure parameters, including sea l  pressures,  compartment 
and air lock pressures,  and docking ring compression strut pressures. 
Trend Analysis - Analysis of the Structures Subsystem has revealed no 
potential application of long te rm trend analysis techniques. Short 
t e rm analysis of compartment and seal pressures  is required, however, 
to verify pressure integrity and to detect and isolate meteoroid punctures 
and other leaks. 
5.1.1.5.2 Redundant Element Checkout 
Redundancy in the Structures Subsystem takes the form of installed and 
independently active elements. A typical example is the dual seals on all pres- 
sure  hatches. These redundant elements, being fully operational rather than of a 
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standby nature and being independently instrumented and controlled, require no 
special treatment from the checkout standpoint. 
5.1.1. 5.3 Integration with Data Management Subsystem 
The checkout interface between the Structures Subsystem and the DMS con- 
sists of the measurement parameters listed in Appendix I. All measurements at 
the interface are in the form of normalized 0-5 Vdc signals and a r e  directly 
compatible with the Remote Data Acquisition Uni t s .  Test  sequencing and control 
a r e  provided by the DMS, as is operational control. 
5.1.1.6 Electrical Power subsystem 
The Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) consists of dual isotope/Brayton 
power conversion elements and a power control and distribution network. The 
power conversion elements include the isotope heat sources and aeroshells, heat 
exchangers, turbines , compress or s, alternator s, and Gas Management Systems. 
The control and distribution network consists of transformer/rectifier as- 
semblies, voltage regulators, static sine wave and square wave inverters, 
batteries, battery chargers, and circuit protection and switching devices. 
5.1.1.6.1 Checkout Functions 
The EPS encompasses a wide variety of equipment including electrical, 
electronic, mechanical, and fluid systems. This resul ts  in  a diversity of check- 
out requirements as identified in the following sections. 
0 Stimulus Generation - Stimulus generation requirements imposed by the 
EPS, except for control and switching purposes, are relatively few and 
simple. These consist of simulated current unbalance inputs required 
to periodically test the operation of differential protection relays, 
simulated reverse  current inputs to periodically test reverse  current 
sensors,  and simulated phase unbalance (open phase) signals to test 
phase balance protection circuits. These stimuli may take the form of 
fixed value currents or  voltages, depending upon the final design of the 
protection circuitry. 
0 Sensing - Sensing requirements imposed by the EPS are listed in 
Appendix I. Measurement sensor and transducer requirements are 
generally well within current instrumentation capabilities. Sensor 
outputs are directly measurable as a dc voltage within specified ranges, 
or a r e  converted to standard measurement voltages by appropriate 
signal conditioning circuitry. 
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Selected sensors are implemented redundantly due to the criticality of 
the measurement or to  the difficulty of replacing a failed unit. Crit ical  
parameters with redundant instrumentation include heat source temper- 
atur e, compressor inlet temperature, compress or discharge pressure,  
turbine inlet temperature, bearing cavity pressures,  and turbine speed. 
These redundant sensors provide the opportunity to  perform cross  cor- 
relation and calibration of measurements. 
0 Signal Conditioning - Signal conditioning is required for all sensor 
outputs which do not fall within the standard measurement capability 
of the Remote Data Acquisition Units. The requirements include s t ra in  
gauge temperature probe conditioning networks, ac-to-dc converters, 
and frequency-to-dc converters. These devices perform signal con- 
version and scaling as necessary to provide a standard output to the 
Data Acquisition System. 
0 Limit Checking - Limit checking routines a r e  used to verify that cri t ical  
parameters such as the isotope heat source temperatures, compressor 
temperature and pressures,  turbine temperatures and speeds, and 
bearing cavity pressure remain within tolerance. 
within the Power Distribution System to monitor bus currents and vol- 
tages and to monitor the states of automatic circuit protection devices 
such as circuit breakers and phase balance protection relays. 
Limit tests are utilized 
0 Trend Analysis - Opportunities to apply trend analysis techniques to  the 
EPS a r e  limited. Meaningful trend data may be obtained from selected 
temperature measurements in  the isotope heat source and in  certain 
equipment items. The latter include bearing temperatures in the rota- 
ting machinery, and heat sink temperatures in equipment such as voltage 
regulators and inverters. These are relatively short-term trend param- 
e te rs  and may provide indications of degradation or incipient failure. 
Longer te rm trend parameters include heat exchanger and radiator 
inlet/outlet temperatures and flow ra tes  which may be used to identify 
and project efficiency degradation in these systems. 
0 Fault Isolation - Fault isolation is accomplished through comparison 
of measured operating conditions with predetermined limits and by 
combinatorial analysis of input/output measurements and associated 
performance parameters. Redundant element substitution is also used 
where available. 
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5.1.1.6.2 Redundant Element Checkout 
Redundant elements in  the EPS include critical protection and switching 
devices, transformer/rectifier units, voltage regulators, 400-Hz square wave 
inverter, 
batteries, and battery chargers. These are isolatible by switching. Checkout 
of the redundant units is accomplished by switching them on-line periodically 
and verifying proper functioning under normal operating conditions. A special 
situation exists in the case of the 600-Hz motor/generators, as both the primary 
and redundant units are normally used only to provide motoring start current to  
the Brayton cycle 1200 Hz alternator, a function normally performed only during 
initial activation of the Space Station. Periodic checkout of these units therefore 
requires a dummy load to substitute for the alternator and permit testing to  be 
performed without interrupting alternator operation. 
60-Hz and 400-Hz sine wave inverters, 600-Hz motor/generator, 
The inverters also present a special case. These units a r e  not designed for 
parallel operation. A redundant off-line unit cannot be rotated on line without 
first interrupting the a c  loads. To  avoid this, a dummy load is provided for 
checkout of redundant inverters. 
5.1.1.6.3 Integration with Data Management Subsystem 
Stimulus requirements in the EPS involve primarily fixed value currents 
or voltages associated with testing of circuit protection devices. These devices 
a r e  distributed throughout the Space Station rather than being concentrated, and 
the devices themselves a r e  generally relatively simple. This combination of con- 
ditions favors external rather than built-in stimulus generation. A requirement 
is therefore imposed on the DMS to generate these stimuli and to control their 
application to the appropriate EPS test  points. 
Measurement sensors, transducers, and signal conditioning for the EPS 
a r e  provided as an integral part of that subsystem. The signal interface between 
the EPS and the DMS is in  the form of a DC voltage for each measurement. The 
voltage levels are in the ranges of 0.20 mV, 0-5 V, and 0-28 V. 
5. 1.1. 7 Data Manacrement Subsvstem (DMS) 
The testing of the DMS will involve principally a ser ies  of software pro- 
grams designed to exercise the DMS group in a normal subsystem configuration. 
If there is a failure in one of the units, the OCS must isolate the failure, recon- 
figure the DMS Subsystem to restore  normal operation, alert the crew of the 
failure and its location, and record the event. Given that a unit has been replaced, 
the OCS must maintain knowledge of the operational status of the new unit. 
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Within the DMS, each functional unit must be tested. This means that there 
must be at least CPU type tests, main store tests, bulk memory tests, bus con- 
troller tests, etc. Since there exists more than one path to perform certain 
functions in  the subsystem configuration, it is important to verify that intercom- 
munications among units also exists. This requirement gives r i s e  to interface 
tests. Some of the interfaces which exist include CPU-to-CPU, CPU to both 
main and bulk memories, CPU to primary and secondary bus controllers, bus 
controllers to terminals, terminals and RDAUs, and RDAUs to individual sub- 
systems. The fact that the many communication paths a r e  possible generates 
the requirement that a path must be switchable or alterable to res tore  operation. 
Determining which path must be altered indicates that a fault isolation capability 
also must exist. 
ment in a sequence such that the analysis of the pattern of responses logically 
leads to a faulty piece of equipment. The maintenance of continuous knowledge 
of the operational status of the equipment can be translated into the requirement 
to maintain a subsystem status table (or configuration table) in software. If the 
operator is to be involved in any actions, interactive crew/display/software tes t s  
a r e  required. 
Fault isolation may occur by commanding tests to various equip- 
5. I. 1.7. 1 DMS Test Methods 
The DMS checkout will consist principally of software diagnostics supple- 
mented with additional temperature, voltage, and logic measurements. 
0 Central Processing U n i t s  - Erro r  detection and isolation in the central  
processing units depend on diagnostic software. In the multiprocessing 
configuration, one central processor can be utilized t o  check another 
central processor. This can be accomplished through memory o r  
through a direct interface. In addition, parity checking can be imple- 
mented between interfaces of the central processor with other units. 
o Main Store Units - The main store units can be checked periodically 
by attempting to address a l l  locations in  each unit, performing ripple 
tests,  sum checks, etc. BITE capabilities in the form of parity check- 
ing will  occur on data read from storage and data presented by the 
central processors. Parity checking will  be the principal means of 
e r r  or  detection. 
0 Data Bus Controller - The data bus controller is the communication 
path between memory and central processor and the data bus. Verify- 
ing operation of the controller can be implemented by software diagnos- 
tics. BITE hardware can be incorporated, which upon command from 
the CPU, inser ts  a known ser ia l  data word (pattern) into the input side 
of the controller and transmits the word back to the CPU. The CPU 
can compare the response to the command word. 
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0 Digital Data Terminals - The digital data terminal interfaces the various 
subsystems/experiments and the data bus. The terminal can be tested 
much like the bus controllers. A self-check feature in the form of 
BITE can be added which routes calibrated signals through the unit to 
the CPU (via the data bus) for verification. 
0 RDAU - The RDAU can be tested in the same manner as the bus con- 
t rol lers  and data terminals. The RDAU contains 32 analog inputs and 
32 digital inputs. One input of each type can be reserved to  wrap around 
an  analog or digital signal into the input for return to the CPU. The 
CPU would command the test  voltage or signal and examine the response 
for known conditions. 
0 Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU) - The LMDU electronics will 
be checked in an  identical manner to the RDAU. The displays wil l  re- 
quire crew participation. 
0 Command and Display Consoles - The controls and displays associated 
with the consoles a r e  subjected to a form of continuous tes t  through 
normal use. For the displays, standard test patterns containing all 
the symbols and numerics presented to  the crew wil l  verify operation 
of display and symbol generation. The controls a r e  exercised through 
the normal equipment utilization. 
0 Image Processing - Tests  for the image processing equipment wil l  
consist primarily of supply voltage and analog measurements for which 
an interface via an RDAU should be provided to the DMS computer. 
Optical equipment is tested through normal use. Integral diagnostics 
should be included with the special purpose processors such that the 
diagnostics can be commanded from the DMS computer. 
0 Bulk Storage - The basic operation of bulk memory can be verified by 
writing-reading random length records of predefined data patterns 
and checking the response for correctness. The basic capabilities of 
writing, sensing, reading forward and backward, 1/0 test, and control 
will be verified via th i s  technique. Error  detection through parity 
checking also will  be performed throughout the test. 
0 GN&C Preprocessor - Built-in test  equipment is assumed to  be applic- 
able. Since the preprocessors a r e  not yet defined, the form of BITE 
is yet to be determined. 
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0 OCS Measurements - In addition to the software diagnostics and BITE 
provisions which can be incorporated into the OCS, a ser ies  of measure- 
ments must be made on certain equipment. Some of the units may be 
temperature sensitive, which will  generate a requirement to monitor the 
temperature. Most of the units also will contain an  integral power supply 
or converter which must be monitored. There also may be certain logic 
which must be monitored. 
The measurements which are required fall into three categories. 
These include: 
a. Analog 
b. Digita l/dis c r  et e 
c. Visual 
The analog measurements will consist primarily of temperature and power 
supply voltages. The digital or  discrete signals wil l  be checked through software 
analysis of state or patterns, Visual inspections could be a visual analysis of a 
display, a pulse t ra in  or pulse shape - visual inspection may be more appropriate 
in performing adjustments, but it represents a form of measurement which may 
be required. 
6.1.1.7.2 OCS Computer Program Segments 
The operational and maintenance requirements indicate that two levels of 
testing or test  control a r e  required. Depending on the type of test  being exercised, 
different information wil l  be extracted and different actions wil l  result  from the 
testing. Two major se t s  of computer programs have been identified to perform 
this testing. Within each program there a r e  several  modules required to extract 
the desired information. The two test levels identified which translate into com- 
puter programs include: 
0 Continuous orbital monitoring (COM) 
0 Subsystem Fault Isolation (SFT) 
The continuous orbital monitoring program is required to maintain cogni- 
zance of equipment's operational status at all t imes and to isolate failures in 
order to reconfigure the equipment. The continuous monitoring program can be 
hardware o r  software. The hardware can consist of Caution and Warning or of a 
machine check interrupt from parity e r r o r  o r  power transients. The software 
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program would consist of a set of test  programs performed iteratively and con- 
currently with the application programs. The test programs would be interleaved 
with the application programs, and performed at a rate determined by the 
executive. The subsystem fault isolation program would be designed to  perform 
more extensive testing than would be performed in the "continuous" program. 
5.1.1.7.3 Test Program Modules 
Each of the two major program sets wi l l  contain several  modules to per- 
form specified functions. These are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
5.1.1.7.3.1 Continuous Orbital Monitoring Program Modules 
The continuous orbital monitoring modules wil l  consist of the DMS test  
programs (e. g. , CPU, memory addressing, 1/0 operation, etc. ), the polling of 
test points, and a Caution and Warning module. 
e Test  Program Modules - The test  programs are designed to  verify 
operation of individual configurable elements. The rationale for this 
i s  to maintain continuous configuration control, necessitating periodic 
information regarding the operational status of all configurable ele- 
ments comprising the DMS group. These test modules wi l l  be designed 
to  exercise as much of each LRU as possible in the allocated time. The 
modules will confirm, for example, fundamental operations of the CPUs, 
main memory, bus control, terminals, etc. 
o Test Point Polling - The test  point polling module is required to sample 
voltages, temperatures, and logic patterns for out-of-tolerance con- 
ditions or pattern e r rors .  The test  points can be handled singly or in 
blocks. 
e Caution and Warning - A Caution and Warning module is required to 
monitor critical signals on a continuous basis. This module may be 
implemented through selective parts of the two modules above; i. e., 
through execution of selective diagnostics or  through the polling of 
selective test points. 
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5.1.1.7.3.2 Subsystem Fault Isolation Modules 
Listed below a r e  candidate program modules which would comprise the 
Subsystem Fault Isolation program. These change with regard to the numbet of 
modules or  because of a merging of responsibilities. The list includes: 
Failure verification/isolation modules 
Failure event analysis module 
Reconfiguration module 
Subsystem status table 
Display/Record/Telemetering Module 
Repair verification modules 
o Fault Veri f i  cat ion/I s o la ti on Modules - Failure v e r  ificati on/iso lati on 
modules a r e  designed to resolve failures to the level at which re- 
dundancy is applied (for reconfiguration purposes) and to the LRU level 
to support the on-line remove-and-replace maintenance philosophy. 
Subsequent to the detection of an  e r ror ,  anomaly, or  failure, it may be 
necessary to verify via an independent path, that an event has occurred 
or that a particular path is disabled. This may be accomplished by 
performing a separate routine or  by correlating resul ts  from other 
routines. The isolation modules wi l l  be executed in  whatever sequence 
is necessary to resolve the failure to  a reconfigurable path. 
o Failure Event Analysis Module - Failure event analysis modules are 
designed to evaluate the event in  te rms  of Criticality, failure history, 
active/inactive status, etc. Based on an  FMEA, hazards studies, etc. ,  
failures can be classified into certain groupings; e. g., cri t ical  items, 
time critical items, i tems involving crew actions, items automatically 
switched through internal BITE, etc. When an  event occurs, it is nec- 
essary to evaluate the source of the event (whether OCS or LRE BITE), 
the criticality of the function lost and whether the crew must be involved 
in any subsequent actions, the redundant paths available and their 
status with regard to power on/off, failure history, etc. 
e Reconfiguration Modules - Reconfiguration modules a r e  designed to  
initiate and execute the sequence of operations necessary t o  reconfigure 
the subsystem. Depending on the source of the failure, different pro- 
cedures may be involved in reconfiguring the equipment. The recon- 
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figuration can occur in software or it can be a physical switching of 
redundant paths. These modules wi l l  be required to execute the unique 
actions associated with each LRU, path, function, or  subsystem. 
a Subsystem Status Table - The subsystem status table is designed to 
maintain the status of all DMS reconfigurable elements. To prevent 
the switching or reconfiguring of faulty equipment, it is necessary to 
maintain a subsystem status table of all equipment. In the event of a 
failure, the subsystem status table must be analyzed with respect to 
the failed element to determine i f  a redundant path is available. Sub- 
sequent to the remove-and-replace of the faulty LRU and the successful 
completion of a n  LRU test module, the subsystem status table would 
be updated. 
a Display/Record - Display/record is designed to  provide interactive 
display/control with the crew and to provide a n  event history file. In  
order to provide prompting information and to provide interactive capa- 
bilities between OCS and crew, display formats (or messages) containing 
such information will be required. In addition, an event history should 
be maintained for ground processing and analysis (logistics, provision- 
ing, long te rm trend data, etc). The capability for telemetering any or 
all test data also will  require certain provisions. 
a Repair Verification/Adjustment - The repair verification/adjustment 
is designed to verify proper operation of LRUs subsequent to repair. 
Special repair  verification or adjustment modules may be required t o  
re-verify an LRU or to  perform LRU adjustments. These tes ts  may not 
be as extensive as the failure verification/isolation modules, but could 
contain certain segments of the diagnostic modules. 
5.1.1.7.4 Computer Program Top Level Flow 
The Multiprocessor Executive System must provide certain times, on a 
scheduled basis, during which DMS tests can be performed. 'The executive may or 
may not subdivide the DMS tests  depending on computer load at the time or on the 
duration required to perform certain test sequences. Subsequent to DMS tests, 
the experiment module tes ts  or particular subsystem tests can be performed. 
At  specified intervals, the executive must return to the regular application 
programs . 
If during the DMS tests, a failure is detected, it must be resolved or isolated 
to an LRU or to a data path that is reconfigurable. The output of the LRU and 
interface tes ts  is a system reconfiguration, display message to  the crew, a re- 
cording of the event, and an  update of the subsystem status table. 
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5.1.1. 7. 5 DMS Redundant Element Checkout Techniques 
The control of redundancy within the DMS will be a software function 
principally and can be implemented through the LRU diagnostics within the Sub- 
system Fault Isolation Program. The redundancy control function consists of 
detecting e r ro r s  or  failures and isolation of the failure to a reconfigurable path. 
The general case of redundancy control is considered initially. 
An output from a single function is acquired by one of two RDAUs (one 
designated as "prime" and the other a s  "secondary"). The RDAU will  perform 
some processing to  the function and feed the information to its respective digital 
data terminal. 
data bus controllers (again, one is designated as "prime" and one "secondary"). 
Control of redundancy within the computer wi l l  depend on diagnostic software. 
Individual CPU diagnostics can be performed and cross  checking of one CPU by 
the other CPU is possible. Cross  checks can be implemented through check 
words in memory or through a direct control interface. If one CPU is determined 
to be at fault, the other CPU can assume the load. With regard to memory, each 
main store unit can be checked periodically by diagnostic software. BITE in  the 
form of parity checking wil l  play a significant role in e r ro r  detection and isolation 
on data read from memory to the CPU or  to the data bus controller. 
From the terminals, the data is fed to the computer via one of two 
The control of redundancy in the data acquisition path can be implemented by 
the incorporation of BITE within data acquisition elements and through software. 
Figure 5-1 shows a method of isolating and reconfiguring the data acquisition ele- 
ments. If an out-of-tolerance event or failure indication occurs, it can be t rue  or  
it can be a false alarm. By performing an  RDAU test, the RDAU can be absolved 
of the responsibility or  determined to be the source of the problem. If the RDAU 
is faulty, t h e  data point has an  alternate path through the secondary RDAU. If 
after performing the RDAU test (which indicated failure) the same indication pre- 
vails through the secondary RDAU, the failure is between the RDAU and the CPU. 
By alternately addressing data acquisition test command between primary and 
secondary elements, a logical isolation and reconfiguration pattern can be developed 
(as shown in Figure 5-1). This procedure would isolate to a replaceable unit. 
Redundancy at the RDAU/sensor level for the baseline has three configur- 
ations. The most critical signals (warning signals) have duplicate sensors  and 
two independent paths to the data bus. The next level signals (caution signals) 
also have duplicate sensors and two paths to  the data bus, but these paths are 
somewhat different from those for the warning signals. The third level of signals 
has a single sensor source, but has two separate RDAU paths to the OCS pro- 
cessors. The redundant sensors and redundant paths afford point-to-point correl-  
ation of data in the case of anomalies. In the case of warning signals, the data is 
fed to the CCDC and data bus through an  LMDU and to the bus through an RDAU 
5-22 
I I ERROR INDICATION FROM RDAU 
PERFORM RDAU I TEST ~ I 
SUBSYSTEM 
ADDRESS SAME DATA 
POINT THROUGH 
SECONDARY RDAU 
EXEC 4 
0X-G TEST PASS 
PRIMARY DATA PATH 
FAULTY, RECONFIGURE TO 
USE SECONDARY RDAU 
DATA PATH 
ADDRESS PRIMARY 
TERMINAL TEST TO 
ISOLATE FAULT 
PRIMARY 
TERMINAL 
FAULTY 
1 
EXEC 
Figure 5-1. Data Acquisition Configuration Control 
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and terminal. If an  out-of-tolerance indication exists, it is possible to address  
the alternate source and verify the condition. This  technique also makes heavy 
use of software for configuration control. 
5.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY 
This analysis identifies the integrated checkout functions associated with 
Space Station subsystems during the manned orbital phase of the mission. These 
functions a r e  depicted in Figure 5-2 and a r e  those required to  ensure overall 
availability of the Space Station. Characteristic of integrated testing is the fact 
that the test involves subsystem interfaces, and, therefore, test  objectives are 
associated with more than one subsystem. 
5 . 2 . 1  INTEGRATED STRATEGY 
Six checkout functions have been identified: 
Caution and warning 
Fault detection 
Trend analysis 
Operational status 
Periodic checkout 
Fault isolation 
These functions represent a checkout strategy of continuous monitoring and 
periodic testing with eventual fault isolation to a line replaceable unit (LRU). 
Under this aspect the functions are grouped as - 
CONTINUOUS MONITORING PERIODIC TESTING FAULT ISOLATION 
Caution and warning 0 Automatic tes ts  0 Localize to SS 
0 Fault detection 0 Operational 0 Isolate to  RLU 
o Trend analysis Verification 
0 Operational status 
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General characteristics of these groups a r e  defined below: 
5 . 2 . 1 . 1  Continuous Monitoring 
Continuous monitoring is not a test  per se.  It is a concept of continuously 
sampling and evaluating subsystem parameters for in/out-of-tolerance conditions. 
This evaluation does not necessarily confirm that the subsystems have failed or are 
operating properly. The evaluation is only indicative of the general status of the 
subsystems. For example, a condition exists where the integrated subsystems 
a r e  indicating in-limit conditions, but during the next se r ies  of attitude control 
commands, an e r ro r  in Space Station position is sensed and displayed. Since 
three subsystems, DMS, GN&C, and P/RCS, are involved in  generating and 
controlling the Space Station attitude, a "positional e r ror"  malfunction is not 
directly related to a subsystem malfunction. The malfunction indication is only 
indicative of an  out-of-tolerance condition of a n  integrated function. 
tion of the problem to a subsystem and eventually to LRU will require diagnostic 
test-procedures that a r e  separate from the continuous monitoring function. 
Final resolu- 
There a r e  situations in which the parameters being monitored a r e  intended 
to be directly indicative of the condition of a subsystem or  an  LRU. Examples of 
these include tank pressures, bearing temperatures, and power source voltages. 
However, even in these simpler cases when a malfunction is detected, an integrated 
evaluation will be performed to ascertain that external control functions, transducers, 
signal conditioning, and the DMS functions of data acquisition, transmission, and 
computation a r e  performing properly. This evaluation will result  in  either a sub- 
stantiation of the malfunction or identification of a problem external to the param- 
eter being monitored. 
Figure 5-2 shows the logic associated with each function in the continuous 
monitoring group, as well as the integrated relationships between these and the 
total checkout functions. The caution/warning and fault detection functions are 
alike in their automatic test and malfunction detection approaches, but a r e  differ- 
ent in te rms  of parameter criticality and malfunction reaction. The caution/warn- 
ing function monitors parameters that a r e  indicative of conditions critical to crew 
or equipment safety. Parameters  not meeting this criticality cri teria are handled 
as fault detection functions. Figure 5-2 shows that in  the event of a critical mal- 
function, automatic action is initiated to  warn the crew and sequence the sub- 
systems to a safe condition. Before this automatic action is taken, the subsystems 
must be evaluated to  ascertain that the failure indication is not a false a la rm and 
that the corrective action can be implemented. After the action is taken, the sub- 
systems must be evaluated to  determine that proper crew safety conditions exist. 
Since automatic failure detection and switching can be integral to  subsystem de- 
sign (self-contained correction) and subsystems can be controlled by the operation- 
al software or manual controls, it is imperative that the status of these events be 
maintained and that the fault detection and correction software be interfaced with 
the prime controlling software. For malfunctions that a r e  not critical, the crew 
is notified of their occurrence, but any subsequent action is initiated manually. 
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The next continuous monitoring function, trend analysis, automatically ac- 
quires data and analyzes the historical pattern to determine signal drift and the 
need for unscheduled calibration. It a l so  predicts faults and indicates the need 
for diagnostic and fault isolation activities. An example of a parameter in this 
category is the partial pressure of nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to establish the 
proper total pressure of the Swce  Station. Since it is an inert gas, the only make- 
up requirements a r e  those demanded by leakage or airlock operation. The actual 
nitrogen flow rate  is measured, and calculations a r e  performed which make 
allowances for normal leakage and operational use. When these calculations 
indicate a trend toward more than anticipated use, the crew is automatically 
notified and testing is initiated to isolate the problem to the gas storage and 
control equipment or to  an  excessive leak path. The historical data is not only 
useful in predicting conditions but is also useful in providing trouble-shooting clues. 
The data might reveal, for example, that the makeup rate  increased significantly 
after the use of an  airlock. This could lead directly to verifying excessive seal 
leakage. 
The final continuous monitor function is in  operational status. This function 
is performed by the crew and is nonautomatic with the exception of the DMS com- 
puter programs associated with normal Space Station operational control and 
display functions. The concept of continuous monitoring recognized and takes 
advantage of the crew's presence and judgment in evaluating Space Station per- 
formance. In many instances the crew can discern between acceptable and un- 
acceptable performance, and they can clearly recognize physically-damaged 
equipment o r  abnormal conditions. 
5 .2 .  1 . 2  Periodic Testing 
As  opposed to continuous monitoring, periodic testing is a detailed evalua- 
tion of how well the Space Station subsystems are performing. Figure 5-2 shows 
that periodic testing is not accomplished by any one technique. Rather, a com- 
bination of operational and automatic tes t  approaches is employed. The actual 
operational use of equipment is often the best check of the performance of that 
equipment. Operation of Space Station equipment and use of the normal operating 
controls and displays will be used in detecting faults and degradation in the sub- 
systems. This mode of testing is primarily limited to that equipment whose 
performance characteristics a r e  easily discernible, such as for motors, lighting 
circuits, and a la rm functions. 
Automatic testing is performed in two basic modes: 
a With the subsystems in an  operating mode, the DMS executes a diagnos- 
tic test procedure which verifies that integrated Space Station functions 
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a r e  being properly performed under normal interface conditions in  
response to natural or designed stimulation. This mode of testing 
allows the evaluation of Space Station performance ' without interrupting 
mission operations. 
0 For those situations where the integrated performance or interface 
compatibility between subsystems cannot be determined without known 
references or control conditions, the DMS will execute a diagnostic 
procedure in a test  mode. In this mode, control, reference, or bias 
signals will be switched in  or  superimposed on the subsystems to allow 
an  exact determination of their performance or localization of problem 
between the interfaces. Since the test mode may temporarily inhibit 
normal operations, the DMS must interleave the test  and operational 
software to maintain the Space Statior, in  a known and safe configuration. 
The scheduled automatic tes ts  a r e  performed to verify availability or proper 
operation of "on-line" subsystems, redundant equipment, and alternate modes. 
0 Periodic Verification of "On-Line'' Subsystems - The first checkout 
requirement is a periodic verification that on-line subsystems are 
operating within acceptable performance margins. The acceptable 
cri teria for this evaluation is based on subsystem parameter limits and 
characteristics exhibited during Space Station factory acceptance or 
pre-flight testing. The rejection cri teria and subsequent decision to 
repair  or reconfigure subsystems is based on the criticality of the 
failure mode. If the subsystems appear to  be operating properly, but 
the test  clearly indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, then one of the 
following alternatives must be implemented: 
- If the failure mode is critical, the crew normally takes immediate 
action to  isolate and clear the problem. 
- If the failure mode is not critical, the crew can take immediate 
action, schedule the work at a later time, or wait until the condi- 
tion degrades to  an  unacceptable level. 
0 Redundant Equipment Verification - A second checkout requirement is 
verifying that standby, off-line, or redundant equipment and associated 
control and switching mechanisms a r e  operable. The acceptable/re- 
jection cri teria for these evaluations is identical to  those for normally 
operating equipment. A primary distinction of this function is that 
equipment may have known failures f rom previous usage or  tests. This  
situation occurs when the crew has knowledge of a failure but has not 
elected to perform the necessary corrective action. The checkout 
5-28 
function then becomes one of equipment status accounting and main- 
tenance/repair scheduling. The status information is interlocked with 
mission procedures and software to  preclude activation of failed units 
while they are being repaired or until proper operation following repair  
is verified. 
0 Alternate Mode Verification - The third checkout function is verifying the 
availability of alternate modes of operation. This function is essentially 
a confidence check of the compatibility of subsystems'interaction and 
performance during and after a change in the operating mode. To some 
extent this function overlaps with redundant equipment verification, but 
is broader in scope in that it verifies other system-operating character- 
istics. For example, some modes will involve manual override or 
control of automatic functions or automatic power-down sequences. 
5.2. 1.3 Fault Isolation 
Fault isolation to an  LRU is a Space Station goal. A s  shown in Figure 5-2, 
fault isolation testing is initiated when malfunction indications cannot be directly 
related to  a failed LRU. The integrated test functions associated with fault isola- 
tion a r e  localizing a malfunction to a subsystem or  to  an  explicit interface between 
two subsystems and identifying the subroutine test  necessary for LRU isolation. 
In structuring this relationship between integrated subsystem tests for fault local- 
ization and subroutine tes ts  for fault isolation, the DMS, in  conjunction with the 
test procedure documentation, must establish a n  effective man-machine interface 
so that in the event of an  unsolved malfunction the crew wil l  be able to help evalu- 
a te  the condition and determine other tes t  sequences necessary to isolate the 
problem. To accomplish this requirement, the DMS must be capable of displaying 
test  parameters and instructions in engineering units and language and be capable 
of referencing these outputs to applicable documentation or programs that correl-  
a te  test  results to corrective action required by the crew. 
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Section 6 
ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS 
6 . 1  SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFJNTIONS 
The on-orbit tests required to insure the availability of the Space Station 
Two discrete levels of 
subsystems a r e  defined herein. Also delineated are the measurement and 
stimulus parameters required to perform these tests. 
testing a r e  defined, i. e . ,  continuous status monitoring tes ts  for fault detection of 
critical and noncritical parameters, and subsystem fault isolation tests for 
localization of faults to a specific Line Replaceable Unit. In addition to  these two 
levels, tes ts  a r e  defined for periodic checkout and calibration of certain units, 
and parameters requiring analysis of trends are defined. 
Due to the software module approach to DMS checkout, it was  deemed 
necessary to estimate the CPU time and memory required to implement these 
modules along with a n  assessment of the services required from an  Executive 
Software System to control the checkout. 
These test descriptions, measurement, and stimulus information provided 
for each subsystem, and the software sizing information provided for the Data 
Management System provide the data required to estimate the checkout impact 
on the DMS software and hardware. Table 6-1 is a summary of the measurement 
and stimulus requirements for the Space Station. 
6 . 1 . 1  GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
The GN&C Subsystem operates in a closed-loop mode with the Data Manage- 
ment and Propulsion Subsystems as elements of the loop. Normal operation is 
fully autonomous. Station attitude, position, and rate information a r e  derived by 
the DMS from the GN&C sensors such as star trackers,  horizon sensors, gyros, 
and accelerometers. Reaction controls a r e  then computed by the DMS and t rans-  
mitted to the propulsion thrusters. GN&C operation is thus closely integrated 
with both of these other subsystems. Operation is also influenced to a high degree 
by external factors such as shifts in vehicle mass, drag, and center of gravity and 
by disturbances such as docking impacts. These factors must be accounted for in 
performing checkout and fault isolation tasks. 
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6.1.1.1 Status Monitoring 
Fault detection within the GN&C Subsystem is accomplished primarily by 
monitoring of selected performance parameters and comparing the resulting 
measured o r  computed values with predetermined limits and/or against parallel 
redundant parameters. The parameters to be monitored in this manner are listed 
in the Status Monitoring column of Appendix 1-1. Precise sampling intervals are 
not required. Detection of an out-of-limit condition resul ts  in immediate notifica- 
tion of the crew. In the case of critical parameters or where otherwise deemed 
desirable, an automatic fault isolation routine is automatically initiated to identify 
the faulty LRU. Otherwise, initiation of further action is a crew option. 
Fault detection procedures must be conditioned where necessary to account 
for externaldisturbances. For example, leakage or venting from the Station will 
cause a response to the subsystem similar to that of a failed open reaction jet. A 
change in the Station configuration, such as that due to  docking or undocking of 
experiment or crew cargo modules will result  in subsystem performance pertur- 
bations which can be interpreted as faults unless these events a r e  accounted for in 
the subsystem logic. 
Sixteen caution functions have been identified for the GN&C Subsystem. 
These are the bearing temperature and vibration monitors for the CMGs. 
6.1.1.2 Trend Analvsis 
Certain o€ the GN&C performance parameters are amenable to trend analysis 
for detection of degradation or pending failure. These are identified in Appendix 
1-1 i n  the Trend column. Included a r e  gyro and accelerometer temperatures, 
laser transmitter power and CMG spin rate,  temperature, and vibration. Trend 
data of another type is required on the frequency and duration of high thrust re- 
action jet firing. This data is necessary to determine actual versus  scheduled 
energy requirements and fuel consumption. 
6.1.1.3 Periodic Checkout and Calibration 
Since most GN&C faults a r e  detectable by operational monitoring, periodic 
checks a r e  performed primarily to  ascertain that qualitative performance param- 
eter degradations which a r e  not obviously detectable have not occurred, and to  
detect failures in inactive or standby equipment. Calibration is a subtask of the 
periodic checkout and will be conducted during the periodic event. Checkout 
intervals a r e  nominally once per month based on predicted performances of the 
components. The horizon detectors for artificial-g operation, star t rackers  for 
inertial orientation, and rendezvous and docking t rackers  a r e  used infrequently 
and will require function testing prior to the respective events. The automatic 
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landmark tracker,  which is a new flight item, is checked once per week for the 
first year when it is being flight tested. After the first year, it is checked once 
per month as is the res t  of the subsystem. 
Checkout utilizes preprogrammed checkout routines and employs the tech- 
nique of introducing calibrated stimuli at the first practical point in the forward 
path of the GN&C loop and monitoring subsequent downstream points for checks 
and calibration. Most of the downstream monitoring points a r e  operational data 
interfaces with the DMS and DMS-computed data, such as attitude or position 
e r ro r s .  The test sequence therfore begins with verification, through self-diag- 
nostic routines, of the DMS software and DMS/GN&C interfaces. This is followed 
by verification of the sensor electronics and data buffers and of the sensors  them- 
selves. The f i n a l  portion of the sequence checks the reaction control elements of 
the subsystem, including the CMGs and the jet drivers.  
6. 1. 1 . 4  Fault Isolation 
All stimulus and measurement parameters a r e  utilized for fault isolation. 
As  indicated previously, fault detection is accomplished.through direct measure- 
ment of these parameters or through DMS computations based upon these measure- 
ments. The DMS-computed fault detection is generally at the system level and is 
in te rms  of excessive attitude, position, or instrument pointing e r rors .  The 
directly detected faults, such as excessive CMG bearing temperature, are general- 
ly more component or assembly oriented. In either case, the fault isolation function 
involves systematic analysis of the fault indicators and associated functions using 
the normal operating input/output relationships plus special test stimuli where 
necessary. Applicable portions of the periodic checkout routines are used. 
Since the fault detection and isolation are limited to the LRU level, some of 
the more familiar component monitor parameters a r e  omitted from the stimulus/' 
meaurement list. An example is ' the  spin rate monitor of the instrument gyro. 
This is an  often monitored function in many applications but in this instance, the 
gyro performance is verified by the response to a command torquing signal which 
checks the gyro as an overall transfer function. If the response is out-of-specifi- 
cation, then the gyro as an  LRU wi l l  be replaced regardless of whether it was the 
spin rate, signal generator, torquer scale factor, or any other fault which caused 
the deviation. 
A typical tes t  and fault isolation routine is diagrammed in Figure 6-1. This  
routine involves the Laser  Rendezvous Tracker,  which is used to  acquire and 
track docking targets. The device transmits a coherent parallel pulsed light beam 
and detects energy returned from a passive reflector on the target vehicle. Course 
pointing of the beam is achieved by mechanical gimbals, while fine pointing is 
achieved by a piezoelectric beam deflector and optical deflection amplifier. The 
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device provides angles, range, and range rate as outputs. Three LRUs are in- 
volved, these being the tracker head, the gimbal assembly, and the electronics 
assembly, The tracker head includes an optical self-test mode which allows a 
portion of the transmitted pulse to be reflected back into the receiver. 
The test  sequence shown i n  Figure 6-1 assumes that no actual target is 
available. The tes t  is therefore not 100 percent complete in that the actual 
beam pointing accuracy cannot be verified. 
6.1.2 PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM 
The Propulsion Subsystem consists of two major elements, one being the 
High-Thrust Monopropellant Hydrazine System and the other the Low -Thrust 
Resistojet Thruster System. Both systems interface with the GN&C and Data 
Management Subsystems for control. The Low-Thrust System also interfaces 
with the EC/LS Subsystem for biowaste propellants. 
6.1.2.1 High-Thrust Svstem 
The High-Thrust Propulsion System must satisfy both an  initial Space 
Station two-year artificial-gravity phase and subsequent zero-gravity phase. 
The quantity of subsystem measurements and stimuli required for the former are 
more than double the quantity required for the latter. This is due to increased 
propellant and pressurant tankage requirements as well as the increased number 
of thrusters necessary during artificial gravity operations. 
Operation of the High-Thrust System is automatic with the thruster firing 
controlled by the GN&C Subsystem. Al l  other normal operational controls for 
the subsystem are associated with tank switching, thermal control, and safing 
functions. The need for tank switching is monitored and controlled by the DMS, 
while the thermal control assemblies are controlled by various thermostats. 
Although the High-Thrust System is normally required only during scheduled 
events such as the artificial-gravity experiment or docking, the system is continu- 
ously maintained in a pressurized and ready-to-fire state. This concept is strongly 
influenced by fluid characteristics, resupplying penalties, and the need for the 
subsystem to be available for unscheduled events or emergencies. Safety param- 
e te rs  as well as certain other system status and readiness indicators a r e  therefore 
monitored continuously even though the system may be inactive. Scheduled high- 
thrust events a r e  typically at three-month intervals and a r e  cri t ical  in nature. A 
complete functional check of the system is therefore required prior to each event. 
Resupply operations a r e  also scheduled every three months and require that leak 
and functional checks of the transfer system lines and controls be performed. 
During the events and particularly during actual thruster firing intervals, 
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subsystem status monitoring requirements become extremely important. Appendix 
1-2 contains the measurements and stimuli required for checkout of the High-Thrust 
Propulsion Subsystem. 
6.1.2.1.1 Status Monitoring 
Continuous monitoring of high-thrust propulsion system parameters is 
performed to detect over-pressure conditions, out-of-tolerance regulation, major 
leakage, empty tankage, and thruster malfunctions: 
Overpressure - Each tank is relieved automatically through a burst 
disk and mechanical relief valve when a major overpressure condition 
ar ises .  Tank pressure as well as relief valve actuation is monitored 
continuously with a signal initiated to a ler t  the crew of any unwarranted 
pres sur  e build-up. 
Out-of-Tolerance Regulation - Redundant pressure regulation is pro- 
vided by parallel regulators, and automatic malfunction detection 
and switching is provided by pressure switches which activate the 
valves to each regulator. Pressure  switches initiate the appropriate 
commands dependent on the malfunction mode (high or low regulation 
outlet pressure). A signal is also provided to  a ler t  the crew to any 
regulator switchover. 
Major Leakage - Pressure transducer signals are monitored 
continuously, and pressure decay rates are computed. An indication 
of any abnormal pressure decay requires the initiation of closing the 
appr opr iat e isolation valves . 
Tank Switching/Isolation - Any pressure differential across  the 
propellant tanks (gas ullage to fluid side) is detected and the 
appropriate switching commands initiated. This differential pressure 
occurs when a tank runs dry thus requiring the next tank (normally 
isolated) to be put on-line to  feed propellant to the thrusters.  
Thruster Out-of-Limit Operating Pressure,  Temperature, and Voltage 
Conditions - The thruster,  to operate safely, must have specific inlet 
conditions. These conditions a r e  monitored and thruster operations 
inhibited i f  they a r e  out of limits. 
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6.1.2.1.2 Periodic Checkout 
Daily checks of the High -Thrust System a r e  conducted to  determine its 
operational status. A more detailed verification is also performed approximately 
every three months. 
Typical daily subsystem status checks are accomplished through visual 
monitoring of displays and through automatic limit checks and trend analysis, 
The following status checks are required 
0 Subsystem Status - Insures that the subsystem is in an  operational 
state (satisfactory pressures, temperatures, valve positions, 
propellant, and pressurant quantities, etc. ). 
0 Primary o r  Backup Assembly Status - Provides an indication of 
whether the redundant or primary subsystem assemblies are in use. 
e Tank Pressures  and Temperatures - Verifies that normal operating 
conditions exist and whether pressure and temperature variation 
trends are normal. 
The more detailed periodic checkout is scheduled over three-month intervals 
and prior to initiation of a critical operation such as an artificial experiment. 
In cases where a fault is detected, the applicable portions of the periodic 
checkout procedure will  be needed to determine the maintenance required. The 
periodic checkout includes: 
e Leak and Functional Tests  - These verify the basic subsystem integrity. 
Leak tes ts  a r e  performed both manually and automatically. The manual 
checks a r e  required to detect low-rate leak conditions which may be 
detrimental over a long period of time i f  uncorrected. The functional 
tests check both the electrical circuits and component (valves, etc. ) 
operations. 
e Pressure Regulation and Thruster Performance Checks - The thruster 
performance checks require monitoring and recording of chamber 
pressure and temperature versus time during the firing interval. 
Automatic/programmed test-sequencing and high-speed data sampling 
at a rate of 250 samples/second a re  necessary. 
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Instrumentation Calibration - One or two-point calibration is required 
for both temperature and pressure transducers. U s e  of standard gages 
or known pressure and temperature references is required. 
GN&C/Propulsion Subsystem Interface Checks - Simulated programmed 
control commands are needed to verify the GN&C propulsion interfaces. 
Other subsystem (DMS and Electrical Power) interface integrity checks 
a r e  also performed as part of the periodic functional tests. 
Propellant Sampling - The quality of the propellant must be determined 
through taking a sample and returning it on the ALS for analysis on the 
ground . 
Subsystem Hardware Life History Log - Automatic storage and display 
of data is desirable.. 
In general, the test sequence for the detailed periodic checkout should first 
include an evaluation of general subsystem status and safety critical parameters 
followed by LRU-level checkout. The general test sequence should be to test the 
high pressure storage assemblies first and then the subsequent downstream 
assemblies. A total. candidate sequence follows: 
(a) Subsystem Status Check 
0 Pressure 
0 Temperature 
0 Valve Position 
0 Propellant Quantity 
0 Identification of On-Line Equipment 
(b) Pressure Transducer Calibration Check 
(c) Verify Purge (Checkout) Assembly Operational Status 
0 Functional 
0 Pressure (Regulation) 
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(d) Subsystem Gross  Leakage Test 
e Pressure Trend/Analysis 
(e) Verify Safety Critical Caution and Warning Circuits (over pressure, 
relief actuation, regulator switchover, etc. ) 
e E le ctri cal C ontinuity/Re spons e 
(f) Bellows Leak Test 
o Gas Analysis of Pressurant 
(g) Pressure Control Assembly Check 
o Backup Regulator Switchover Circuit 
0 Regulation 
o Pressure Switch Setting 
(h) High Pressure Isolation Valve Check 
o Leakage - Pressure  Trend Analysis 
49 Functional 
(i) Test Low Pressure Manifold and Propellant Tank (Gas Side) Isolation 
Valves 
e Leakage - Pressure  Trend Analysis 
e Functional 
Test Propellant Isolation Valves (Tanks and Manifolds) 
e 
(j)  
Leakage - Pressure Trend Analysis 
e Functional 
(k) Check Tank Switching Circuit 
e Functional 
6- 10 
(1) Thruster Modules 
0 Isolation Valves - Leaks and Functional 
0 Isolation Circuits 
0 Thruster Valves - Leakage 
0 Thruster - Functional and Performance Firing 
(m) Miscellaneous 
0 Vent Valves - Leak and Functional 
0 Catalytic Nonpropulsive (propellant) Vent Device - Functional 
0 Temperature Sensors - Calibration 
0 Resupply Subassembly 
(n) GN&C - Propulsion Integrated Subsystem Test 
0 Functional - Firing Commands 
0 Performance - Chamber Pressure and Temperature versus  Time 
Verification 
6.1.2.1.3 Fault Isolation 
Fault isolation checks within the High-Thrust Propulsion System consist 
essentially of portions of the detailed periodic checkout sequence previously 
described. An example of isolating a fault following the detection of a change in  
the regulator isolation valve is depicted in Figure 6-2. The following steps are 
required to isolate a fault in the pressure control assembly. The example is 
considered to be one of the more complex fault isolation tes ts  for the high thrust 
system. 
1. Verify subsystem operational status. 
2. Calibrate hi pressure and pressurant manifold pressure transducers. 
3. Verify purge (checkout) assembly is operational. 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
6.1.2.2 
Close propellant tank pressurant isolation valves, low pressure manifold 
isolation valves, and regulator isolation valves . 
Verify regulation isolation valves a r e  functional. 
Vent low pressure manifold. 
Open primary regulator isolation valves 
Monitor downstream regulation pressure - either a high o r  low regula- 
tion pressure failure indication should occur. If the regulator proves 
to  be satisfactory, the pressure switches o r  switchover circuits are 
malfunctioning. 
Close regulator isolation valve and provide pressure switch test 
pressures  from the purge (checkout) assembly. Ver i fy  pressure- 
switch actuation pressure valves. If the pressure switch performance 
is satisfactory, the control logic circuits must be malfunctioning 
Conduct electrical switchout circuit repair  and checks as required. 
(Note: The Electrical LRUs have not been identified for the Propulsion 
Subsystem. ) . 
Reset regulator switchover circuit and assure  the pressure control 
assembly is in a n  operational state. 
Low-Thrust System 
The Low-Thrust Propulsion System uses EC/LS-produced biowaste gases 
(C02, H 2 0 ,  CH4) and stored water as propellant for resistojet thrusters.  These 
thrusters have a thrust level of 25 millipounds, and a r e  used in  a high duty cycle 
mode (25-80 percent) to provide station orbit maintenance and, i f  desired, CMG 
desaturation. The system consists of compression pumps, heat exchangers, 
accumulators, supplementary propellant tankage, thrusters,  and the necessary 
valves, switches, etc., for system control, checkout, etc. 
Normal system operation is in the orbit-keeping and attitude control mode 
and is fully automatic. Thruster selection and control is derived by the DMS 
computational equipment on the basis of inputs from the GN&C Subsystem. The 
DMS also controls the subsystem configuration parameters such as propellant and 
pressurant selection. These parameters a r e  primarily a function of impulse re- 
quirements and available stores. Manual control capability is provided to  allow 
crew override i f  required due to a malfunction or other reasons. On-orbit check- 
out of the low-thrust system includes a combination of continuous monitoring, 
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daily operational status checks and trend analysis, a detailed periodic checkout 
every three months, and fault isolation activities. Appendix 1-3 contains the 
measurements and stimuli required to check out the Low-Thrust Propulsion 
System. 
6.1.2.2.1 Status Monitoring 
Continuous monitoring of low thrust system parameters is conducted to 
detect faults and to initiate switching to redundant LRUs when necessary. This is 
accomplished by a combination of integral sensing/switching provisions and DMS 
action. The integral implementation is utilized primarily in  the case of failures 
which demand immediate and direct action to relieve a potentially hazardous con- 
dition. An example is excessive pressure on the outlet side of a pressure 
regulator. The condition would be detected by a pressure sensitive switch which, 
when activated, would automatically operate solenoid valves to isolate the regu- 
lator and switch to  a parallel redundant unit. Notification of the occurrence 
would be given the DMS which would then proceed to notify the crew and accom- 
plish other required reactions, such as fault verification, repair  direction, or 
modification of Space Station operations. Faults which .are less crit ical  i n  nature 
and those for which diagnosis and corrective action require the computational and 
analytical capability of the DMS a r e  processed by automated DMS routines. Table 
6-2 lists a number of representative failure modes and the associated subsystem 
or DMS action. 
6.1.2.2.2 Periodic Checkout 
A s  for the High-Thrust System, daily operational status checks a r e  required 
for the Low-Thrust System. These daily checks a r e  basically the same as those 
described in Subsection 6.1.2.1.2.  
A more detailed checkout of the Low-Thrust System is conducted every 
three months. A l l  redundant elements within the system are checked, including a 
verification of the proper operation of all valves. The daily checks only verify 
valve positions, not valve actuation. A possible test sequence to be used in  the 
periodic checkout is: 
0 Subsystem Status Check 
- Pressure  
- Temperature 
- Valve Position 
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Table 6-2. Representative Failure Modes and Associated Subsystem or DMS 
Action 
COMPONENT FAULT ACTION 
Pump 
Pump 
Excessively high or 
low pump speed 
Out-of- limit inter - 
stage temperature 
Storage bottle and/or Excessive pressure 
High Pressure Manifold 
Regulator Out - of - tolerance 
regulation 
Flow Control Valve Fail close or open 
Thruster 
Thruster 
Thruster 
Fittings 
H20 Vaporizer 
H20 Storage 
Heating element over 
temperature 
Out -of -tolerance 
power consumption 
Inlet valve wil l  not 
close 
Leakage 
Out - of - toleranc e 
heat input 
Out-of-tolerance 
pres sur  e 
DMS turn off pump and 
isolate by closing appropriate 
valves. 
Same as above, initiated by 
measurement in EC/LS 
Subsystem. 
Relief assembly vents gas(es). 
Integral control. 
Switch to alternate regulator 
and isolate by closing appro- 
priate valves. Integral control. 
DMS switch to alternate feed 
system and isloate by closing 
crossfeed valves. 
Integral thruster cutoff. 
DMS switch to alternate 
thrusters. 
DMS switch to alternate 
thruster and isolate module. 
DMS or  crew inspection de- 
termine source and isolate. 
Switch to  alternate assembly. 
DMS switch to alternate vapor- 
izer.  Tarn  off heaters and 
close isolation valves. 
DMS-switch to alternate tank 
and isolate. 
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- Propellant Quantity 
- Identification of On-Line Equipment 
- PumpSpeed 
- Vaporizer 
Pressure Transducer Calibration Check (only every 6 months) 
Subsystem Gross Leakage Test 
- Pressure Trend Analysis 
Verify Safety Critical Caution Circuits (over pressure,  relief 
actuation, regulator switch-over, etc. ) 
- Electrical Continuity/Response 
Flow Control Check 
- Backup Regulator Switchover Circuit 
- Regulation 
- Pressure Switch Setting 
- Valves 
Thruster Modules 
- 
- Isolation Circuits 
- Thruster Valves - leakage 
- Thruster Heaters 
Inter face Checks 
Isolation Valves - leaks and functional 
- GN&C 
- EC/LS 
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6.1.2.2.3 Fault Isolation 
DETERMINATION 
OF VALVE 
FAILURE (OPEN) 
Fault isolation within the Low-Thrust System typically involves a n  input/ 
output relationship such as regulator inlet versus  outlet pressure, valve command 
versus position, etc. A typical fault isolation flow is depicted in  Figure 6-3 for 
a C02 tank isolation valve failure. The failure is detected as a result  of monitoring 
valve position, and the crew is notified of switchover to the redundant valve. 
this case, the failure is either the valve o r  in the DMS control logic o r  data ac-  
quisition elements . 
For 
A 
b 
YES 
Figure 6-3. Low Thrust System C02 Tank Isolation Valve Failure (Open) 
PERFORM 
DMS 
CHECKS 
i 
The capability to substitute redundant elements provides a very useful fault 
isolation tool for the Low-Thrust System. This may be used in  the case of the 
pressure regulator assemblies, compression pumps, and water vaporizers for 
example, where solenoid-controlled isolation and cross  feed valves allow rapid 
switchover to the redundant elements. 
NO 
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r i 
REPLACE 
VALVE 
Another valuable fault isolation tool is the onboard crew member. H i s  powers 
of observation and reasoning in  some cases enable him to  detect and isolate faults 
which may elude the efforts of an automated system o r  which a r e  difficult to detect 
by instrumentation, as in  the case of fluid leakage. Planned utilization of the crew 
for routine fault isolation will  be minimized, however, due to the limitations on 
available manpower resources . 
6.1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM 
The Environmental Control and Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem provides 
the atmosphere supply and control, atmosphere reconditioning water management, 
waste management, and thermal control functions for the Space Station, including 
the IVA/EVA Systems. Proper operation of the subsystem is essential to the 
habitability of the Space Station and to the lives of the crew. The subsystem 
therefore features a high degree of reliability which is achieved through provision 
of redundancy and backup operating modes. 
The EC/LS Subsystem normally operates in  an automatic closed-loop mode 
under overall supervision of the Data Management System (DMS). An important 
function of the DMS will  be to maintain a vehicle mass  balance to project expend- 
ables use ra tes  and to  identify equipment which is not reclaiming oxygen and water 
at the required efficiency. The measurement/stimulus list for the EC/LS is given 
in  Appendix 1-4. 
6.1. 3 .1  Status Monitoring 
Status monitoring instrumentation is provided for major parameters which 
reflect performance and operational status of the subsystem. Any appreciable 
degradation of subsystem performance is detected by limit checking. Depending 
upon the nature of the fault the crew receives a normal malfunction notification or 
a caution o r  warning alarm. Caution pertains to a condition of station degrada- 
tion where some station activities may be curtailed. A warning is given when life 
critical systems a r e  involved and the crew is in  immediate danger. 
Fault detection acceptance or rejection cr i ter ia  a r e  based on historically 
or  analytically derived definitions of normal operation. Each individual fault 
detection parameter must be considered separately and acceptance or rejection 
cri teria selected which accurately reflect performance. Limits on acceptance 
cri teria a r e  made sufficiently broad to avoid premature or  erroneous fault warnings, 
yet with adequate margin to avoid the development of hazardous conditions. 
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Normally, not all the EC/LS equipment is operating at a given t ime and an 
inventory of on-line assemblies must be kept by the DMS. This inventory is re- 
quired to condition limit checking and other fault detection procedures s o  as to 
prevent false malfunction warnings for shutdown equipment. Also, EC/LS 
assemblies which operate in a cyclic mode possess parameters which vary greatly 
over the cycle. Provisions must therefore be made for conditioning the tes t s  of 
these parameters with the normal for that point in the cycle. 
6 . 1 . 3 . 2  Trend Analysis 
Trend analysis is utilized for functions which a r e  subject to performance 
degradation of known and measurable characteristics. These include electrolysis 
cells, reverse  osmosis membranes, adsorption beds, and evaporator wicks. 
By observing the change in the major performance parameters, component re- 
placement can be scheduled at a convenient time for the crew. Hazardous 
conditions can be avoided by trend analysis prediction of out-of-tolerance con- 
ditions. Trend analysis is also used to monitor expendable use rates. This pin- 
points locations of excessive expendables use ra tes  indicative of possible leakage 
or  other failures, and also provides a basis for resources  management and re- 
supply planning activities. An example of this application is the use of nitrogen 
repressurization history to detect abnormal cabin repressurization rates which 
may be indicative of a leak in  the vehicle pressure shell. 
6 . 1 . 3 . 3  Periodic Checkout 
The EC/LS is periodically checked out to determine its status at specific 
periods in the mission. Checkout just prior to resupply is advantageous so that 
any deficiencies can be identified and replacements can be included in  the resupply 
provisions . 
The general checkout sequence addresses the least dependent functional 
group first. A s  an example, the thermal control equipment is checked out first 
because its operation does not depend on other functional groups. However, many 
other assemblies depend upon proper operations of the thermal control equipment. 
By verifying thermal control, deficiencies due to inadequate heating and cooling are 
eliminated as possible causes of deficiencies in EC/LS equipment. The sequence 
for checkout of functional groups follows the sequence below. 
1. Thermal Control 
2. Atmosphere Supply 
3. Atmosphere Reconditioning 
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4. Water Management 
5. Waste Management 
6. IVA/EVA 
Sequencing within an  assembly group follows the same general procedure; 
the assemblies and LRUs which a r e  least dependent a r e  checked first. Where 
applicable, test sequencing is established by combinational analysis requirements. 
Only a portion of the LRUs wil l  be operating at a given time during the 
mission. Therefore, in order to accomplish checkout, stimuli will be provided 
by the DMS to exercise the EC/LS. 
Units on standby redundancy a r e  checked out by switching operation from 
the normally operating unit. 
Acceptance or rejection cri teria will  consist of detecting on-off type 
components which fail to operate o r  detecting equipment which falls short  of 
qualitative performance requirements. In some cases, on-off equipment is tested.  
for performance as well as actuation. An example is a shut-off valve which is 
tested for actuation and for leakage. Leakage beyond allowable tolerance results 
in degraded subsystem performance and is considered a fault. Tolerance bands 
are chosen sufficiently broad to avoid premature fault identification and high 
utilization of spares.  In many cases, some performance degradation can be 
tolerated in order to extract more life from components. 
6 . 1 . 3 . 4  FAULT ISOLATION 
Once the fault detection function has  identified an abnormality in the EC/LS, 
tes ts  a r e  performed to identify the failure down to the LRU level. This entire 
procedure can be performed by the DMS in nearly all cases. A major exception 
is fluid and gas lines, where the exact location of a failure such as a blockage or 
leak cannot in some cases be performed by inplace instrumentation. Portable 
instrumentation and visual inspection procedures adapt readily to this application. 
Fault isolation functions utilize much of the procedure software which is 
used for the periodic checkout function. The major difference is that the fault 
detection process has generally narrowed the failure location down to a small  
portion of the EC/LS. The point of entry into the functional tes t  procedure is 
therefore determined by the malfunction indicated, and only that portion of the 
test necessary to identify the failed LRU is executed. Following repair  or re- 
placement, proper operation is verified by retesting. 
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A typical fault isolation flow is il lustrated in Figure 6-4.  This flow is 
initiated upon detection of excessive C 0 2  in the cabin atmosphere and proceeds to  
isolate the fault to the appropriate LRU or  to determine the required corrective 
action. 
6 . 1 . 4  R F  COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
The R F  Communications Subsystem contains the receiver, transmitters,  
power amplifiers, transponders, modems, and antenna systems to  provide radio 
frequency communications between the Space Station and the ground, DRSS, Shuttle, 
free-flying experiment modules, and EVA crewmen. The subsystem operates in  
the S, Ku, and V H F  bands. 
On-orbit checkout activities required to insure the availability of the sub- 
system include monitoring of its normal operational outputs, performing periodic 
checks, and selecting fault isolation routines associated with the loss of a com- 
munications function. In addition, some trending and calibration are required. 
The measurements and stimuli associated with these checkout activities are 
identified in Appendix 1-5. Al l  analog and R F  stimuli a r e  generated by the sub- 
system but controlled by the DMS. Conditioning of sensor outputs is also integral 
to subsystem LRUs and results in all measurements being compatible with DMS 
data acquisition elements. 
Go/No-Go decision outputs a r e  provided where possible for checkout of the 
R F  communications subsystem. The acceptance/rejection cri teria associated with 
the occurrence of an  event such as primary power ON/OFF, modulation output 
present, switch position selected, and channel or mode selected are straight- 
forward. A bilevel output is either present or  absent and would be indicated by 
two distinct voltage levels. A n  absolute acceptance/rejection criterion as- 
sociated with analog responses such as R F  power output level, VSWR level, and 
AGC output level, on the other hand, i s  more difficult to  establish. This  is due to 
design variances between equipment and the accuracy of the individual measure- 
ment. For instance, the Ku-band PA may be specified to  deliver not less than 
10 watts of R F  power, and this would be indicated by a 4.0-volt analog output. A 
tolerance of + 10 percent due to design and measurement variances resul ts  in a 
range of outfits froin 3 . 6  to 4 . 4  volts. Reliance on a n  absolute level could resul t  
i n  the rejection of a unit that is operating normally. Therefore, the analog outputs 
should be utilized primarily for trend analysis  purposes. 
The checkout of the R F  Coininunications Subsystem can be automatically 
controlled by the DMS and should require minimal crew participation. The crew 
participation would be limited to calling up preprogrammed fault isolation and 
periodic checkout routines and interpretation of anomalies. 
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FAILURE INDICATION 
C 0 2  LEVEL EXCESSIVE I 
AIR DIVERTER 
POS IT1 ON ED 
VALVES CORRECTL 
REPLACE 
FAULTY AIR 
DIVERTER 
VALVE 
Y 
VALVES CORRECTLY 
POSITIONED 
EXCESSIVE 
NO YES 
BAKEOUT 
EXCESSIVE v 
NO YES 
A 
H 2 0  DIVERTER 
POSITION ED 
A /ARE\  
Y 
VACUUM VALVES CORRECTLY 
PERFORMING 
YES YES 
A 
VALVES CORRECTLY BAKEOUT 
POS IT1 ON E D 
DIVERTER 
VALVE 
> LEAKY MOLE 
EXCESSIVE 
NO 
REPLACE FAULTY AIR 
DIVERTER VALVES 
OR DUCT 
Figure 6-4. Logic Diagram for C02 Concentration Fault Isolation 
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6 . 1 . 4 . 1  Status Monitoring 
During normal operation of the subsystem, only two different types of param- 
e te rs  are monitored on a nearly continuous basis. These a r e  the transmitter or 
exciter and power amplifier R F  power output levels, and the receiver AGC output 
levels. These noncritical parameters a r e  sampled once per minute. This sampling 
can be performed during normal operation of the subsystem without the need for 
stimuli. In the case of AGC output level, for example, the signal stimulus is the 
modulated R F  signal transmitted by the Shuttle, free-flying experiment module, 
etc. Since the AGC level varies as a function of received signal strength, this 
parameter should be compared on a sample-to-sample basis to detect large changes 
in output level. Unless a failure occurs, the R F  power output should stay fairly 
constant during a normal operating period. For  power output levels, the R F  output 
of the exciter associated with the power amplifier provides the required input 
stimulus. Measurement of power output during normal operation actually provides 
a better indication of overall performance than would a check of the power amplifier 
by itself. 
Although several  parameters a r e  monitored' continuously during subsystem 
operation, none of these can be classified in a caution or warning category. 
6 . 1 . 4 . 2  Trend Analysis 
To detect graceful degradation i n  Communication Subsystem receivers,  
exciters, power amplifiers, and transmitters,  internally generated AGC, R F  
stimuli, AGC outputs, and power outputs are periodically sampled. The internally 
generaged R F  stimuli are necessary to obtain an accurate indication of the AGC 
output levels. Sampling should occur approximately once per day for equipment 
utilized to support the Shuttle, free-flying experiment modules, and direct-to- 
ground links. Equipment that supports the primary link between the Space Station 
and the relay satellite, on the other hand, should be sampled about once per hour. 
6 . 1 . 4 . 3  Calibration 
The only calibration functions that have been identified a r e  the R F  power 
levels at the high-gain antenna feeds and low-gain antenna elements. The measure- 
ment of R F  System insertion loss is required after the replacement of an  LRU in 
the R F  Transmission System to verify that the unit has been properly replaced. 
6 . 1 . 4 . 4  Periodic Checkout 
Periodic checks of subsystem status and availability are performed at once- 
per-month and one-per-week intervals. The monthly checks should be performed 
several  days ahead of anticipated operational usage. This primarily pertains to  
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that equipment utilized to  support the Shuttle and experiment modules. During the 
artificial-gravity portion of the mission, the S-band equipment utilized for the 
direct-to-ground link should be checked once per week. After completion of arti- 
ficial gravity, these checks can be performed at monthly intervals. Week-by-week 
checks should also be performed on the transmitters (exciters and power ampli- 
fiers), receivers, signal interface modems, and High Gain Antenna System utilized 
for the Space Station relay satellite Ku-band link. 
The procedure for periodic checkout requires systematic checks performed 
on a group of LRUs associated with a particular mission support function. Except 
for the High Gain Antenna System, the following represents a periodic checkout 
procedure for a typical se t  of R F  link equipment. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Apply primary power to all  units. 
Monitor primary power indication. 
Check for completion of power amplifier warm-up cycle. 
Monitor exciter, power amplifier, and antenna feed R F  power 
output levels. 
Monitor VSWR levels at power amplifier output and antenna feed. 
Apply modulation input stimulus. 
Monitor modem and exciter outputs for presence of modulation. 
Apply modulated R F  signal at input to  low noise preamplifier. 
Monitor preamplifier output level and receive AGC output level. 
Monitor modem and receiver outputs for presence of modulation. 
Switch to redundant preamplifier and repeat steps 8, 9, and 10. 
Apply known antenna position control input. 
Monitor a.ntenna position output indication and compare with input, 
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6.1.4. 5 Fault Isolation 
Fault isolation of the R F  Communications Subsystem is performed on a 
systematic basis on a group of LRUs that a r e  associated with the loss of a 
particular function. A typical fault isolation flow diagram is depicted i n  Figure 
6-5 for the case where no video signal is received from the ground. This partic- 
ular routine culminates i n  the identification of an  LRU to be replaced or calls for 
further testing of the High Gain Antenna System or  interfacing portions of the 
Data Management Subsystem. 
6.1.5 STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM 
The Structural Subsystem forms and maintains the compartment divisions of 
the Space Station. It provides a pressure shell/structural shield designed for high 
damage resistance from external projectiles (meteorites), and eliminates s t resses  
due to orbital thermal cycling. 
Ports  a r e  provided on the exterior structure shell to accommodate docking 
of resupply/logistic and experiment modules which enhance orbital life and 
versatility of the basic station design. 
The Structures Subsystem also includes provisions needed for deployment of 
the spent S-I1 stage as a counterweight for the artificial gravity mode of operation. 
Operational assessment of the Structures Subsystem elements is generally 
accomplished by monitoring of measured system parameters,  and to a significant 
extent, by visual inspection. Operational measurements for the subsystem are 
predominantly of the event monitoring type intended to inform the crew of the 
immediate configuration/status of the subsystem. Functions to be monitored and 
displayed included position/event data on docking rings, hatches and airlock doors, 
and antenna booms. Analog measurements/display include counterweight position 
and pressures,  temperatures, and power monitoring of compartment divisions and 
functional units which provide pre and post event data to the crew for condition 
assessment. It should be noted that the operational data requirements for this 
subsystem a r e  extremely event-oriented and that the frequency of use is low 
(ave l/nio). Hence, the impact upon the Data Management Subsystem for real-time 
continuous data display and computation is also minimal (e. g. data callup in lieu of 
full-time dedication is acceptable). Measurement and stimuli requirements for the 
Structures Subsystem are contained in Appendix I- 6. 
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F A I L U R E  
NO V I D E O  S IGNAL 
RECEIVED ON 
G R O U N D  
REPLACE 
F A U L T Y  
ES 
Figure 6-5. Typical Fault Isolation Routine Flow Diagram 
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6. 1. 5. 1 Status Monitoring 
Due to the nature of the Structures Subsystem the requirements for  continuous 
status monitoring for  purposes of fault detection are quite limited. Such monitoring 
requirements that do exist utilize selected operational status parameters such as 
temperature and pressures.  Required sampling rates a r e  relatively low and are 
not critical. Acceptance rejection cri teria are based upon comparison of measured 
values with predetermined limits. Support from the EC/LS Subsystem monitor of 
atmosphere consumption is utilized for detection of abnormal compartment leakage. 
Detection of out-of-limit conditions results in notification of the crew. Since no 
safety critical functions a r e  involved, no automatic corrective action is required. 
Fault isolation is accomplished by combined crew/automatic procedures. Auto- 
matic fault detection is heavily supplemented by crew observation of normal sub- 
system status displays and of the actual equipment during operation. 
No cautiodwarning functions have been identified in association with the 
Structures Subsystem. Certain related functions such as hull leaks a r e  covered by 
EC/LS caution/warning functions. 
6. 1. 5. 2 Trend Analysis 
No trend analysis requirements have been identified for  this subsystem. 
6. 1 . 5 . 3  Periodic Checkout 
Periodic checkout of the Structures Subsystem elements is planned to occur 
either prior to a scheduled event such as module docking and artifical-g deployment/ 
termination or  during specific operational times such as shift  changes where status 
information pertaining to compartment configuration (hatch positions) and antenna 
positions is of interest to the oncoming crew. 
Functional checkout of the docking mechanism, which includes visual inspec- 
tion and extension/retraction of the docking ring is conducted prior to  a scheduled 
docking event to verify operation of the mechanism before committing the arriving 
module to that port location. This checkout is scheduled sufficiently in advance to 
permit reassignment of the module in the event of malfunction. Likewise, periodic 
start-of-shift checks of the station configuration are planned to alert the oncoming 
crew as to overall subsystem status. 
Periodic review of EC/LS atmosphere consumption trend analysis is also 
planned to assess  leakage of the pressurized compartment(s) to establish "as is" 
acceptance or  need for corrective action. 
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6.1.  5 . 4  Fault Isloation 
The fault isolation process to the LRU level for the Structures Subsystem 
lacks the complexity generally associated with electronic subsystems due to  the 
nature of the hardware elements involved. In most instances malfunctions are 
obvious from the operational data being displayed or by visual inspection, and 
therefore require a minimum of DMS support. Isolation of leaks in the pressure 
shell of the station will utilize a combination of pressure decay, visual inspection, 
and sonic detector techniques. Pressure  decay tests, accompanied by acoustical 
leak sensors on the shell surface, will permit isolation to a specific compartment/ 
location. If the leakage occurs in association with an event such as EVA or  docking 
visual inspection for seal/structural damage of the hatch/door involved wil l  be 
utilized. Scuffing, wear, or puncture of a seal  will be suspect. Isolation of leaks 
in the basic structure shell will utilize the ultrasonic detection technique which 
employs the use of portable detectors capable of sensing ultrasonic energy in the 
frequency range of 35-50 KHz produced by gas flow through a n  orifice. 
6.1.6 ELECTRICAL POWER 
The Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) consists of dual Isotope/Brayton 
power conversion systems and a transmission, conditioning, and distribution 
system. 
6. 1.6. 1 Power Conversion System 
The Isotope/Brayton System (IBS) produces the electrical power for the Space 
Station by converting thermal energy from plutonium isotope heat sources to elec- 
tr ical  energy through Brayton cycle turbine-driven alternators. 
The IBS consists of the heat source assemblies, heat exchangers, rotating 
power conversion units, Gas Management System, and voltage-regulator/speed 
control assemblies. 
system (IRV) for emergency jettison and return of the heat sources. 
The system also includes an atmosphere reentry and recovery 
Appendix 1-7 contains a listing of the measurements and stimuli associated 
with the IBS. 
Operation of the IBS is in a closed-loop automatic mode and is controlled by 
the Data Management System (DMS). 
To provide heat source control, the compressor inlet temperature, turbine 
Position indicators 
inlet temperature, heat source capsule hot spot temperature, and Be0 hot spot 
temperature a r e  processed by the heat source control logic. 
tell when the heat source is in the "operating" mode and when it is extended and 
radiating into space in the "emergency cooling" mode. 
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The power conversion Brayton gas loop is controlled by the turbine inlet tem- 
perature, the compressor inlet temperature, the bearing cavity pressure,  and the 
compressor outlet pressure.  
In addition to the gas loop instrumentation, there a r e  several  electrical 
parameters included with the Power Conversion System to provide fault detection 
and control for the alternator. These a r e  alternator output, load bus, ser ies  and 
shunt field currents,  alternator output voltage, and frequencies. The voltages, 
currents,  and frequencies together with voltage regulators/exciter and speed con- 
trol circuitry provide the signals necessary to maintain specified speed and voltage 
regulation. They also provide the signals vital to normal startup and shutdown as 
well as emergency control in case of critical level out-of-tolerance voltages, 
currents,  and speeds. 
The Gas Management System contains pressure and temperature transducers 
for monitoring the status of the reserve supply of the Xe-He gas for  the power 
conversion loop. It also includes several  valves to provide a controlled gas supply 
to the thrust bearings, journal bearings, and for maintenance of the loop gas 
inventory. Auxiliary contacts on each valve act as positive position indicators to 
ehow the status of the valves. 
The IRV is utilized only for emergency disposal of the heat source. It con- 
sists of an ejection mechanism, passive stabilization and control system, ballute 
type descent system, and recovery aids such as radio beacon and flashing light. 
6. 1.6. 1. f Status Monitoring 
Status monitoring is utilized on selected performance parameters to detect 
system faults. Acceptance or  rejection of status measurements is based upon 
comparison of the measured values against predetermined limits and/or against 
parallel redundant parameters. 
The majority of the status monitoring parameters a re  safety critical and are 
treated a s  caution and/or warning parameters.  Detection of an out-of-limit condi- 
tion in one of these measurements results in activation of the crew a la rm and also 
in the initiation of automatic fault isolation and safing procedures. Certain param- 
eters  a r e  identified in both the caution and the warning category. These involve 
two-level limit checking. 
6. 1.6. 1 . 2  Trend Analysis 
Trend analyses a r e  applicable to several of the IBS functions. In particular, 
analysis of temperatures and pressures  in the Brayton 1oop.and heat rejection loops 
is useful i n  ascertaining the efficiency of the system and spotting degradation in 
performance. The trends of critical heat source temperatures a r e  of interest  
from a safety standpoint. 
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6. 1. 6. 1 . 3  Periodic Checkout 
Periodic tests a r e  required to supplement the continuous status monitoring 
in order to make a quantitative evaluation of system operating characteristics and 
to verify the operation of standby or  inactive systems. Items in the latter category 
include the drive mechanisms for extending the heat sources to their emergency 
cooling positions and the IRV Systems. 
normally begins with verification of the DMS control interfaces, followed by check- 
ing of the IRV Systems and heat source extension mechanisms. It should be noted 
that functional testing of the extension systems requires short-term interruption 
of power generation in the unit being tested. Power distribution and consumption 
during this period must be managed accordingly, and proper operation must be 
reverified upon completion of the test. 
The test  sequence is not critical but 
6. 1. 6. 1.4 Fault Isolation 
The IRV heat source and Brayton power conversion loop a r e  major subsys- 
tems that are line replaceable units. The Gas Management and Heat Rejection 
Systems a r e  line replaceable at the component level. Electrical control components 
such as the voltage regulator exciter and speed control a r e  line replaceable as 
individual units. Integration of the radiator cooling flow tubes into the vehicle 
structure precludes inclusion of the Heat Rejection System as a line replaceable 
unit. Instead, the components a r e  either line replaceable or  have built-in redun- 
dancy. The Heat Rejection System itself is a redundant element of the Power 
System s o  that the Power System electrical production does not have to be disturbed 
during the replacement of components. The pump motor has instrumentation to 
isolate pump failures (pump pressure out and flow rates)  f rom power failure (pump 
current and voltage). Deterioration of the pump motor can be detected from trend 
analysis of the power drawn by the unit and the deterioration can be segregated 
froin deterioration of the fluid cooling loop o r  coolant by comparing the change in 
power drawn (motor current) with the pump head (pump outlet pressure).  Changes 
in individual flow rates ,  temperature r i se  across  cold plates, and hot spot tem- 
peratures can be used to isolate cooling (cold plate) failures f rom failures in the 
components they a r e  designed to cool. Radiator outlet temperature is an important 
parameter for judging the condition of the fin surface coating of the radiator. A t  
any instance, only one heat rejection loop for each Power Conversion System is 
operating and only one of the two pumps is in operation s o  that only one se t  of 
transducer signals a r e  needed to provide data. The hot spot temperatures a r e  
critical parameters,  however, and the triple redundancy is required to isolate 
instrumentation faults from operating system faults to prevent false caution signals. 
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A typical fault isolation flow is illustrated in Figure 6-6. Here a fault in the 
heat rejection pump gives the first indication of a fault by setting off the caution 
alarm f o r  the isotope heat source capsule temperature. The chart demonstrates 
that even though the fault occurred in a component far removed from the parameter 
that gave the indication, adequate instrumentation is available to isolate the fault 
at the faulted component. In actual practice, more than one fault a la rm may occur 
(such as capsule temperature and pump hot spot temperature, o r  capsule tempera- 
ture and compressor outlet temperature) which would lead directly to isolating the 
fault . 
6.1.6.2 Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution 
This section discusses the monitoring and control requirements for  the 
Transmission, Conditioning and Distribution (TCD) portion of the EPS. Appendix 
1-8 provides a TCD measurement/stimulus list which identifies the specific 
parameters,  stimuli, and response functions required to check the system and to 
determine its operational status. 
The TCS System requires a minimum of crew supervision. Operational 
parameters consist of alternator feeder current readouts, battery status, and 
principal primary and secondary bus voltages. The feeder current readouts, 
together with alternator output power displays establish the degree of load balance 
between the two Brayton PCS units. A small  amount of unbalance is inherent in 
the system. Crew action is required only i f  the normal range is exceeded (as 
detected by the Power Management Assembly), or if high experiment activity re- 
quiring maximum possible power from the Brayton machines is imminent. Crew 
response under these conditions is to shift load from one machine to the other by 
selective switching of loads. 
Battery status displays and readouts of selected bus voltages provide addi- 
tional information for evaluating system performance and capability for accepting 
additional load. The ability to call up the status of any other system element, as 
may be deemed necessary for evaluation of a particular operational condition, 
provides the flexibility required to ensure adequate status assessments at any 
given time. 
Al l  circuit breakers and contactors for power transmission lines, source 
and distributor buses, and power conditioning equipment can be remotely con- 
trolled. Many a r e  controlled by signals from automatic protection equipment such 
as differential o r  reverse  current relays. Remote control is also required to 
provide for  either manual o r  programmed reconfiguration of the TCD System 
following automatic f ault-clearing operations, as well  as for  facilitating recon- 
figuration to match changing load or  other operational conditions. Additional con- 
trols are provided to support checkout functions. 
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Figure 6-6. Typical LRU Malfunction Isolation Flow Chart 
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It is important to note a t  this point that no capability is shown for  remote 
control of individual circuit breakers in the distribution circuits to the loads. It 
is assumed for  the purpose of this study that all switching of loads is accomplished 
in the load systems themselves rather than by opening and closing circuit breakers  
in the power lines to individual loads. 
design is yet to be developed. 
Final definition of load switching control 
6. 1. .6.2. 1 Status Monitoring 
Continuous monitoring is required to detect out-of-tolerance conditions for  
parameters such as alternator load-sharing, principal bus voltages , and equipment 
temperatures. Continuous monitoring is also required to detect abnormal events. 
These include relay t r ips ,  circuit breaker and contactor tr ips,  and power condi- 
tioner overload (current limiting signal). 
Alternator feeder currents and most bus voltages a re  sampled at the rate of 
six per minute, Feeder current values should stay fairly constant during normal 
operation, but as previously mentioned, some unbalance is inherent. A sampling 
rate of s ix  per minute for  bus voltages should eliminate the effects of voltage 
transients (assuming a fault signal is generated only if an out-of-tolerance condi- 
tion is sensed in two consecutive samples), while still providing a reasonable 
response time for follow-on corrective action. The higher sampling rate of once 
per second for 28 Vdc and 400 Hz load bus voltages assures  minimum delay in  
detecting out-of -tolerance voltages at the principal load interfaces. For this 
higher ra te ,  abnormal voltage should be sensed in a minimum of five consecutive 
samples before a fault signal is generated. 
Equipment temperatures are sampled at a rate of four per  hour. Considering 
thermal lags inherent in the equipment being monitored, this rate should be ade- 
quate for all but catastrophic failures. 
Relay trips a r e  nominally monitored at a one-sample-per-minute rate. Cir-  
cuit breaker and contactor tr ips are sampled at a rate of two per  minute. This 
allows a margin for  contact opening time before the next sample is taken. If the 
next sample does not show a contactor tr ip,  it is presumed the contactor will not 
operate to clear the fault and alternate corrective action is immediately taken. 
An exception to the nominal sampling rates is shown fo r  the alternator feeder/source 
bus differential relays. The rate here is one sample per second. This is because 
operation of these relays results in tripping the associated alternator circuit breaker,  
with a consequent loss of one-half the station primary power. The sampling rate for 
the alternator circuit breaker is five per second, also much higher than nominal. 
These relatively high ra tes  a r e  required to minimize system and load disturbances 
in switching to a backup mode of operation. 
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A sampling rate  of two per minute is chosen for detection of power condi- 
tioning equipment operating in a current-limited overload mode. Again, this allows 
a margin fo r  transient overloads. 
No life-critical functions have been identified for  the TCD System. An 
unscheduled opening of the alternator feeder circuit breaker,  however, results in 
loss of one-half of the primary power source and is therefore listed as a caution 
function. Loss of 260 Vdc bus voltage is also listed since this results in interrup- 
tion of all 400 Hz power. Loss of 400 Hz square wave bus voltage and loss of 400 
Hz sine wave bus voltage a r e  included since they result in interruption of all 400 
Hz square wave and sine wave power, respectively. 
6. 1 . 6 . 2 . 2  Periodic Checkout 
Periodic checkouts will  be performed at intervals ranging from once per  
week to once each six months depending on equipment or  parameters to be checked. 
The principal tes ts  required to ensure TCD System performance, integrity, 
and availability a r e  listed in Table 6-3. In addition to these tests, checks of 
selective switch positions, interlocks, system load distribution, and availability 
of load bank equipment a r e  required. Tests f o r  relay, circuit breaker,  and con- 
tactor operations can generally be accomplished on line during periods of relatively 
low-scheduled experiment activity; system switching effects will  be minimal. No 
major shock producing tes ts ,  such as power line faults o r  fault clearing, are 
planned. 
Complexity of checkout varies from simple readouts of parameters,  such as 
voltage or temperature, to injection of test currents into current transformer 
loop circuits to simulate fault conditions seen by protection relays. An example 
of a procedure which typifies the range of parameter testing and also illustrates 
the handling of redundant units is given in Table 6-4 for  the high voltage rectifier- 
regulators. 
6. 1.6. 2.3 Calibration 
No requirements for calibration a r e  listed. A limited amount of calibration 
may be required for certain relay installations. This has not been analyzed at 
this  time. 
6. 1. 6.2.4 Trend Analysis 
A limited amount of trend analysis is necessary for TCD parameters.  These 
a r e  identified in Appendix 1-7. 
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Table 6-3, Transmission Conditioning and Distribution System Periodic Tes t s  
(Isotope/Brayton) 
Test Rationale 
Protective Relay Operation To verify proper operation of pro- 
tective devices 
Circuit Breaker and 
Contactor Operation 
To determine remote operability of 
breakers and contactors 
Standby Redundant Equip - To verify operational capability of 
ment Operation standby units 
Battery Charger Mode 
Alternator Load Sharing 
To determine charger response to 
To determine whether load balance 
Switching control inputs 
is within allowable tolerances 
Regulated Transformer- 
Rectifier Load Sharing 
Power Conditioning Equip- 
To determine whether load balance 
is within allowable tolerances 
To determine nominal performance 
capability and degradation, if any, 
with respect to like units 
ment Parameters  
Bus Voltages 
Battery Monitor Voltage 
and Temperature 
To a s ses s  general health of TCD 
system 
To determine battery status 
6. 1.6. 2. 5 Fault Isolation 
Control signals for  opening and closing remotely operable circuit breakers,  
contactors, and switches a r e  required for fault isolation. These signals are 
operated internal to the TCD System (e. g. , differential protection sensing and 
relay output) to provide coordinated automatic fault clearing, and external to the 
system for checkout purposes. A typical fault isolation flow diagram is given in 
Figure 6-7. 
6 .1 ,7  DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
Prior  to defining specific tests,  it is necessary to define the operating 
environment. It is a requirement that testing be performed on-line and that fault 
isolation to the LRU should be achieved to support a remove-and-replace main- 
tenance philosophy. Operating on-line means that the testing performed must be 
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Table 6-4. Periodic Checkout High Voltage Rectifier-Regulators 
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
a. 
9. 
10 * 
11. 
Apply primary power to one off -line redundant unit. 
Monitor open-circuit output voltage level. 
Apply overload test  current to secondary of current limiting sensing 
circuit and monitor for current limiting mode alarm. 
Remove test  current and reset  current limiting mode alarm circuit. 
Repeat steps 1 - 4 with second off-line redundant unit. 
Connect first off-line unit to 260 Vdc bus and verify that input 
current,  output current, and output voltage a r e  within specified 
limits. 
Repeat step 6 with second off-line unit. 
Verify that the two units share  load within specified limits. 
Disconnect the two previously on-line units and assign them to the 
standby redundant mode. 
Reverify load sharing between the two on-line units. 
Continue operation with the new unit assignments until the next 
checkout period o r  until reconfiguration is required for  other 
operational reasons. 
interleaved with other application programs. Within these constraints, it is 
necessary to define: 
The provisions included to detect e r r o r s  in data transfer on a 
con tinu ou s bas is 
The specific actions to be taken when e r r o r s  occur within individual 
DMS equipment 
The provisions included for verifying equipment operation on a 
periodic basis 
The provisions included for reverifying equipment subsequent to 
a repair 
The OCS/crew interface with regard to equipment status information 
and maintenance 
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I .. 
Figure 6-7. Typical Fault Isolation Flow Diagram 
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The constraint of operating on-line indicates that overall operation must 
occur somewhat as indicated in Figure 6-8. Concurrently with the execution of 
Operations and Experiment programs, the OCS programs will  be implemented on 
a time available basis. During each of the t ime slots,  certain portions of the OCS 
responsibility must be performed. Test sequencing and control wil l  be performed 
by an OCS executive while overall time scheduling wil l  be performed by the DMS 
executive. The execution of the tests wil l  be asynchronous, and the time allocated 
will  depend on the time demands of other programs. 
Parity checking of all data transfer will occur during operation of all applica- 
tion programs. This is not sufficient to verify complete operation of the DMS - 
additional tests a r e  required on functional areas on a scheduled basis during the 
time slots allocated to OCS. These additional tes ts  must be short  enough to be 
incorporated in the time slots,  yet thorough enough to verify operation of the 
equipment under test. Parity e r ro r s ,  depending on the source,  will prompt the 
running of some of the DMS tests to verify the e r r o r  (see Figure 6-8). Other sub- 
systems a r e  polled as shown. 
Monitoring" tests (COM). The operation described above wil l  be an iterative 
process - repeating after one complete subsystems tes t  cycle. The tests performed 
during the COM tests ,  however, may not be sufficient to isolate an e r r o r  o r  failure. 
It is anticipated that more extensive testing wil l  be required on the DMS to isolate 
the failure to a reconfigurable element (e. g. , the testing of all interfaces after 
LRU replacement). 
Isolation" (SFI) tests.  
These tes ts  have been termed "Continuous Orbital 
The second level of testing has been termed "Subsystem Fault 
APPLICATION 
PROGRAM5 
PARITY OCS TEST 
CHECKING EXECUTION 
i ~ i i  uwr i  I F  
CONSLCIII I V I  
I 
Figure 6-8. OCS Test Program Execution 
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Within the DMS, e r r o r s  can be generated from two sources; i. e. from parity 
e r r o r s  in any of the data transfer paths or  from the COM diagnostics performed 
on a periodic basis. Central processing unit, main memory, or  1/0 parity e r r o r s  
wil l  cause the appropriate COM tests  to be performed to verify the e r ror .  If the 
e r r o r  is verified, the SFI tests may be performed to  isolate the fault and recon- 
figure the DMS to restore  operation. E r r o r s  generated by the COM tests may 
automatically cause the appropriate SFI tests to be executed or may notify the crew 
to manually initiate the SFI test. 
Bulk memory e r r o r s  or  data acquisition errors may trigger the SFI tests 
directly. The figure also indicates that crew keyboard entry can initiate the SFI 
tests. These principally a r e  those tes ts  which may be performed asynchronously, 
tests performed upon demand, o r  those tests which may require crew participation. 
Other events can be generated by out-of -tolerance conditions emanating f rom 
measurements made on subsystem test points. Some additional processing 
associated with failure analysis may be required for  these cases. Figure 6-9 
shows a top level flow of a typical failure event analysis. If an out-of-tolerance 
condition occurs, it should be determined whether o r  not the event is associated 
with a critical signal. Subsequent to this, i t  is important to know the failure 
history of the function (i. e. , whether it is the first or second failure). Other items 
include determining the source of the event indication. If it is from BITE equipment 
within a given subsystem, there is no alternative but to believe the indication and 
execute the predetermined action. If the indication emanates from an  RDAU, it is 
possible to verify the event through an alternate path. Each of these decisions 
can have two results,  and all paths must be analyzed. An OCS test control hierarchy 
that incorporates the separate responsibilities discussed above is shown in Figure 
6-10. The SFI group includes the failure event analysis, fault isolation, equipment 
reconfiguration sequence, and display/record messages. 
6.1. 7. 1 Continuous Orbital Monitoring Tests (COM) 
The COM tests associated with the DMS a r e  divided into three groups; i. e .  , 
one group contains software diagnostics only; another group includes the acquisition 
and limit checking of test point data (through RDAUs), and the third group includes 
the parity checking hardware. Figure 6-11 shows a representative top level flow 
for the COM tests. These tests wil l  not be performed without interruption as 
shown, but rather wil l  be  performed on a time available basis under executive 
control. 
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Figure 6-9. Failure Event Analysis 
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Figure 6-10. Test Control Hierarchy 
6.1.7.1. 1 Computer Group 
The purpose of the computer COM tests  is to exercise periodically as much 
of the central processing units, main s tore  units, and data bus control units as 
possible within time constraints and without causing interference to other applica- 
tion programs. The COM tests shall ver i fy  capability of the following elements 
of the computer group: 
CPU instruction operation (i. e. , add, subtract, multiply, divide, etc. ) 
CPU data flow 
Register, adder, shifter, and mover functions 
Main storage addressing 
Control communication between CPU and data bus controller 
Data flow between data bus controller and main memory 
Power supplies 
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Figure 6-11. COM Top Level Flow 
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The CPU tests  must be designed to tes t  all arithmetic and logic functions of 
the computer. The basic technique to be employed will  be one of performance of 
an operation and comparison of the actual results with the expected results. 
tests must be repeated on a scheduled basis in all six CPUs. 
These 
A limited MSU test wil l  be accomplished by main storage addressing. The 
test shall verify the addressability of individual MSUs by cycling through all MSU 
addresses on a time available basis. This test  need not be repeated for each CPU 
test. 
The COM tests also shall provide a functional check of the data bus controller 
by a wraparound technique, using BITE hardware. 
connect the bus controller output, address,  and control lines to corresponding 
input lines. The basic technique again is to compare actual results to expected 
results. 
This hardware will effectively 
In addition to these tests,  power supply voltages and discrete indicators will  
be polled through RDAUs for comparison or limit checking. A s  a general rule, 
two consecutive e r r o r s  o r  an out-of -tolerance measurement is caused for a sub- 
system reconfiguration. 
6. 1. 7 . 1 . 2  Bulk Memory Group 
The principal COM tests on bulk memory will be supply voltage measure- 
ments. All data which is transferred to or  from bulk memory is parity checked, 
and wil l  be the principal source of e r r o r  detection. Consecutive e r r o r s  wi l l  initiate 
Subsystem Fault Isolation Tests. 
6. 1. 7 . 1 . 3  Data Acquisition Group 
This group consists of the terminals, RDAUs, and stimulus generation units. 
The wraparound technique wil l  be utilized on a periodic basis to verify the opera- 
bility of each terminal, RDAU, and SGU. 
6. 1. 7. 1 . 4  Command, Control, and Display Group 
6 . 1 . 7 . 1 . 4 . 1  Command, Control Display Consoles (CCDC) - The CCDC COM tests 
will consist primarily of supply voltage measurements. The displays and controls 
a r e  subjected to testing through normal daily equipment usage. Such i tems as 
loss of character generation, display quality, brightness, etc. , are self -annunciating, 
and special tests need not be mechanized. Crew participation is required in most 
tests of CCDC (see CCDC SFI tests). 
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6. 1.7.1.4.2 Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU) - The COM test  for  LMDUs 
should be implemented in a similar manner as the RDAUs; i. e. , on a periodic 
basis, the LMDU should be utilized in a wraparound type test for  response genera- 
tion. The response should be compared to an expected pattern. 
The display is subjected to  a form of continuous orbital monitoring through 
crew use and observations. There will be no special COM display tests utilized on 
a continuous basis. 
6.1.7.1.5 Image Processing Group 
The COM tests for the image processing equipment will  consist primarily of 
supply voltage and other analog measurements. Additional integral diagnostics 
should be included with special purpose processors such that the diagnostics can 
be commanded from the DMS computers. An interface with an RDAU should be 
provided to implement communications with the DMS computers, 
6. 1. 7.2 Subsystem Fault Isolation Tests (SFI) 
The COM tests performed on a cyclic basis and supplemented with parity 
checking comprise the fundamental DMS e r ro r  or  failure detection capability. If 
a failure is detected, it must be isolated to a replaceable unit. The testing capa- 
bility for isolating to the replaceable unit is called "Subsystem Fault Isolation (SFI). 
Since it is incumbent upon the DMS/OCS to be able to isolate failures to the 
line replaceable unit (LRU), a definition of these elements has been formulated. 
These a r e  partially a result of the degree in which a software/hardware system 
can effectively isolate malfunctioning elements in addition to  the physical considera- 
tions of packaging and accessibility within a given equipment complex. 
Several techniques are presently used to provide varying degrees of "self 
checking" and fault isolation capability within computers. These techniques were 
investigated with respect to their applicability for  the Space Station OCS. In addi- 
tion to the COM tests ,  four fundamental techniques wil l  be  used in the proposed 
SFI scheme. The four include: 
0 Parity checking on all internal data 
Checks hardware for  correct data handling capability. 
0 Known problem computation 
Checks hardware for  correct data handling and computing 
capability. Test more conclusive than parity checking. 
Extract problem routine f rom memory, work problem, verify 
answer with correct  answer stored in memory. 
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a Hardware pattern generator 
- Checks hardware for  correct  data handling capability. 
Generates known data word pattern for checking write/read 
accuracy of memories. 
a Crew interactive/manual tests 
6. 1. 7.2. 1 Computer SFI Tests 
For the purpose of deriving a fault isolation scheme, the DMS/OCS computer 
subset has been modeled as shown in Figure 6-12. This model is comprised of the 
following elements : 
a Data bus controller (DBC) 
a Data bus switch inatrix (DBSM) 
a Data bus input/output '(DBI/O) 
a Shared memory matrix (SMM) 
DATA AUS 
D A T A  BUS 
CONTROLLER 
J 
C P U  
f' 
Figure 6- 12. Computer Subsystem Diagnostic/Fault Isolation Model 
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0 Shared memory 
0 Shared memory input/output (SMI/O) 
0 Logic and control (L & C) 
0 CPU dedicated memory 
0 Power supply and distribution 
These elements have been described in Section 4 . 4 ,  Line Replaceable Unit 
Definition. 
Figure 6- 13 depicts the proposed computer subsystem fault isolation logic 
developed for the DMS/OCS. The primary diagnostic conditions utilized in this 
scheme are: 
0 Detection of parity e r ro r s  
0 Incorrect (or no) response to a command or  pattern check 
The "soft power down" activity is noted in Figure 6-13 only to the extent of 
depicting the isolatable unit involved. By its very nature, it is self-diagnostic and 
isolating. 
The flow diagram indicates a shared memory as an isolatable unit. By 
employing certain manual procedures supplemented with additional automatic (via 
OCS) tests,  the shared memory units can be further broken down to a lower level 
of isolation i. e. , the LRU level. Figure 6-14 gives a unified fault isolation model 
for the shared memory unit. 
Manual diagnostic/fault isolation procedures for determination of the shared 
memory LRUs would be dependent upon the type of OCS notification, i. e. ,  
Type I - Shared memory wil l  not respond to inquiry or command 
Type IT - Shared memory generating parity e r r o r s  or incorrect write/ 
read of known pattern 
Figure 6-15 depicts the manual diagnostic and fault isolation logic for  the 
shared memories. It is postulated that the mechanical sections will  have some 
type of self -test capability to determine operational status. This self-test capa- 
bility would be manually actuated in such a manner as to demonstrate the action of 
various mechanical, and electro mechanical components (motors, solenoids, gears,  
etc. ). A human operator, following a prescribed diagnostic routine, could then 
reasonably assess  the operational status of the mechanical section. 
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Figure 6- 13. Computer Subsystem Fault Isolation Flow Diagram 
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Figure 6- 14. Shared Memory Unit Manual Diagnostic/Fault Isolation Model 
MEMORY 
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6. 1. 7.2.2 Bulk Data Storage 
POWER 
Figure 6- 16 is a diagnostic/fault isolation model for the bulk data storage 
facility. This model is comprised of the following elements, each of which has 
been described in Section 4 .4 ,  Line Replaceable Unit Definition. 
0 Digital Buffer and Control Unit 
e Record/Reproduce Electronics 
e Switch Matrices 
e Tape Transport Controller 
i )  Tape Transport 
0 Power Supply and Distribution Units 
Figure 6-17 depicts the proposed bulk data storage fault isolation logic. The 
primary diagnostic conditions utilized in this  scheme are the same as those noted 
for the computer subsystem fault isolation scheme. 
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Figure 6- 16. Bulk Data Storage Diagnostic/Fault Isolation Model 
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6. 1.7.2.3 Data Acquisition Subsystem 
A typical Data Acquisition Subsystem element is shown in Figure 6-18. This 
element is a representative hardware configuration for a majority of the identified 
data acquisition requirements on the Space Station. It is comprised of the following 
elements, each of which has been described in Section 4.4, Line Replaceable Unit 
Definition: 
0 Data Bus Terminal (DBT) 
o Remote Data Acquisition Unit (RDAU) 
0 Stimuli Generation Unit (SGU) 
a 
i 
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I 
I 
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1 . 
Figure 6- 18. Typical Data Acquisition Element 
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It is incumbent upon the DMS/OCS to  be able to  identify malfunctioning 
elements to the lowest replaceable unit (LRU) in the system loop. Each of these 
units has the ability under DMS/OCS computer control to perform a n  operational 
self-check of its circuitry or,in the case of the SGU, to  provide a special test  
output which can be monitored by a known "good" RDAU and thereby provide an 
indication as to the functional status of the SGU. Using these built-in capabilities, 
the DMS/OCS can, with proper programming, initiate checkout routines in such a 
manner as to identify LRUs and other elements which indicate fault operation. 
The fault isolation logic for the data acquisition elements is given in  Figure 6-19. 
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Figure 6-19. Data Acquisition Element Fault Isolation System Flow Diagram 
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Since the OCS ground rules  do not preclude manual fault isolation activities, 
their use was integrated in the proposed scheme only to the extent necessary to 
supplement the automatic fault isolation and only in those cases where it would 
be extremely expensive to implement or  would be impossible from a practical 
standpoint. The flow chart depicts two items which indicate the need for manual 
troubleshooting. 
1. Addressed data terminal does not respond to valid commands. This 
indicates a possibility of a bad data terminal/data bus connection or a 
catastrophic data terminal failure. The possibility of a bad data bus 
can be investigated by checking continuity of data transmission on that 
particular branch. 
2. Bad data is being received but the DBT and RDAU self-checks are 
satisfactory, and the stimulation responses a r e  correct. This is a 
situation which would tend to indicate a sensor assembly/function under 
test which responded correctly to a calibrated input (simulation signal), 
but not correctly to a measured parameter input. This would, however, 
be a legitimate indication i f  the stimulation signal was inserted at points 
in the system different from the measured parameter input. In this case, 
it would indicate a fault in the portion of the system not included in the 
stimulation loop. 
This fault isolation scheme would, with the exceptions noted above, auto- 
matically indicate which data acquisition LRU would need to  be replaced. The 
actual replacement would then be a manual operation. The "Replace" signals 
could be used to switch in  redundant units for noncritical parameters in  addition t o  
providing the display. For critical functions, this scheme would provide a status 
display only since these functions will  be implemented operationally redundant, 
6.1.7.2.4 Command/Control and Display Console SFI Tests  
It is postulated that the individual control and display assemblies (status 
lights, keyboards, pushbuttons, etc.) of the Command/Control and Display Console 
will  be respectively "unitized" and contain their  own particular encode/decode 
electronics. For example: the computer keyboard assembly is comprised of the 
mechanical key assembly and all required control and encode electronics. This 
entire keyboard assembly could be removed, as a unit, from the CCDC. Light 
panels, alphanumeric displays, etc. , would be handled in a similar manner. The 
CRT display assembly would contain the CRT, deflection circuitry, and all re- 
quired video control circuitry. 
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Figure 6-20 shows a top level flow for the CCDC SF'I tests. The tests include 
both automatic and manual tests. The automatic tests include those associated with 
the data bus terminal, command buffer and control unit, and stimulus generation 
unit. Tests  associated with lamps, CRT displays, or viewers are manual tests. 
6.1.7.2.5 Image Processing SFI Tests  
A s  in the CCDC, image processing SFI tests will  be largely manual. The 
automatic tes ts  are concerned with the digital equipment interfacing the computers, 
Figure 6-21 shows a preliminary top level SFI flow diagram for the image pro- 
cessing equipment. 
6.1.7.3 DMS Test  Timine: 
Tes ts  typical of those required for the DMS can be sized for memory and 
execution time, but the frequency with which the tests must be performed was not 
specified. In addition, certain units within the DMS probably will  be checked more 
frequently than others. Because the aggregate contribution to computing load by 
the DMS/OCS depends upon these items, it is necessary to assure  the frequency of 
performifig tes ts  and the sequence o r  order in  which the units are checked. 
The two principal factors upon which the test iteration rate could be based 
a r e  the failure rates and mission criticality. Of the two factors, criticality will  
demand the highest iteration rate. The approach taken has been to examine the 
mission and to specify a maximum time during which an undetected failure can be 
tolerated. The cumulative time required for detecting the failure, for isolating 
the failure, and for recovery must be equal to or less than the total time during 
which the failure can be tolerated. 
A moderate worst case which can be utilized as a basis for affixing the 
iteration rate  is a docking operation. During this operation certain commands 
and responses are exchanged between the Space Station and the docking vehicle. 
Some of the considerations involved i n  this operation are discussed in  McDonne11 
Douglas Space Station Electronics Subsystem Study (DRL 8, Volume 5, Book 5, 
pages 169-177). The primary docking mode is automatic, but with crew observa- 
tion having override capability. 
loss of data exchange capability with the docking vehicle for a period of time. 
During docking, range and closing rate  are important parameters involved in  
command maneuvers. Errat ic  or loss of computational capabilities may be mani- 
fested through range e r r o r s  o r  closing ra te  e r rors .  Errors  which permit too 
rapid a closing rate  can affect vehicle safety, while e r r o r s  permitting too slow an  
approach expend docking vehicle fuel unnecessarily. 
Failures in  the DMS wil l  cause e r ra t ic  or total 
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Figure 6-20. Command/Control and Display Console Fault Isolation Flow Diagram 
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For anlaysis purposes, it was  assumed that the maximum allowable error 
build-up in closing rate is 10 percent (i. e . ,  due to DMS failure to deliver or re- 
move some command). At one foot per second in the near vicinity of the Space 
Station, the maximum allowable e r ro r  would be 0.1 foot per second. If a 100- 
pound thruster were left "ON" due to a failure, the t ime required to  produce a 
0.1 foot/sec velocity increase towards the Space Station would be (assuming a 
40,000 pound vehicle): 
- loo = 40 seconds t =  - -  V sac. 40,000 
If it is assumed further that any e r r o r s  imparted to  the system must be 
removed upon recovery, the tests must be performed in one half the t ime above 
or  20 seconds. Therefore, an iteration rate  of once per twenty seconds w a s  
utilized for sizing the software for checkout of that DMS equipment involved in  the 
critical operation. 
The DMS equipment appears to  fall into four categories with regard to  the 
frequency of testing. The first group is a critical group consisting of the CPUs, 
main memory units, data bus controllers, critical terminals, and crit ical  RDAUs. 
This group is tested once per 20 seconds in accordance with the postulated worst 
case situation. The second group is less critical, and consists primarily of the 
remaining terminals and RDAUs. The second group should be checked at least 
once per hour, and wil l  also contain a l l  discrete and analog measurements to  be 
made 011 DMS equipment (e. g., power supplies). 
The third group consists primarily of bulk and mass memories and displays. 
This group should be checked at least once per 24 hours. The fourth group wil l  
be an "on-demand" group associated with image processing, repair  verification, 
calibration, etc. Table 6-5 summarizes the iteration periods. 
6.1.7.4 DMS Measurements/Stimuli 
In addition to  the software programs and BITE provisions, a se r i e s  of 
measurements must be made 011 certain DMS equipment. The measurements will 
be concerned principally with power supply measurements and temperature 
measurements . 
Each supply contains certain protective circuitry associated with over- 
voltage, under-voltage, and over-current protection. Each supply should provide 
a discrete logic output indicating that a limit has been exceeded. The logic output 
would be monitored via an  RDAU. 
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Table 6-5. Iteration Periods 
l/hour 1/24 Hours On-De mand 1/20 sec. 
COM tes t s  SF'I Tests  
1. All DMS Mea- 1. Bulk and 1. Image Pro-  
sur e ment s mass cessing 
1. CPUS 
memories 
2. MSUs 2. Noncritical 2. Standard Dis- 2. Calibration 
Terminals and play Patterns 
RDAUs 0 CCDC 
0 LMDU 
3. DBCs 3.  SGUs 3. SF'I Tests  
4. Critical 
DBTs 
5. Critical 
RDAUs 
6. Measurements 
Associated with 
above LRUs 
4. Repair Veri-  
fication 
Temperature measurements will  be checked on equipment likely to  require 
monitoring. The measurements will be made on the racks through which the 
coolant will flow. Actual measurement will  be performed and limit checked within 
the RDAUs. 
Appendix 1-9 lists the measurements and stimuli required to complete check- 
out of the DMS. 
6.1.7.5 DMS Test Software Sizing Study 
The approach taken in the study was  to implement the Command SF'I tests 
previously described to estimate the DMS resources required to perform the tests. 
Flow charts were generated to describe the logic €or each test. Accompanying 
each test  flow is an estimate of the memory required, the CPU time required to 
execute, and the I/O time required i f  applicable. 
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Because software sizing is very much involved with the basic organization of 
the processing equipment, it w a s  necessary to  expand considerably the baseline 
DMS to assume additional architectural features. Many of the assumed features 
were with regard to: 
Processor interrupt features and instruction capabilities 
How process or -to - pr o c e s s o r  communi cat ions a r e  i inple me nt ed to  
convey CPU failure data to other CPUs 
How main memory is organized with regard to  addressing, memory 
contents, table formats, preferential storage areas ,  etc. 
How the 1/0 channels are assumed to  operate 
The channel command word format 
How information tables a r e  stored with regard to  configuration control 
How out-of-tolerance conditions propagate through the data acquisition 
path 
Certain of the features above a r e  key to OCS software sizing of DMS tests 
while other features may be more important to executive control of O C S  and 
general software design. Most of the features assumed have been utilized in one or 
more applications for similar purposes (e. g., in the IBM SystemA Pi and IBM 
System/36O lines). 
6.1. 7. 5. 1 Architectural Assumptions 
6.1.7.5.1.1 Microprogram - The processor can be microprogrammed so that 
the basic instruction set  can be augmented without requiring an  engineering change 
to the processor. The need for such augmentation a r i s e s  from the requirement 
to autoinatically test, isolate, and reconfigure the DMS hardware under software 
control. An  example of this type of instruction is the one used to set the address  
translation register of a shared memory LRU. 
It is also assumed that the processor contains special reconfiguration 
instructions (e. g. , "set configuration control registers"). Configuration control 
registers within each configurable element will be the principal means of maintain- 
i ng c onf i gur a t i on c ont r o 1. 
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6.1.7.5.1.2 Interrupts - An Interrupt System exists to provide a means by which 
a computer can make rapid response to extra-program circumstances that occur 
at arbitrary t imes and perform a maximum amount of useful work while waiting 
for such circumstances. Parity er rors ,  failures, or out-of-tolerance conditions 
will result in an  "interrupt. The types of interrupts assumed include: 
o "Machine Check" interrupt is provided in the event of machine 
malfunctions (e. g., failures in  processors, memories, or data 
bus controllers). 
-''I/Of' interrupts are provided as a means whereby a CPU will 
respond to a request from an external device. Out-of-tolerance 
conditions as indicated via RDAU limit checking will cause a n  
I/O interrupt. 
o "Program" interrupts to denote improper specification or use 
of instructions and/or data . 
0 "Supervisor Call'' interrupt to  implement a high speed request 
for executive services (e. g., task switching, storage allocation, 
data logging, configuration control register management, etc. ). 
0 "External" interrupts for miscellaneous purposes (e. g., to  enable 
a response to t imers,  crew console keys, and processor-to- 
processor communicatipns). 
6.1.7.5.1.3 Parity - Parity checking will be utilized to provide a continuous 
checkout of all data transfer to and from the processors. Parity e r r o r s  in  
general will result  in a machine check interrupt. 
6.1.7.5.1.4 Processor-to-Processor Communications - Processor-to-processor 
communications exist to permit the asynchronous transfer of data pertinent to 
reconfiguration to other processors. Actual communication wil l  be implemented 
through the data bus controllers rather than through a direct interface (avoids the 
case where each processor must "pass along'' information regarding other pro- 
cessor conditions). 
6.1.7. 5. 1. 5 Configuration Control Capability - A "configuration control register'' 
will be maintained in each DMS configurable element to establish the prevailing 
subsystem structure by specifying to each element its state, the processors from 
which it accepts configuration changes, and the elements to which it listens in  
the exchange of data and certain control signals. The operational processors will  
have the capability of examining and setting all  configuration control registers for 
system Configuration data. 
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6.1.7.5.1.6 Real-Time Clock - A "real-time" clock is required to  keep a copy of 
the reference clock (reference clock is external to the processor). It is included 
in the processor to allow high speed reference to r ea l  time. 
6.1.7.5.1.7 Interval Timer - A high resolution interval t imer is included for 
storage of the interval remaining until a time dependent event must be initiated. 
When the interval elapses, an  interrupt occurs such that high frequency polling 
of a clock is not necessary. 
6.1.7.5.1.8 Storage Address Translation Capability - Storage address transla- 
tion capability exists to  facilitate the interchange and reconfiguration of main 
memory elements. 
6.1.7.5.1.9 Use of Dedicated Memory - The dedicated memory associated with 
each processor will be used as a buffer which is not addressable by a program, 
but rather is employed by the processor to contain those portions of main storage 
currently being used. When the program starts operating on data in a different 
portion of main storage, the data in that portion is loaded by the processor into 
the buffer and the data from some other portion removed. This activity takes 
place without program assistance and is completely transparent to any program 
instruction. 
The main storage organization as seen by each processor is as follows: 
0 Define Pi, i = 1,2,3,  . . . as the preferential storage LRU associated 
with each processor. See Figure 6-22. 
e Each processor ''sees'' the first LRU of addressable memory as the 
LRU containing its own preferential storage a rea  (PSA). 
0 Beginning with the highest address  expressable in 24 bits (4000 K words) 
and proceeding downward, each processor has the hardware capability 
to assess  the preferential storage areas of other processors, for fault 
isolation and reconfiguration purposes. Authorization is under software 
control. 
This arrangement allows for expanding the number of processors and the 
amount of main storage without disturbing the addressing scheme. 
A special instruction is available to set  the PSA base address (e. g., as in 
the IBM/FAA 9020 system) thus allowing the PSA to be i n  shared, instead of 
dedicated, me mor y. 
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Figure 6-22. Main Storage Organization Seen By Processor 
6.1.7.5.1.10 Processor-to-Memory Communications - It is fundamentally 
necessary for OCS purposes for any processor to access  any other processor 
PSA because it is in th i s  a r ea  that data is stored as a result  of a machine check. 
This data will be used by an  OCS processor to perform LRU isolation on other 
process or s . 
6.1.7.5.1.11 Processor Allocation - The processor allocation services of the 
master executive will  effect a partitioning between the Experiment and Operational 
multiprocessors. 
6.1.7.5.1.12 PSA Access - The Operational processors will  be allowed to access  
a "diagnostic scan out" a rea  within each PSA of other processors for failure 
de t e c t ion/i s o la t i on purposes . 
6.1. 7. 5. 1.13 Memory Uni t  Configuration Control - A l l  memory units contain a 
configuration control register and an  address translation register to facilitate 
real-time changes in configuration. 
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6.1.7.5.1.14 Memory Addressing - Units are addressed relative to”zero” to  
permit logical substitution among memory units. An actual address is formed by 
a processor, utilizing the sum of the contents of the address translation register 
and the relative address within the memory. This process is transparent to 
softwar e. 
000 BYTE COUNT DATA ADDRESS (IN FLAGS SHARED MEMORY 
k II 
6.1.7.5.1.15 Duplicate Executive Capability - Duplicate copies of the master 
executive will  be maintained in main memory to avoid loss of configuration control. 
6.1.7.5.1.16 Data Bus Controller (DBC) 1/0 Operations - It is assumed that the 
data bus controller can execute 1/0 operations independent of processor operations 
by obtaining data bus program from main memory (similar to the channel operation 
in the IBM System/360). The assumption allows the processor to be devoted to  
main storage programs leaving the comparatively slow 1/0 programs to  the bus 
controller, 
6.1. ‘7.5.1.17 DBC Confimration Control - The data bus controller contains a 
configuration control register to  facilitate real-time changes in  configuration. 
6.1.7.5.1.18 Processor-to-Processor Data Flow - The DBC provides a processor- 
to-processor data flow path for improved configuration flexibility. 
6.1.7.5.1.19 Data Bus Command Word Format - A sample format for the data 
bus controller command word is shown below. 
6.1.7.5.1.20 Data Acquisition 1/0 Operation - An 1/0 operation wil l  be initiated 
by a processor instruction (e. g., Start I/O) containing an  operand which addresses  
down to the data bus terminal level in  the data path. The format is shown as 
follows: 
16 BITS 
I 1 
I D BG I SPARE TERMINAL SPARE I 
2 BITS 4 BITS 7 BITS 3 BITS 
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The data bus controller will be commanded by the processor 1/0 instruction 
to fetch a data bus command program from main storage. The program wil l  
supply the additional addressing and commands to  be utilized by the lowest level in 
the data path (e. g., RDAU or SGU input/output). 
SEEK 
6.1.7.5.1.21 Data Acquisition Command Structure - Typical RDAU commands 
wil l  include: 
SPARE RDAU LINE 
e SEEK (address RDAU/line) 
STIMULATE SPARE 
e WRITE RDAU MEMORY (set RDAU limits and mask) 
SGU NUMBER WAVEFORM 
m READ RDAU (sequential read of one or more RDAU channels. 
Channels addresses "wraparound" from highest to lowest) 
e READ RDAU MEMORY (read RDAU limits and mask) 
16 BITS 
The SGU wil l  be handled as in the case of an  RDAU; i. e . ,  a "start I/O" 
instruction and channel program. The format is as follows: 
16 BITS 
Discrete command outputs to any subsystem wil l  be handled through the 
data bus terminal. The format is as shown: 
16 BITS 
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6 . 1 . 7 .  5. 1 .22  Controls and Displays - The controls and displays wi l l  be treated 
similarly to the RDAU; i. e . ,  they will respond to a specific se t  of instructions 
contained in a data bus command program. The Experiment and Command/Control 
consoles wi l l  be handled the same. 
6 . 1 . 7 . 5 . 1 . 2 3  Polling Technique - The fundamental method of announcing out-of- 
tolerance conditions (which must generate an unexpected interrupt) is via a hard- 
ware polling. Each RDAU, independently of command, limit checks a l l  inputs. 
Out-of-tolerance conditions wi l l  be stored in a register within the RDAU. Each 
terminal must poll the RDAU continuously and s tore  any out-of-tolerance con- 
ditions. The data bus controller wil l  poll the terminals for interrupt conditions. 
All subsystems which interface with the terminals wil l  announce special status 
conditions in the same manner, i. e . ,  conditions a r e  announced in the same bit 
positions. Unused RDAU channels w i l l  be masked to  avoid generating interrupts. 
The mask of the secondary RDAU will prevent two separate interrupts from 
occurring because a single test  point signal is out of limits. 
6 . 1 . 7 . 5 .  1 . 2 4  Functional Levels of Operation - Throughout test descriptions 
where "reconfiguration" or  "configurable element'' is used, the subdivisions are 
as defined in the following hierarchy. 
e SUBSYSTEM 
a CONFIGURATION 
0 CONFTGURABLE ELEMENT 
0 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT (LRU) 
The "Subsystem" level includes the complete DMS equipment. A "Configura- 
tion" represents a particular combination of DMS equipment utilized at a given 
time (e. g., the particular bus controller, bus terminal, and RDAU i n  use at a 
given time). A "Configurable Element'' is the level at which DMS reconfiguration 
is performed. A "Configurable Element" can be comprised of one or  more LRUs 
(e. g., the processor contains multiple LRUs). The LRU is the smallest  denom- 
ination of equipment for which fault isolation is attempted and is the level at which 
"on-line" remove-and-replace maintenance is performed. 
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Participation of configurable elements in various DMS operations is shown 
be low: 
PROCESSOR 
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(a) DATAPATH 
P I  
P2 
P3 
P4 
P5 
P6 
I TEST POINT MEMORY RDAU 
& 
(b) STORED-PROGRAM EXECUTION 
MEMORY 
(c) 1/0 OPERATIONS 
MEMORY 
(d) SHOULDER TAP 
( e )  UNEXPECTED INTER RUPT PRESENTATION 
S 
w 
I 
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T 
' R  
I 
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( f )  TEST POINT POLLING 
DBC DBT 1 1 
(g) SET CONFIGURATION CONTROL REGISTER6 
R DAU 
Pa - OPERATIONS PROCESSOR 
P - EITHER AN EXPERIMENT OR 
b 
A N  OPERATIONS PROCESSOR 
(h) PRIMARY/SECONDARY D A T A  PATH 
NOTE: 
A FAILURE AT ANY POINT I N  THE DATA PATH 
FROM THE DBC TO THE RDAU CAN CAUSE A 
RECONFIGURATION TO THE SECONDARY DATA PATH 
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6.1.7.5.2 COM Test Software Sizing 
i / r e  
The general organization and descriptions of Continuous Orbital Monitoring 
tes ts  a r e  shown pictorially in Figure 6-23. Three main groupings occur based on 
the rate  at which each group is performed. Within each group, there is included 
the item being tested and the name of a test implemented on the item under test. 
There is another category not shown in  Figure 6-23, i. e . ,  an  "ON DEMAND" 
group initiated by the crew. Accompanying each test is an estimate of CPU time, 
memory required, and the 1/0 time i f  applicable. The CPU t imes are based on 
a 1 microsecond memory cycle time and instruction timing formulas of the System/ 
4 Pi Model E P  computer. Where System/4 Pi timing formulas were used, the 
times were scaled to take into account the 1 microsecond memory (4 Pi E P  mem- 
ory cycle time is normally 2.5 miscroseconds). Where System/$ Pi E P  instruct- 
ions were not available for the study, appropriate System/360 timing formulas 
were used. 
......... POLLING 
RDAUs a a WRAP/MEMoRY 
TEST 
WRAP TEST DBTS 0 0 
............. MEMORY TESTS/ 
PROCESSING DISPLAY PATTERNS 
PATTERN TESTS/ 
MANUAL TESTS DISPLAYS a 0. 0 0 ................ COMMAND/READI 
MEM. WRITE TESTS 
ilr 
\ 
MEMORY 
ADDRESSING MAIN 0. e a  0 .  0 0 .  0 
t MICROPROGRAMMED ......... MEASURE- POLLING I MENTS 
1;;. ............ ' I  MEMORY ADDRESSING ...................... 
STATUS I POLL 
I CPU a MICROPROGRAMMED 
NOTE 
e "r" IS THE RESOLUTION OF 
THE INTERVAL TIMERS. 
,y, "k" ARE 
POSITIVE INTEGERS; i j k. 
AS i lr.  j l r ,  klr. 
e TEST EXECUTION RATES SPECIFIED 
Figure 6-23. COM Test Organization 
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6 , l .  7 . 5 . 2 . 1  CPU COM Test - It is assumed that the CPU test  is microprogrammed 
and initiated with a "DIAGNOSE" instruction. For  timing purposes, it is assumed 
that the test requires 10 milliseconds to  execute. The resul ts  of the test a r e  read 
out to a "diagnostic scan out" a rea  of the processor preferential storage in shared 
main memory. The test results a r e  accessible by other processors for fault 
detection/isolation purposes. In the assumed implementation there are two 
methods of indicating that a CPU is in trouble: 
SEND - - 
0 The processor-to-processor link via the bus controller. This would be 
a "write direct" to the OCS processor which would generate a machine 
check interrupt. 
DBC MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS 
WRAP FOR PATTERN TO CON. CHAIN FLAG 
WRITE TROLLER 
D BC 
WRAP FOR RETURN PATTERN 
READ 
1 
MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS 
0 If the above path fails, the OCS processor will poll PSAs to look at the 
diagnostic scan out a r ea  for all processors.  
The flow and sizing estimate for the diagnostic scan out a r ea  poll a r e  shown 
in Figure 6-24. 
6 . 1 . 7 . 5 . 2 . 2  COM Memory Addressing - The memory addressing tes t  will con- 
sist of addressing all main memory locations. A location which cannot be read 
will cause a parity e r ro r .  The flow and sizing estimate a r e  shown in Figure 6-25. 
8 . 1 . 7 . 5 .  2 . 3  Data Bus Controller COM "Wrap" Test - This test consists of 
issuing special 1/0 commands to configure the DBC to a test mode. A hardware 
feature in the DBC will permit a pattern from main memory to be transferred to 
the DBC which will "wrap" the pattern to the lines to be relocated in memory. 
The patterns returned to memory a r e  compared to those sent for failure informa- 
tion. The patterns will be stored on a byte basis and there will be 256 patterns or 
bytes. The "wrap" test will be performed on all four data bus controllers. The 
command word format will be as shown below. 
The test flow and sizing estimate a r e  shown in Figure 6-26. 
6 . 1 . 7 . 5 . 2 . 4  Data Bus Terminal COM "Wrap" Test  - This test will be identical 
to the data bus controller "wrap" test where 1/0 commands will configure the 
DBT to a test mode. Patterns will be transferred from memory to the terminal 
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Figure 6-24. CPU Diagnostic Scan Out Area Poll 
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Figure 6-26. DBC COM Wrap Test Flow 
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SEND ___) 
RECEIVE - 
There is an additional "time" or delay involved in this test; i, e. , there is 
an 1/0 time required for the ser ia l  transfer of the patterns to  the terminal and 
for the ser ia l  return. 1/0 time is based on a data bus bit rate of one megabit 
per second. 
MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS DBT 
WRAP FOR PATTERN TO TERMINAL 
DBT MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS 
WRAP FOR RETURN PATTERN 
)I 
The flow is essentially the same as for the data bus controller "wrap" test 
(Figure 6-26). The sizing estimate is as follows: 
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 usec 
CPU Time/Terminal = 397 240 usec 
Memory = 98 ~ 1 0  words 
1/0 Time/Terminal = 4096 usec 
NOTES: 1. Data bus time is the transfer of 256 bytes at 16 usec per  byte. 
Total 1/0 time = 200,000 usec for 50 terminals. 
2. The CPU time is 46 + 351 n, where "n" is the number of 
terminals. Total CPU time i s  17,600 usec for 50 terminals. 
6.1.7.5.2.5 RDAU COM Tests  - There a r e  two tes t s  associated with the RDAUs; 
i. e . ,  one is similar to the DBC/DBT wrap tes ts ,  and the second is a memory/ 
multiplexer test. In the first test, a form of "wrap?' test is performed but a 
pattern is not transferred from main memory. Instead, a DC voltage developed 
within the RDAU is connected to one channel of the multiplexer. The voltage is 
converted to digital and transmitted to the CPU for comp&ison to an  expected 
value. The flow is essentially the same as for the DBC/DBT tests (Figure 6-26) 
and, for this reason, is not repeated. The sizing estimate is as follows: 
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 usec 
CPU TIME = 18,750 _+1875 usec (for 133 RDAUs*) 
MEMORY = 38 2 4  words 
1/0 Time = 1400 1400 usec (105 usec/RDAU) 
*Formula for CPU time = 46 + 138 n, where n = number of RDAUs. 
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The second RDAU test  is the memory/multiplexer test. In this test the 
contents of RDAU memory a r e  read to verify that the contents a r e  as expected, 
and then a sequential "read" is made to verify all channels of the multiplexer. 
The approximate RDAU memory assumed is: 
LIMITS 64 Bytes 
ANALOG MASK 4 Bytes 
DISCRETE MASK 4 Bytes 
EXPECTED DISCRETE PATTERN 4 Bytes 
TOTAL 76 Bytes 
The total entry/exit time, CPU time, and 1/0 time for the tests will be the 
sum of the times required for the individual tests.  The test  flow for the memory/ 
multiplexer test and the sizing estimate a r e  shown in Figure 6-27. 
6.1.7.5.2.6 Image Processing COM Tests  - An assumption is made that a crew 
member must manually initiate or  commit a device within image processing to  
actual test performance. 
The COM tests cannot interrupt any operation being executed within the 
experiment group or within bulk memory. It is assumed that a recommended 
schedule for testing will be relayed to the crew via a CRT display. 
In the actual image processing test ,  the only OCS processor participation is 
in the check of the permanent and working digital storage and displays (again it is 
performed only upon authorization or request by a crew member because the test 
may destroy memory contents). The actual memory tes ts  will consist of t rans-  
mitting patterns from the OCS to the memories and rereading the memory for 
pattern comparison. After completion of the memory test, a display pattern is 
written on the CRTs. The display test pattern will contain all alphanumerics which 
will be observed by the crew. Successful completion will be entered into a key- 
board. The remainder of the image processing group is assumed manually 
controlled through BITE equipment. These tes ts  will not affect the software 
sizing. The test flow for the memory test is shown in Figure 6-28. 
For the display part of the image processing tests,  additional display 
assumptions were required. These include: 
0 
0 Vector capability 
0 At least 64 characters 
Operation similar to IBM 2250 Display 
6- 76 
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Figure 6-27. RDAU Memory/Multiplexer Test Flow 
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ENTRY 
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Figure 6-28. Image Processing COM Memory Test Flow 
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A candidate display pattern which can be sized is shown in Figure 6-29. The 
display utilizes all symbols, numerics, vectors, etc. The flow for the test pattern 
is shown in Figure 6-30. 
6.1.7.5.2.7 Bulk Memory COM Tests - The bulk memory tes ts  will be auth- 
orized by a crew member as in the image processing tests. In the case of tapes, 
a crew member must mount a special test  tape. The actual tes ts  for peripheral 
devices a r e  fairly standard and consist of the execution of the various device 
commands and of writing/reading bit patterns. A top level flow for the bulk 
memory tes ts  is included in Figure 6-31. Sizing estimates are based on the IBM 
System/36O On Line Test System (OLTS). 
6 , l .  7 .5 .2 .8  DMS COM Measurement Limit Checks - In addition to the software 
programs and BITE provisions, a se r i e s  of measurements must be made on cer- 
tain DMS equipment. The measurements will be concerned principally with power 
supply measurements and temperature measurements. 
Since each RDAU independently polls and limit checks measurements, there  
is no separate program flow as such. If an out-of-tolerance condition occurs, it 
ultimately causes a program interrupt and the RDAU is checked through a "wrap" 
and "memory/multiplexer" tes ts  discussed ear l ier .  
6.1.7.5. 2 .9  GN&C Preprocessor COM Test - Without explicit details of the 
preprocessor characteristics, actual test descriptions cannot be evolved. For 
purposes of sizing the DMS-OCS, it is assumed that the preprocessors have an  
integral test  capability through incorporation of BITE, and that they will respond 
to test commands from the OCS via the data bus. The response from the 
x x x x x x x  } K T E S  CHARACTERS & NUMERICS x x x x x x x  
x x x x x x x  
4 
BYTES 
Figure 6-29. Sample Display Test Pattern 
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Figure 6-30. Image Processing Display Test Flow 
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preprocessors is assumed in the form of a GO/NO GO discrete signal. The power 
supplies for  each preprocessor will be monitored and limit checked by RDAUs. 
The sizing estimate is as follows: 
TEST FOR 
DISKS 
Memory = 100 150 words 
CPU Time = 40 220 usec 
1/0 Time = 100 230 usec/processor 
' OTHER I 
TAPES DRUMS I 
I 
TEST FOR TEST FOR 
I 
6.1.7.5.3 Subsystem Fault Isolation Test Software Sizing 
L-------J 
In many cases,  the performance of the COM tests ,  through the device 
addressing, inherently yields fault isolation. Consequently, many of the SFI 
t es t s  will be common to the COM tests. The capability must exist for performing 
any of the COM tests  (which may be utilized as SFI tests) upon initiation by a crew 
member. The SFI tes t s  which are common to  the COM tes t s  include the CPU tests, 
data bus controller, data bus terminal, RDAU, displays, bulk memory, and image 
processing. Unique tes t s  a r e  required in the a rea  of memory units and switch 
matrices . 
ENTRY (VIA CALL) 
I 
DEVICE 
Figure 6-31. Bulk Storage COM Tests 
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6.1.7.5.3.1 Shared Main Memory - The COM main memory test checked to  
determine if  each memory location could be addressed. The SFI test  consists of 
MAIN 
MEMORY 
LRUl 
generating a pattern in one location in memory, writing the pattern into the 
memory under tes t ,  and re-reading the pattern to  compare it to  the original 
pattern. The SFI flow and sizing estimate fo r  the memory tes t  is shown in 
Figure 6-32. 
1 
MAIN 
MEMORY 
LRUZ 
6.1.7.5.3.2 Switch Matrix - There a r e  two switch matrix units in the baseline; 
i. e . ,  a data bus controller switch matrix and a memory switch matrix. There 
will not be an explicit switch matrix test ,  but rather one of the COM tests  may be 
attempted in different configurations to logically isolate the problem. 
PROCESSOR 
Three cases have been considered for problems associated with the switch 
matrices. 
MEMORY - SWITCH 
MATRIX 
e Case "A" - A problem exists in communication between a processor 
and a data bus controller as shown below: 
SECONDARY 
CONTROLLER CONTROLLER 
DATA BUS 
PROCESSOR SWITCH 
MATRIX 
e Case "B" - A problem exists in communication between the processor 
and memory as shown below: 
e Case "c" - A communication problem exists between the data bus 
controllers and main memory as shown below: 
DATA BUS DATA BUS 
DATA BUS 
SWITCH 
MATRIX 
I MEMORY SWITCH I MATRIX 
MAIN 
MEMORY 
LRUS * 
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Figure 6-32. Shared Main Memory SFI Flow 
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Flows for Cases "A, I'  "B, '' and "C" are shown in Figures 6-33, 6-34, and 6-35. 
NO IDENTIFY THE * SWITCH MATRIX 
LRU 
The aggregate of CPU time and memory required to implement the three 
cases described is: 
r- f 
b 
DISPLAY 
TO CREW 
' 
L 
CPU time = 200 2160 usec 
Memory = 150 2100 words 
6.1.7.5.4 DMS Reconfiguration Software Sizing 
A set of subsystem elements in which communication and control paths are 
established constitutes a prevailing "configuration. I' When elements are added, 
deleted, or substituted, a new configuration is created; the process of establishing 
the new configuration is called "reconfiguration. If Whenever reconfiguration takes 
place, the total resources of the subsystem have changed, and appropriate actions 
a r e  required such that OCS is aware of the conditions. Reconfiguration can be 
invoked due to failures or due to a resource reallocation, but this report  does not 
consider the latter. Configuration control normally is under program control, 
i. e . ,  reconfiguration will occur automatically via OCS. ' Display messages will 
sent to the crew for notification of reconfiguration or for cases  where manual 
actions are necessary. 
be 
Figure 6-33. Case "A" Flow 
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R €CON F IGU RE 
MEMORY 
SFI  FOR 
MEMORY 
Figure 6-34. Case "B" Flow 
Depending on the source of e r ro r  or malfunction, certain events must occur. 
In the event of a memory element failure, i t  must be determined what the contents 
were, if the contents a r e  recoverable, or if the data is available f rom other 
sources, and what program res ta r t  steps a r e  necessary. In the case of an 1/0 
failure, configuration control registers and the bus controller 'table must be up- 
dated. If a CPU fails, other C P U s  must be notified, and some form of analysis 
of the intermediate resul ts  from that processor may be required. For bulk 
memory failures, it is necessary to update the bulk memory allocation table. 
Figures 6-36 through 6-39 show representative flows for the CPU, main memory, 
the data acquisition path, and bulk memory. CPU time and memory estimated for 
each a r e  included in the figures. 
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Figure 6-35. Case "C" Flow 
6.1.7.5.5 Program Restart Software Sizing 
Subsequent to the steps of detection, isolation, and reconfiguration, it is 
necessary to resume program operation - ideally with nothing lost in the form of 
data. Attempting program restar t  without loss  of data necessitates even further 
definition of the types of data inputs and of the baseline design. 
The approach taken has been to define restar t  categories, assume one 
category (a worst case) for implementation, assume a technique for restart, 
define the system, generate the flows, and perform the sizing estimate. The 
principal reason for assuming one design was that there were seven recovery 
categories with s ix  failure modes or 42 possible analyses that could be performed. 
The case assumed was that a real-time data source was being used, that a failure 
had occurred in working storage, and that a checkpoint/restart technique would be 
utilized for recovery purposes. 
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Figure 6-36. CPU Reconfiguration 
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Figure 6-37. Main Memory Reconfiguration 
6. I. 7.5.5.1 Program Restart  Categories - The various program res ta r t  cate- 
gories ar ise  due to variations in the character of data inputs, whether or not 
intermediate results a r e  useful and should be utilized in recovery, or whether it 
is permissible to neglect past data and begin again. Seven res ta r t  categories are 
discussed below. 
0 In this category, the program is driven by real-time data and inter- 
arr ival  time between records,  either explicitly or implicitly, forms 
part  of the input. Recovery must make use of the resul ts  obtained when 
the program last ran, the data which caused the latest execution, and the 
time which has elapsed since the previous cycle. 
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Figure 6-38. Data Acquisition Reconfiguration 
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Q The same as in the previous paragraph except that the inter-arrival 
time is not a part of the program input. 
e+ The program is driven by real-time data, but the results f rom previous 
executions can be ignored for the purposes of res tar t .  Two subsets of 
this category would be where inter-arrival time is and is not significant 
as part  of the input. 
o The program does not process real-time data, but it is advantageous 
to be able to resume execution at some point other than the beginning of 
the input s t ream because of the time required for program execution. 
In this case, the intermediate results and the relative position in the 
input s t  r eam a r e  checkpoint e d. 
0 Program does not process  real-time data. Restart  consists of re- 
positioning to the beginning of the input s t ream and rerunning the 
program. 
0 The program processes real-time data, but it is not necessary to  log 
the data or to checkpoint the intermediate results.  Restart  consists of 
first refreshing the program text and then beginning execution with the 
first  input event which occurs afterward. 
0 This is a degenerate category for programs which a r e  terminated upon 
failure of any resource being utilized. Restart  is accomplished manually. 
NOTES: 1. Whenever real-time data is being processed, it is assumed that 
either the data ra te  or the program execution time is such that 
"catch up" after recovery is possible. 
2. It is also assumed that the program is "refreshable"; i. e. , 
program instructions a r e  kept separate f rom data and inter- 
mediate results.  It also is assumed that the program instructions 
a r e  never altered. 
6.1.7.5.5.2 Restart  Operation - For analysis purposes the worst case restart 
category was assumed where real-time data was being processed, past resul ts  
were required, and inter-arrival time of data is significant. Figure 6-40 shows 
a diagram indicating overall operation. 
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BULK MEMORY 
-- COMMANDS  DATAFLOW 
Figure 6-40. Diagram - Program Checkpoint and Data Logging Operation 
In Figure 6-40, input data is via the Real-Time Data Source. The actual 
program executing is redundantly stored in bulk memory. The input data is fed 
to two places; i. e. , to main working storage and to a data log (also in bulk 
memory). This i s  a temporary storage a rea  for data between checkpoints (data 
log also occurs redundantly for recovery purposes). A checkpoint supervisor 
will cause intermediate results in working storage to be transferred to  the redun- 
dant checkpoint log, under program control. If a failure occurs in the main 
program, reconfiguration will occur, the program text will be read into the new 
memory unit, intermediate results from the last checkpoint are read into working 
storage, and data from the last checkpoint will be utilized from the data log until 
the processor "catches up. 
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The sequence described represents that for a failure in a main storage unit 
containing an application program. For other failures there  will be a somewhat 
different sequence. The failures which should be considered include: 
(a) Main store unit containing program 
(b) Main store unit containing working storage 
(c)  Processor failure 
(d) Storage device containing data log 
(e)  Storage device containing checkpoint log 
( f )  Storage device containing program text 
The actual sizing analysis has considered (a) only, but it is assumed that the 
other five failure modes will be approximately equivalent to (a) in complexity. 
Figure 6-41 shows a flow and sizing estimate for the sequence described previously. 
Another aspect of program restar t  is the maintenance of continuity of oper- 
ational data. This could be a failure external to the computer (e. g. , within a bus 
controller, terminal, RDAU, or within bulk storage itself). Figures 6-42 and 6-43 
a r e  flows indicating how the data logs would be utilized during an unexpected inter- 
rupt emanating from an RDAU and from an attempt to  read a record from a log 
which has failed. 
6.1.7.5.6 Blocks and Tables 
Maintaining configuration control, performing schedules, recovery, and 
failure verification, etc., imply several  tables. There must be a table for device 
addresses down to the test  point level, tables providing information on data paths, 
tables for scheduling the frequency of performing COM tests ,  failed item tables, 
memory allocation tables, a directory table to determine where the other tables 
a r e  located, etc. The following is a preliminary list and sizing estimate for the 
blocks and tables assumed in this design. It a lso has been assumed that all tables 
must be redundantly stored. 
6.1.7.5.6.1 Device Address Table - A table must be maintained for addresses 
down to the RDAU channel. The table should indicate (1 bit position) whether the 
primary or  secondary data path should be used. 
Memory = 4000 test points x 32 bits address  = 8K words 
Redundancy = 8K words 
Total = 16K words 
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Figure 6-41. Program Restart Flow 
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6.1.7.5.6.2 Data Path Table - This table indicates what bus controller, terminal, 
and RDAU are "on-line, '' what their addresses are, and whether they are opera- 
tional, failed, under test ,  etc. 
RELATIVE PRIMARY POINTER SECONDARY POINTER 
TEST POINT TO DEVICE TABLE TO DEVICE TABLE 
ADDRESS ENTRY ENTRY 
3 WORDS 
Memory = 4000 test points x 3 words/block = 12K words 
Redundancy = 12K words 
Total = 24K words 
6.1.7.5.6.3 Limit Check Table - A copy of each RDAU memory must be main- 
tained for each RDAU "read sequential. '' Verify the RDAU limit check mode. 
RDAU Memory = 76 bytes (19 words) 
Memory for 133 RDAUs = 133 x 19 = 2527 words 
Redundant storage = 2527 words 
Total memory = 5054 words 
6.1.7.5.6.4 Processor Table - This table identifies each processor. It indicates 
the address of each processor 's  preferential storage area and the processor 's  
operational status. 
Memory = 6 processors x 4 words/proc. = 24 words 
Redundancy = 24 words 
Total = 48 words 
6.1.7.5.6.5 Switch Matrix LRU Table - This table translates point-to-point 
switch matrix failures into LRU identification. 
Total memory = 600 words (estimate) 
6.1.7.5.6.6 Memory Allocation Table - This table indicates what main storage 
LRUs a r e  f ree ,  operational, under test ,  etc. 
Memory = 22 LRUs x 4 words/block = 88 words 
Redundancy = 88 words 
Total = 176 words 
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6.1.7.5.6.7 Rate Table - This table is used to  initiate events such as the COM 
tests  which may occur at specified frequencies; e. g, , once per 20 seconds, once 
per hour, etc. A priority also must be stored with each event. For sizing pur- 
poses, it is assumed that there may be 250 COM test events and 50 OCS executive 
events and that each event has  a 2 word block size. 
r f 
TIME OF LAST 
IDENTI FlCATlON RATE INITIATION, ti 
EVENT A t  
. WORDS 
32 BITS 16 BITS 16 BITS 
Memory = 300 events x 2 words/block = 600 words 
Redundancy = 600 words 
Total = 1200 words 
CONFIGURABLE ELEMT. 
ID. (PROC., MEM, DBC, 
DBT, RDAU, ETC:) 
6.1.7.5.6.8 Repair Time Table - This table is utilized to assure  (via crew 
prompting) that the repair  ra te  exceeds the failure rate. It will provide a time 
in which a failed LRU should be replaced. 
ALLOCATED REPAIR TIME 1 WORD 
REPAIR TIME BLOCK 
CONFIGURABLE 
ELEMENT 
I DENT1 FlCATlON 
R E  LAT l  VE 
SERIAL NO. 2 WORDS 
TIME OF 
FA1 LUR E 
Memory = I word/block x 1 2  blocks for DMS = 12  words 
Redundancy = 12 words 
Total = 24 words 
6.1.7.5.6.9 Failed Item Table - This table contains the configurable element 
identification and the time at which the item failed. It is used in conjunction with 
the repair  time table to assure  replacement. 
FAILED ITEM BLOCK 
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Memory = 2 words/block x 10 failure capacity = 20 words 
PHYSICAL RECORD UNIT 
CHARACTERISTICS ~ ADDRESS DATA SET NAME 
Redundancy = 20 words 
Total = 40 words 
STARTING 
5 WORDS NUMBER OF TRACK 
TRACKS ADDRESS 
6.1.7.5.6.10 Auxiliarv Storage Allocation Table - This table indicates the 
6 .1 .7 .5 .6 .11  Directorv Table - This table contains the locations of all tables. 
For each table there is a double entry due to the redundant storage. 
Total memory = 8K words (estimate) 
6 .1 .7 .5 .7  Executive Services 
A three-level software hierarchy has been assumed in this design; i. e.,  
there a r e  individual application programs to check the various equipment within 
the DMS, there is a checkout executive to perform test  scheduling, event initiation, 
and program restar t ,  and there is a master executive to perform interrupt handling, 
scheduling of 1/0 services, and overall task scheduling. The executive services of 
the OCS and Master executives a re :  
o OCS Executive 
- Provides asynchronous event initiation; i. e . ,  starting a test  at a 
particular time to assure  that the prescribed test rate is met. 
- Provides "configuration control register" management for config- 
uration control purposes. 
- Initiation of tes ts  in portions of the DMS which are outside the 
operational subset (i. e. , in the experiment subset). 
- Provides program restar t  categorization and res ta r t  services.  
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0 Master Executive Services 
- Provides 1/0 services with specific capabilities to start 1/0 (SIO), 
test 1/0 (TIO), halt 1/0 (HIO), and test channel (TCH). 
- Perform allocation of main storage resources.  
- Perform allocation of auxiliary storage resources. 
- Provide processor-to-processor READ/WRITE direct communica- 
tion via the data bus controller. 
- Perform dynamic storage allocation for "save" areas ,  working 
storage, etc. 
- Perform data logging function. 
- Provide checkpoints for storage of intermediate program resul ts  
for system recovery purposes. 
6 .1 .7 .5 .8  DMS Checkout Sizing Summary 
Table 6-6 summarizes the sizing estimates f o r  the various OCS items 
discussed in previous sections. Some of the i tems had to be expressed in t e r m s  
of the number of bytes handled or  transferred. To get absolute values for these 
cases,  further assumption would be required, 
CPU times were calculated using estimates of the instructions needed to  
perform each "block" in  the flow chart of the program. The time requirements 
of the instructions were then determined using timing formulas for models of the 
IBM System/360 and System/4 Pi having similar instruction se t s  and architecture. 
These processors had a memory cycle time of 2.5 usec; therefore, the resul ts  
were scaled by a factor of 1/2.5 = 0 . 4  to bring them into line with the baseline 
processor characteristics, which included a memory cycle time of one micro- 
second. 
6.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION 
The task of ensuring overall Space Station availability is primarily dependent 
upon the proper structuring of individual subsystem tests.  The ability to test  the 
subsystems independent of other subsystems is directly related to the number and 
types of interfaces. A s  shown in Figure 6-44, the DMS and Electrical Power Sub- 
systems (EPS) interface with every other Space Station subsystem. In addition, 
the EC/LS Subsystem provides cooling to most of the electronic packages. This 
6-99 
v u  
a l a ,  
m u )  
0 0  m m  
L r L r  
m a l  a a  
0 
m 
U 
m 
0 
I N  
; $  
a 
Lr 
0 .c 
V 
u) 
0 
m 
P 2 3 2 2  - 3 1 1 3  0 I N  
1 :  
a 
0 
I I N  
i t  I l k  
a 
I I 
I 
Lr al a .  
QJ 
8 
W 
8 
al 
8 
; 
3 
0 
+I 
0 m d
- m 
m dl
+I 
u) 
j m E 
; 0 0 
+ I  
.-I 
0 m 4
m 
m -3 
+I 
I 
I I 
ha 
E: 
N 
m 
.I4 
.Fl U 0 0 
1 u  s 
U 
u) 
4 
3 
a, c u 
V 
m 
E 
0 
m 
1 
0 (D 
+I 
0 
4 
:: 
0 
cr (u
+I 
cr m 
W 
t - m  O N  a m  
W 
I 
CD 
a, 
P 
cd 
E 
4 
d . . .  r t N m  a v) 
6- 100 
cd 
E 
E 
? cn 
W 
I 
W 
a, 
P 
cd 
+ 
F 
I $ 1  I I 
I 
I [ I  I [  
I I I I I I  
I I I I I I  
I I I I I I  
m 
-1.1 
4 
N 
4 
U 
w 
0 m ,I 
c? 
a N
6- 101 
STRUCTURE 
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Figure 6-44. Subsystem Interfaces 
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter- 
faces be taken into account so that erroneous o r  ambiguous test resul ts  will not 
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tes t s  a r e  
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces 
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsysteni a r e  proper. Properly 
designed, these higher -level tes ts  will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions 
must be verified, maintained, or  changed; (2)  localize the malfunction to a single 
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation. 
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and is 
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tes ts  would be integrated. Ilow- 
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the 
performance of another Subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test  standard 
against which the subsystem parameters a r e  compared. Subsequent t o  this veri- 
fication, the test is dedicated to the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would 
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to verify 
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test 
it must meet one or more of the following conditions: 
0 Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem 
0 Test involves subsystem interfaces 
0 Test requires proper operation of other subsystems 
In several  cases,  the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of 
OCS and functional elements. As  an example, the DMS has  a functional interface 
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and 
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed 
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its hormal functions, 
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test  there must be an intrinsic 
relationship between the operational and test software. This relationship must be 
carefully considered in structuring the integrated tes t s  since unstable or inter- 
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under 
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tes t s  is not extensive due to the 
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub- 
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems a r e  
largely standardized. A s  a result, relatively common tests  can be designed for 
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a 
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface. All  special integrated tes t s  that 
have been identified a r e  discussed in the following paragraphs. The GN&C/DMS/ 
PROP configuration for navigation and attitude control poses the most difficult 
problem for on-orbit testing so it is presented in significant detail. Other inte- 
grated tes t s  a r e  summarized. 
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6,2.1 GN&C/DMS/PROP 
6.2.1.1 Block Diagram 
Figure 6-45 shows the block diagram for the GN&C/DMS/PROP Subsystems 
as configured for the zero g, horizontal mode of operation. The subsystems are 
shown at the LRU level with all primary functional interfaces. For simplicity, 
prime power inputs, cold plate interfaces, and mechanical or fluid connections 
a r e  not shown. 
6 .2 .1 .2  Functional Description 
The GN&C Subsystem accommodates both the artificial-g and zero-g opera- 
tions of the Space Station. In the zero-g mode of operation, the GN&C Subsystem 
provides autonomous navigation, rendezvous command, traffic control, automatic 
docking, and stabilization and control of the Space Station. 
The autonomous navigation scheme utilizes the stellar inertial reference 
data and the automatic landmark tracker augmented with the drag accelerometer. 
The navigation is accomplished by automatically tracking known and unknown land- 
marks several  t imes each orbit. The landmark is similar in operation and mech- 
anization to a gimballed s tar  tracker.  The drag accelerometer accounts for 
anomalies due to Space Station orientation and docked module changes which 
contribute to navigation e r ro r s .  
Both ground tracking and onboard subsystems will provide the navigation 
information for the first  year or s o  of the Space Station Program. The ground- 
generated data will be transmitted onboard for evaluation of the autonomous 
navigation system performance. A s  the confidence in autonomous operation is 
increased through this parallel operation, the gromd tracking is to be phased out. 
In all operating modes and orientations, the gyros provide the high-frequency 
rate and attitude information necessary to supplement the data from the stellar 
seiisors and the horizon sensors.  
A more accurate Earth-centered reference is obtained in the horizontal 
orientation through the use of the strapdown star sensors.  The star sensors  pro- 
vide the long-term, drift-free inertial reference data while the gyros provide the 
short-term, high-frequency attitude and rate information. The passive star sen- 
s o r s  a r e  used while the Space Station is maintained in an Earth-centered 
orientation. The constant rotational rate required of the vehicle to  maintain this 
type of orientation provides the scanning motion for the star sensors,  which a r e  
completely passive and provide no tracking o r  scanning capability of their own. 
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The sensors themselves provide inertial attitude data which is transformed into 
Earth-centered attitude information by use of the navigation parameters.  By this 
method, both inertial attitude and Earth-centered attitude are derived from the 
passive star sensors  while the vehicle is in the horizontal or other Earth-centered 
orientation. This Earth-centered orientation is considered to  be most responsive 
to experiment and subsystem requirements. 
Pr imary attitude control actuation is provided by control moment gyros 
(CMGs). A CMG configuration utilizing four double-gimballed CMGs, each having 
a momentum capacity of 1,100 ft-113-sec, was selected for the isotope/Brayton- 
powered Space Station. Both High and Low-Thrust Propulsion Systems are 
utilized by the GN&C Subsystem for CMG desaturation and backup attitude control 
capability. The reaction jet control buffer provides the interface with the 
Propulsion Subsystem. 
The DMS provides the link between the sensors,  which are used to determine 
the vehicle angular position, and the actuators, which a r e  used to maintain or 
change the vehicle angular position. The use of the DMS provides the flexibility 
required during both the development and operational phases to accommodate the 
total Space Station Program objectives. The DMS performs the data processing 
necessary for all guidance, navigation, and attitude control functions. The inter - 
face electronics controls the flow of information from the sensors  to the DMS and 
converts all sensor inputs to a standardized format before the inputs are t rans-  
ferred.  The interface electronics performs a similar function for output informa- 
tion from the DMS to the control actuators. 
6.2.1.3 Test Flow 
The test flow for the GN&C/DMS/PROP configuration is shown in Figure 
6-46. The flow demonstrates the technique for malfunction detection, subsystem 
localization and fault isolation to the LRU. For simplicity some tes t s  associated 
with prime power, mode commands and cold plate temperatures are omitted. It 
is assumed that in programming the actual tes ts  these types of measurements will 
be implemented as standard procedure. In the same vein, detailed tests of the 
DMS a r e  not shown. Again, it  is assumed that the final procedure would contain 
the necessary self-test, command verification, and other checks to maintain 
confidence in DMS performance throughout the test. 
Many of these test sequences will be repeated for different channels of data 
or for identical s e t s  of equipment. The test flow does not show the repetition of 
these tes ts  but indicates the need for them. For example, there  are four control 
moment gyros (CMGs). The flow shows a typical test for one CMG. It should be 
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Figure 6-46. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 3 of 4) 
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pointed out that although the detail test sequence will  be identical for all CMGs, 
the absolute value of the parameters such as torque commands, gimbal position, 
gimbal, ra tes  will be different for all CMGs. In some cases, the test flow ter- 
minates in an instruction for  the DMS to check data transfer.  This instruction 
is intended to include all operations necessary to verify that the DMS is function- 
ing as required to support the operational and test routine. 
6.2.2 GN&C/DMS/COMM 
The DMS has a functional interface with the GN&C and COMM Subsystems 
for  the pointing and control of antennas. The GN&C sends navigation and attitude 
information to the DMS which in turn uses  it to compute antenna pointing positions 
and slewing rates.  Once computed, the DMS transfers  these commands to the 
antenna actuators in the Communication Subsystem. 
Localizing a malfunction to one of the three subsystems will be performed 
in a manner similar to that described in subsection 6.2.1. The DMS will verify 
receipt of proper attitude and navigation data from the GN&C Subsystem, check 
i ts  capability to operate on and transform the data into appropriate antenna 
commands, and verify the transmission of the control data to the Communication 
Subsystem. Verification of proper response and operation of Communication Sub- 
system equipment will be aided by the switching and use of redundant transmitters 
and receivers.  
6 . 2 . 3  DMS/EPS 
The DMS has a power management interface with the Electrical Power Sub- 
system. This function primarily includes start-up, control and shutdown of the 
power conversion equipment, and the control and reconfiguring of the power pro- 
file through the distribution buses. Fault isolation is performed by a DMS self- 
check that verifies proper generation and transmission of control functions to the 
interface. 
The startup, control, and shutdown of the power conversion equipment by 
the DMS is another example of the integral relationship that must exist between 
the operational and test software. For example, in starting the Isotope/Brayton 
System the automatic operational procedure must contain exact instructions for a 
normal start  and an additional set of instructions for aborting or safing an ab- 
normal start .  To know the starting sequence (operational software) is not pro- 
ceeding as planned implies a knowledge of what is wrong (test  software). Based 
upon this knowledge the DMS can execute the appropriate operational controls and 
identify the malfunctioning element. 
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6.2.4 GN&C - PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM INTERFACE 
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Subsystem operates in a 
closed-loop mode with the DMS and Propulsion Subsystem as elements of the loop. 
Electrical signals to activate appropriate Propulsion Subsystem high thrusters  
a r e  provided by the GN&C jet dr ivers  based upon control information computed 
by the DMS. Although the interface between the DMS and the GNC is fairly 
complex, the GN&C - Propulsion Subsystem interface is not, and can easily be 
incorporated into tes ts  defined for the Propulsion Subsystem. 
6.2.5 EC/LS - EPS ISOTOPE/BRAYTON INTERFACE 
The Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem interfaces with 
the EPS Isotope/Brayton System for removal of waste heat via a fluid heat ex- 
changer installed in the Brayton Power Conversion System. It is planned that 
flow rate,  temperature, and pressure parameters be continuously monitored on 
both sides of the interface as part of normal EPS and EC/LS Subsystem checks. 
6.2.6 EC/LS - LOW-THRUST PROPULSION INTERFACES 
The EC/LS Subsystem interfaces the low-thrust portion of the Propulsion 
Subsystem to supply unreacted C02 from the C02 removal assembly, methane 
by-products from the C02 conversion assembly, and excess water. The Propul- 
sion Subsystem uses  these biowaste fluids in the Low-Thrust System as propellant, 
The interface is controlled by the DMS or by manual control to satisfy such 
parameters as propellant and pressurant selection. These parameters  are pri- 
marily a function of impulse requirements and available stores.  Checkout of the 
interface is required to verify proper valve and pump operation for the transfer of 
the waste gases and excess water. 
6.2.7 EPS - SUBSYSTEM INTERFACE 
The Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) supplies power to  all assemblies of 
other subsystems requiring electrical power. Interfaces between the EPS Trans- 
mission, Conditioning, and Distribution (TCD) System and other subsystem assem- 
blies a re  standardized throughout the Space Station. In addition, the tests and 
associated measurement/stimulus requirements defined for the EPS have indicated 
that a comprehensive capability exists for checking TCD outputs. Fault localiza- 
tion between TCD assemblies and elements of other subsystems can therefore be 
accomplished by EPS Subsystem-oriented tests. 
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Section 7 
SOLAR ARRAY CHECKOUT ANALYSIS 
7.1 GENERAL 
An analysis was made to determine the requirements for onboard checkout 
of an Electrical Power Subsystem for Space Station containing a solar panel a r r a y  
as the prime power generator, This effort was directed by MSC in addition to  the 
analysis of the isotope/Brayton cycle nuclear power generator in the original study 
baseline. The solar a r r ay  power generator analyzed is as described in  DRL No. 
MSC T-575, Line Item 13, entitled "Solar-Powered Space Station Preliminary 
besign," Volume II. One change was made in the baseline. The fuel cells which 
were included to provide premanning and emergency power were not analyzed for 
the following reasons: 
1. The study baseline included batteries for this purpose. 
2. No source of reactants was available from the study baseline. The fuel 
cells normally received reactants from the cryogenic attitude control 
engines. These engines in the study baseline system do not require 
cryogenic fuels and therefore no source was provided. 
The approach taken to this analysis w a s  to identify the changes in  study 
results obtained far the original baseline due to the substitution of a solar array 
system for each of the subtasks performed on the original baseline subsystem. 
7.2 CRITICALITY AND FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS 
The changes to the criticality and failure mode analyses prepared for the 
isotope/Brayton Space Station configuration have been identified. It is assumed 
that the overall subsystem criticality numbers (complements of the probabilities 
of achieving full subsystem specification performance for 180 days) are approxi- 
mately the same for both configurations. Revisions to component-level data are 
necessary for the Environmental Control/Life Support, Structures, and Electrical 
Power Subsystems, 
'7.2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT 
Changes required in the EC/LS Subsystem a r e  a consequence of removing 
the subsystem's high temperature water interface with the Isotope/Brayton 
System. Failure mode and criticality data for added components are provided 
in  Table 7-1. 
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Deleted EC/LS components are:  
2370 
3112 
3312 
6601 
6602 
6603 
6604 
6605 
6606 
6701 
Valve sequence controller 
Valve temperature bypass 
Valve temperature control (hot) 
Accumulator 
Gas Separator 
Filter 
Pump/Motor 
Check Valve 
Re lief Valve 
Mix heat exchanger 
7.2.2 STRUCTURES 
Changes in the Structures Subsystem a r e  a result of adding elements to  
support the solar array power boom. A 42-pound increase in  a spares weight is 
estimated as being required to achieve reliability requirements for the Structures 
Subsystem. A revised criticality ranking of components is given in Table 7-2. 
Failure mode and criticality data for added components a r e  provided in Table 7-3. 
7.2.3 ELECTRICAL POWER 
A criticality ranking of EPS components for the solar a r r a y  Space Station 
configuration is provided in Table 7-4. 
Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution System a r e  given in Table 7-5. 
Similar data appear i n  Table 7-6 for the solar array/battery system. 
Failure mode and criticality data for the 
7.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT DEFTNITION 
Except for the specific maintenance concepts identified for the electrical 
power source, the maintenance policies and concepts defined for the isotope/Bray- 
ton Space Station configuration a r e  also applicable to the solar a r r a y  configuration. 
The changes required to the previously defined maintenance concepts to accom- 
modate the solar array configuration have been identified. 
7 . 3 . 1  STRUCTURES SUBSYSTEM 
The reference to the isotope reentry vehicle (IRV) rotation mechanism i n  
the previously defined concepts can be deleted. All other information however is 
completely applicable to  the solar array configuration. 
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Maintenance of the solar array deployment and orientation system is planned 
through providing an on-orbit removal and replacement capability for such LRUs 
as the redundant axis drive units, turret  head radial  and thrust bearings, main 
torque shaft roller bearings, and the inflatable seals  for the turret  head and 
torque shaft. Although seal  replacement requires IVA, the other replacements 
noted can be accomplished in  a shirtsleeve environment. Replacement of the 
support boom unfold and lock actuators requires EVA, but the need for this activity 
is extremely remote. 
A capability for replacing the entire Space Station power boom module is 
provided in  the NAR baseline design. The probability of utilizing this  capability 
would be extremely remote i f  individual solar panels were designed for replace- 
ment. Without this feature, there is a high r i sk  of needing a new boom before 
the expiration of 10 years. 
7.3.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 
The major Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) maintenance activity for the 
solar -array Space Station is associated with the replacement of components such 
as power contactors, switches, inverters, battery chargers, and battery modules. 
Hardware that is expected to experience failure is modular and redundant with 
offline spares  switched i n  when a failure occurs. 
The battery module is the basic maintenance unit of the battery and is 
capable of being removed and replaced by the crew while in orbit. Each battery 
has provisions for bypassing a failed cell, sensing voltage, temperature, and 
pressure, and a load resistor for conditioning of a n  individual cell. 
allows three cell failures per battery before maintenance or replacement is re- 
quired. The individual cell control approach permits automatic bypassing of 
failed cells with battery operation continuing on the remaining "good" cells. 
Failed cells a r e  replaced af ter  the fourth cell fails in any of the twelve 75-cell 
batteries. Replacement is at the three-cell module level. It is planned that all 
cells be replaced after 2 .5  to 3 years operation. 
This concept 
Although the replacement of individual solar panels o r  solar panel segments 
is not possible in the present design, the Space Station's long duration mission 
makes the provision of this capability highly desirable. It is assumed for purposes 
of this study that individual solar panels a r e  replaceable. This is considered 
necessary since the original design has been modified i n  this study to exclude the 
fuel cells. One function of the fuel cells w a s  to provide power when the entire 
power boom w a s  being replaced. This function is not required i f  a lower level 
maintenance capability is provided. Replacement of individual solar panels and 
bi-stem actuators requires EVA, of course, but this is a very infrequent activity. 
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7. 4 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY 
The subsystem and integrated subsystem checkout functions identified and 
analyzed for the isotope/Brayton Space Station configuration a r e  largely applicable 
to the solar a r r ay  configuration. Checkout functions identified for other sub- 
systems and integrated subsystems are not affected by the new solar a r r ay  con- 
figuration. The previously identified sensing requirements for the Environmental 
Control/Life Support and Structures Subsystems a r e  affected, of course, and the 
necessary revisions a r e  included in changes to the measurement/stimulus lists. 
7.4.1 ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 
The Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) consists of power conversion as- 
semblies and a power control and distribution network. The power conversion 
assemblies consist of solar a r r ays  and batteries for prime power. The batteries 
a r e  also used for premanning and emergency power. The control and distribution 
network consists of battery chargers, rectifier filters, autotransformers, inverter - 
regulators, solid-state circuit breakers, power contactors, and primary and 
secondary bus structure. 
The EPS encompasses a wide variety of equipment including electrical, 
electronic, and mechanical systems. This results in a diversity of checkout 
requirements. 
7.4.1.1 Stimulus Generation 
Stimulus generation requirements imposed by the EPS are relatively few and 
simple. These consist of simulated current unbalance inputs required to ,period- 
ically test  the operation of differential protection relays, and mode-select inputs 
to the inverters and battery chargers. 
7.4.1.2 Sensing 
Sensing requirements imposed. by the EPS a r e  shown in detail in the measure- 
ment/stimulus list. A major portion of the EPS measurements are attributed to 
battery measurements required by a per-cell approach to battery management. 
Included a r e  measurements for cell pressure, temperature, voltage, and those 
required for cell reconditioning, cell by-pass, and detection of failed cells. 
Measurement sensor and transducer requirements a r e  generally well within 
current instrumentation capabilities. Sensor outputs are directly measureable as 
a dc voltage within specified ranges, o r  are converted to standard measurement 
voltages by signal conditioning circuitry. 
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Selected sensors are implemented redundantly due to the criticality of the 
measurement o r  to the difficulty of replacing a failed unit. Critical parameters 
with redundant instrumentation include array blanket temperature and main shaft 
bearing temperature. These redundant sensors  provide the opportunity to perform 
cross  correlation and calibration of measurements. 
'7.4.1.3 Signal Conditioning 
Signal conditioning is required for all sensor outputs which do not fall within 
the standard measurement capability of the DMS remote data acquisition units. 
The requirements include s t ra in  gage, temperature probe conditioning networks, 
ac-to-dc converters, and frequency-to-dc converters. These devices perform 
signal conversion and scaling as necessary to provide a standard output to the 
Data Acquisition System. 
7.4.1.4 Limit Checking 
Limit checking routines a r e  highly applicable to  the E M .  These are used 
to verify that critical parameters such as battery cell  temperatures and pressures,  
and solar a r r ay  orientation and boom tip deflections remain within given tolerances. 
Limit tests a r e  utilized within the Power Distribution System to monitor bus vol- 
tages and currents and to verify the settings of automatic circuit protection devices 
such as percentage differential protection relays. 
7.4. I. 5 Trend Analysis 
Opportunities to apply trend analysis techniques to a solar array/battery 
EPS a r e  evident for both short-term and long-term trends. Meaningful trend 
data may be obtained from selected temperature measurements i n  equipment 
items throughout the EPS and from system voltages. The former includes heat 
sink temperatures in equipment such as autotransformers, inverters, and battery 
cells. These are relatively short-term trend parameters and may provide in- 
dications of degradation or incipient failure. Long-term trend parameters include 
load sharing and voltage regulation of inverters, current-voltage (IV) characteris-  
t ics of each solar array circuit, and battery voltage. The long-term parameters 
a r e  used to identify and project efficiency and output degradation in these 
assemblies 
7.4. 1. 6 Fault Isolation 
Fault isolation is accomplished through comparison of measurement 
operating conditions and predetermined limits and by combinational analysis of 
input/output measurements and associated performance parameters e Redundant 
element substitution is also used where available. 
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7.4.2 REDUNDANT ELEMENT CHECKOUT 
Hardware that is expected to experience failure is modular and redundant in 
the sense that off-line spares  are turned on automatically when failures occur so 
that no loss of operation is experienced. Redundant elements in the EPS include 
protection and switching devices for critical loads, 60-Hz inverters, 400-Hz i m -  
ver ter  output modules, and battery cells. Checkout of the redundant units is 
accomplished by switching them on-line periodically and verifying proper func- 
tioning under normal operating conditions. A special situation exists i n  the case 
of the 60-Hz inverters for the general purpose loads (GPL), assuming they do 
not operate in parallel. Periodic checkout of these units would then require a 
dummy load t o  substitute for the GPL loads in order for testing to be performed 
without interrupting GPL operation. 
7.4.3 INTEGRATION WITH DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
Stimulus requirements in the EPS involve primarily fixed value currents  or  
voltages associated with operation or testing of power conditioners and circuit 
protection devices. These devices are concentrated at the main power centers, 
They generally do not require unique or sophisticated stimuli. This combination 
of conditions favors external rather than built-in stimulus generation. A re- 
quirement is therefore imposed on the DMS to generate these stimuli and to  control 
their application to  the appropriate EPS test points. 
The design employs solid-state load control and circuit breaker units i n  the 
power distribution feeders for the individual loads. These units provide automatic 
protection against overloads, but a r e  under DMS computer control for all other 
load power switching functions. The logic and decision functions are presumed to 
be furnished by the DMS. This creates a difficult subsystem integration task 
because of the lack of concise interface definition. These EPS-DMG interfaces 
are excluded from the present analysis, not simply for lack of interface definition, 
but rather for compatibility with the isotope/Brayton analysis. In the isotope/ 
Brayton study i t  was assumed that load power on-off switching would be accom- 
plished in the load subsystems; manual magnetic circuit breakers were assumed 
for load feeder applications, with separate provisions for remote switching of 
emergency/essential loads to alternate supply buses as required. 
A minimum of two remote data acquisition units are required to  operate in 
conjunction with the solid-state circuit breaker, the built-in test, and operational 
parameters of the secondary bus structure. Fully automatic protective and 
corrective controls, including problem-solving, are a function of the DMS. The 
complex control-protective functions are absolutely dependent on the DMS 
computer. 
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Not all automatic functions are controlled by the DMS. Battery charger 
logic functions such as end-of-charge cutoff, over pressure and over-temperature 
cutoff, temperature compensation of charging voltage, and cell and module bypass 
control are handled locally by the charger control unit. 
Measurement sensors,  transducers, and signal conditioning for the EPS 
are provided as an integral part of that subsystem. The signal interface between 
the EPS and the DMS is in the form of a dc voltage for each measurement. The 
voltage levels are in the ranges of 0-20 mv, 0-5 v, and 0-28 v. 
7 .5  LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT DEFINITION 
The definition of line replaceable units (LRUS) prepared for the isotope/ 
Brayton Space Station configuration is valid for  the GN & C, Propulsion, and RF 
Communications Subsystems in the solar a r ray  configuration. It also is largely 
applicable for the Structures and Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS) 
Subsystems. The LRU listing for  the Electrical Power Subsysteni (EPS), however, 
was completely revised to reflect the solar  a r r ay  configuration. 
7.5. f ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT 
Changes required in the EC/LS Subsystem are a consequence of removing 
its high temperature water interface with the Isotope/Brayton System. Removal 
of this interface eliminates the need for  the heating water portion of the thermal 
control system and its interfaces with other EC/LS systems. The change, however, 
does require the addition of heaters and heater control elements in these other 
systems which include the C02 removal assembly of the Atmosphere Reconditioning 
System, the urine water recovery and water storage assemblies of the Water 
Management System, and the fecal collection assembly of the Waste Management 
System. Affected LRUs and their quantities for both the isotope/Brayton and the 
solar a r r ay  configurations a re  shown in Table 7-7. 
7.5.2 STRUCTURES 
The definition of Structures Subsystem LRUs provided for the isotope/Brayton 
Space Station configuration is also valid for the solar a r r ay  configuration. There 
a r e ,  however, additional LRUs required in the Structures Subsystem to support 
the solar a r ray  power boom. These a r e  delineated in Table 7-8. 
7 .5 .3  ELECTRICAL POWER 
A complete revision of the original LRU definition for the Space Station 
Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) w a s  necessary for  the Solar Array Power Sys- 
tem. The EPS LRU identification for the solar a r r ay  configuration is segmented 
into two parts. The first is concerned with EPS transmission, conditioning, and 
distribution equipment while the second addresses the solar array/battery system. 
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Table 7-7. Solar Array Analysis - EC/LS LRU Changes 
LRU 
Quantity 
I/Br Solar Change 
7 . 5 . 3 .  1 Transmission, Conditioning and Distribution 
The transmission/conditioning/distribution (T/C/D) design defined for  the 
solar array power generator requires the following minimum modifications for 
compatibility with the study baseline subsystems. 
e Change the output voltage of the rectifier-filters from 60 vdc to 28 vdc. 
P Increase the dc power output capability and reduce the a c  power output 
capability to reflect the lower ac-to-dc power ratio for the MDAC loads. 
P Delete the double ac  buses (416 vac). 
e Add a 6O-Hz 115-uac single-phase power capability for loads in the GPL. 
The EPS T/C/D LRUs are listed in Table 7-9. 
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Table 7-8. Solar Array Analysis - Structures LRU Additions 
LRU Quantity 
Support Boom Unfold Actuator 
Support Boom Lock Actuator 
Thrust Bearing Assembly 
Radial Bearing Assembly 
Turret  Head Lockout Block 
Torque Shaft Inflatable Seal 
Turret  Head Inflatable Seal 
Y / Z  Axis Drive and Electronic Interface Unit 
X-Axis Drive and Electronic Interface Unit 
Torque Shaft Roller Bearing 
Space Station Power Boom (Complete Module) 
2 
2 
12 
24 
12 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
The components mounted on the secondary bus structure are considered 
LRUs and are designed for removal and replacement. Only the solid-state circuit 
can be installed o r  removed with the circuits of the secondary bus energized. 
Replacement of an auto transformer o r  rectifier filter is not expected to be re- 
quired in a ten-year period of operation. 
The boom inverter (solar a r ray  power) and the core inverter will be of modular 
design having input, control, and output modules. The modules are replaceable in 
orbit should a malfunction occur. With proper design, the inverters would be 
interchangeable between the two locations with a change in input modules. 
Contactors and solid-state components are used for power control. Where 
large currents have to be handled, contactors are used because of the limited 
ratings and large voltage drop inherent in solid-state devices. Solid-state load 
control and circuit breaker units a r e  used for  the individual loads; therefore, 
smaller contactors (ratings of 20 amperes and below) will not be required. Space 
provision for spare  circuit breakers i s  included in the secondary bus structure.  
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Table 7-9. Solar Array Analysis - EPS T/C/D LRUs 
Quantity 
LRU Required Redundant 
Boom Inverter Feeders 
Boom Inverter Feeder Power Contactors 
Boom Inverter Feeder Differential 
Protection Re lays 
Primary Bus Differential Protection Relays 
Primary Bus Tie Cables 
Primary Bus Tie Power Contactors 
Battery Charger lnput Power Contactors 
Core Inverter Input Power Contactors 
Core Inverter Output Power Contactors 
Autotransformer Input Power Contactors 
Battery Charger Modules 
Boom Inverter Modules (4 x 6 at 2. 5 kw) 
Core Inverter Modules (4 x 3 at 2.5 kw) 
Autotransformer 
Autotransformer Diff erential Protection 
Relays 
Secondary Bus Main Power Contactors 
Rectifier - Filter 
Solid-state Circuit Breakers (28 vdc/l20 vac 
60-Hz 115-vac Single-phase Inverter 
SSSDs) 
(for GPL) 
Power Control Modules 
Instrumentation Sensors/Signal Conditioning 
Main 6O-Hz Distribution Bus Power 
Switches (Single Pole) 
4 
4 
12 
12  
4 
4 
12 
4 
4 
4 
12 (TBD) 1 
23 1 
11 1 
4 
12 
8 
4 
TBD yes - TBD 
(Est. 570) (For redundant loads) 
I 1 
TBb TBD 
TBD TBD 
2 
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Table 7-9. Solar Array Analysis - EPS T/C/D LRUs (Continued) 
LRU 
Quantity 
Required Redundant 
60-Hz Bus Line Cable (Single Phase) 1 
60-Hz Bus Line Cable Circuit Breaker 1 
60-Hz Feeders to Distribution Panel 
(GPL Only) 
Breakers (GPL Only) 
60-Hz Distribution Feeder Circuit 
1 
10 
60-Hz Bus Sectionalizing and Load Line 
CBs (GPL Only) 10 
7. 5.3.2 - Solar/Array Battery 
For compatibility with the study baseline subsystems, the fuel cells have 
been removed from the design. The EPS analyzed, therefore, employs two basic 
kinds of power sources for meeting Space Station power requirements. 
are: (1 )  the solar a r r ays  for  the light period of each orbit and (2) batteries fo r  
the eclipse periods and for power peaking. 
These 
The solar a r r ay  is comprised of four independent rollup solar panels, each 
of which is made up of 40 electrical circuits. The panels are overdesigned at 
beginning of life to allow for approximately 3 6 percent degradation. Replacement 
of the solar  a r ray  requires fu l l  replacement oE the Space Station power boom. 
The capability for replacing individual panels o r  panel segments is not indicated 
in the present solar a r r ay  design. Although the reliability of the solar  a r r ay  
complex is relatively high, the assumption is inade that the long duration mission 
justifies being able to replace at least solar panels individually. 
The battery assembly consists of a group of battery modules, battery racks 
or  enclosures, and control units. 
batteries designed fo r  100-ampere hour capacity and consist of 25 three-cell 
modules connected in series o r  a total of 75 series-connected cells. 
75 cells o r  one module is included in each of 75 cell batteries as a spare .  
EPS requires twelve such batteries. 
The batteries are sealed nickel-cadmium space 
Three of the 
The 
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A listing of the solar array/battery LRUs is given in Table 7-10. Their 
selection is predicated upon life and reliability considerations as well as previously 
defined maintenance concepts. Maintenance is restricted to those assemblies and 
components which are within the scope of projected crew ekills and available 
tooling. 
Table 7- IO. Solar Array Analysis EPS Solar Array/Battery/LRUs 
LRU Required Standby Redundant 
Solar Panels 
Batteries 
Battery Module (26/Battery) 
Bi-Stem Actuators 
4 
12 
3 00 
4 
0 
0 
12 
0 
7.6 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT/STIMULUS LISTS 
Changes to the subsystem test definitions and measurement/stimulus lists 
prepared for the isotope/Brayton Space Station configuration have been defined to 
reflect the solar array Space Station configuration. The data for the GN & C, 
Propulsion, and RF Communications Subsystems a r e  not affected by the new con- 
figuration. Table 7-11 is a summary of the measurement and stimulus require- 
ments for the Solar Array Space Station. 
7.6.1 ENVfRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT 
Environmental Control and Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem changes are a 
consequence of: (1) removing the subsystem's high temperature water interface 
with the Isotape/Brayton System, and (2) adding heaters and heater control elements 
to certain EC/LS assemblies. Measurements and stimuli that apply only to the 
isotope/Brayton configuration are delineated in Appendix I- 10 (a). Additional 
measurements and stimuli required for the solar a r ray  configuration are noted in 
Appendix I- lO(b). The previously submitted EC/LS Subsystem test definitian is 
not affected by these changes. 
7.6.2 STRUCTURES 
The definition of Structures Subsystem tests provided for  the isotope/Brayton 
Space Station configuration is also valid for  the solar a r r ay  configuration. There 
a re ,  however, additional checkout activities required to support the solar a r r ay  
power boom. Changes to the previously submitted Structures Subsystem measure- 
ment/stimulus list a r e  given in Appendix I-lO(c). 
7-20 
7-21 
Parameters to control and monitor proper folding and unfolding of the a r r ays  
receive only an operational assessment. This event-oriented function is expected 
to occur very infrequently. 
A periodic power check of the X-axis and Y/Z axis drive units is conducted 
at the start of each shift. A thorough check and visual inspection of power boom 
operation a r e  expected to be required every three months. The power boom is 
pressurized during this check, and continuous monitoring of boom temperature 
and pressure is required. 
7.6.3 ELECTRICAL POWER 
A complete revision of the previously submitted test definitions and 
measurement/stimulus lists f o r  the Space Station Electrical Power Subsystem 
(EPS) was required. The EPS Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution 
System (TCD) is addressed first, followed by the Solar Array/Battery System. 
7.6.3.1 Transmission, Conditioning, and Distribution 
The TCD System requires a minimum amount of crew supervision. This is 
indicated by the limited number of operational parameters required. Operational 
parameters consist of core and boom inverter power output readouts, battery 
status, and ac  and dc secondary bus voltages. The inverter power readouts 
establish the degree of load balance between the operating units. A small  amount 
of unbalance will normally be present whether the inverters a r e  operating in a 
parallel mode or  isolated. Crew action is required only if normal limits are 
exceeded (as detected by the Power Management Assembly), or  if high experiment 
activity requiring maximum possible sustained power is imminent. Crew response 
under these conditions is to maximize inverter loading by isolating selected primary 
buses and/or by selective transfer of loads. 
Battery status displays and readouts of selected bus voltages provide addi- 
tional information for evaluating system performance and capability for accepting 
additional load. The ability to call up the status of any other system element, as 
may be deemed necessary for evaluation of a particular operational condition, 
provides the flexibility required to ensure adequate status assessments at any 
given time. 
Al l  circuit breakers and contactors for power transmission lines, source 
and distributor buses, and power conditioning equipment can be remotely controlled. 
Many a r e  controlled by signals from automatic protection equipment such as 
differential relays. Remote control is also required to provide for  either manual 
o r  programmed reconfiguration of the TCD System following automatic fault- 
clearing operations, as well as for  facilitating reconfiguration to match changing 
load or  other operational conditions. Additional controls are provided to support 
checkout functions. 
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No capability was shown in the isotope/Brayton configuration for  remote 
control of individual circuit breakers in the distribution circuits to the loads. 
was assumed that all switching of loads would be accomplished in the load systems 
themselves rather than by opening and closing circuit breakers in the power lines 
to individual loads. This assumption w a s  made since final definition of load 
switching control design was not yet developed. This is in contrast to the solar  
a r r ay  configuration which uses solid-state switching devices (SSSDs) f o r  this 
purpose. 
It 
7 , 6 . 3 . 1 . 1  Status Monitoring 
Continuous monitoring is required to detect out-of-tolerance conditions for 
parameters such as inverter load-sharing, principal bus voltages, and equipment 
temperatures, and also to detect abnormal events. 
circuit breaker and contactor t r ips ,  and loss of inverter sync signal. Sampling 
rates  generally correspond to those specified for the Isotope/Brayton System for 
analogous functions. 
These include relay t r ips ,  
Boom and core inverter power output, operating currents and 60-Hz inverter 
This rate should eliminate bus voltages are sampled at the rate of s ix  per minute. 
the effects of transients (assuming a fault signal i s  generated only if  an out-of- 
tolerance condition i s  sensed in two consecutive samples),  while still providing 
a reasonable response time for follow-on corrective action, A sampling rate of 
once per second is specified for bus voltages. This assures  minimum delay in 
detecting out-of-tolerance vo'ltages at the load interfaces. For this higher rate, 
abnormal voltage should be sensed in a minimum of five consecutive samples 
before a fault signal i s  generated. 
Equipment temperatures are sampled at a rate of four per hour. Considering 
thermal lags inherent in the equipment being monitored, this rate should be adequate 
for all but catastrophic failures. 
Secondary bus differential relay t r ips  are monitored at a one sample per  
minute rate. The corresponding power contactor tr ips are sampled at a rate of 
two per minute. If a contactor t r ip  i s  not indicated in either of the first two Sam- 
ples following a relay trip,  i t  is presumed the contactor will not operate to clear 
the fault, and alternate corrective action is immediately taken. Battery charger 
input contactors are also sampled at  a ra te  of two per minute. 
Boom inverter feeder and primary bus differential relay trips are sampled 
at a rate of one per second. This i s  because operation of these relays results in 
tripping the associated boom inverter contactor, with a consequent loss of one- 
fourth the station primary power source capacity. 
inverter contactors i s  five per second. 
The sampling rate for the boom 
These relatively high rates  are required 
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to minimize system and load disturbances in switching to a backup mode of opera- 
tion. A sampling rate of five per second is chosen for the core inverter contactors 
since the loss  of one of these units also results in a one-fourth reduction in station 
source capacity. 
No life-critical €unctions have been identified for the TCD System. An 
unscheduled opening of a core or boom inverter or autotransformer contactor, 
however, results in loss of one-fourth of the primary power source and is there- 
fore listed as a caution function. 
7.6.3.1.2 Periodic Checkout 
Checkouts will be performed at intervals ranging from once per  week to 
once each s ix  months depending on equipment or parameters to be checked. These 
can be summarized a s  follows: 
EauiDment or  Parameter Checkout Interval 
Cable currents 
Bus volts 
60-Hz inverters 
Battery chargers 
Once per week 
Core and Boom Inverters 
Autotransformers 
Secondary Buses 
Rectifier - Filters 
Once per month 
Power Contactors Once each three 
months 
Differential Protection Once each s ix  
months 
The principal tests required to ensure TCD System performance, integrity, 
and availability are listed in Table 7-12. In addition to these tests, checks of 
selective switch positions, interlocks, and system load distribution are required. 
Tests for relay, circuit breaker, and contactor operations can generally be 
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Table 7- 12. Transmission Conditioning and Distribution System Periodic Tests 
(Solar Array Space Station) 
Test Rationale 
Protective Relay Ope rat ion 
Circuit Breaker and Contactor 
Operation 
Inverter Module (Internal) 
Switching 
Battery Charger Mode and 
Module Switching 
Paralleling 
Inverter Synchronizing and 
Inverter Load Sharing 
Power Conditioning Equipment 
Parameters  
Bus Voltages 
To verify proper operation of 
protective devices 
To verify remote operability 
of breakers and contactors 
To determine inverter response 
to control inputs 
To determine charger response 
to control inputs 
To assess performance of 
automAtic (internal) circuits 
To assess performance of 
automatic (internal) circuits 
To determine nominal per- 
f ormance capability and 
degradation, if any, with 
respect to like units 
To assess general health of 
TCD System 
accomplished on-line during periods of relatively low-scheduled experiment 
activity; system switching effects will be minimal. Testing of input and output 
contactors for  the boom inverters can be accomplished without power interruptions 
by scheduling tests during dark periods when power is not available f rom the solar 
arrays.  Battery charger contactors can also be tested during dark periods. Core 
inverter contactor testing can be scheduled for sunlight periods when full power 
is available from the arrays.  No major shock-producing tests,  such as power 
line faults o r  fault clearing, a r e  planned. 
Complexity of checkout varies from simple readouts of parameters,  such as 
voltage or  temperature, to injection of test  currents into current transformer 
loop circuits to simulate fault conditions seen by protection relays. An example 
of a procedure which typifies the range of parameter testing and also tests the 
module switching circuits provided €or power matching is given in Table 7-13 f o r  
the core inverters. 
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Table 7- 13. Periodic Checkout Core Inverters (Schedule During Sunlight Periods) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 .  
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Open inverter input and output power contactors. 
Inhibit closure of output contactor. 
Switch battery charger off (internal). 
Close inverter input power contactor. 
Monitor inverter frequency (free running). 
Monitor open-circuit output voltage levels, phase angles, and 
waveforms for harmonic content. 
Apply synchronizing signal to inverter. 
Monitor inverter frequency (clock controlled). 
Repeat Step 6. 
Enable closure of inverter power output contactor. 
Monitor inverter output for paralleling transients at contact 
closure (paralleling is automatic). 
Measure inverter phase power outputs, frequency, phase currents,  
phase voltages, phase angles, power factor, and harmonic content; 
measure input voltage and current. 
Measure load division among operating inverters. 
Command turn on of additional core inverter module; monitor 
change in core inverter input and output power. 
Command turn off of module turned on in Step 14; monitor change 
in core inverter input and output power. 
Return to pre-test conditions. 
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7.6.3. 1.3 Calibration 
No requirements €or calibration a r e  listed; however, a limited amount of 
calibration may be required for  certain relay installations. 
yet to be determined. 
This requirement is 
7. 6.3.1.4 Trend Analysis 
A limited amount of trend analysis is necessary fo r  TCD parameters. The 
sampling rate for parameters monitored for this purpose is as follows: 
Trend-Monitored Equipment o r  Parameters  Sampling Rate 
Cable currents Four per hour 
Inverter output power 
Bus voltages 
Rectifier-Filter input voltage 
Rectifier-Filter output current 
Equipment temperatures Four per day 
7.6.3. 1. 5 Fault Isolation 
Control signals for opening and closing remotely operable circuit breakers 
and contactors a r e  required for fault isolation. These signals a r e  operated inter- 
nal to the TCD System (e. g. ? differential protection sensing and relay output) to 
provide coordinated automatic fault clearing, and external to the system for  pre-  
programnied operations and checkout purposes. A typical fault isolation flow 
diagram is given in Figure 7-1. 
7.6.3.2 Solar Array/Battery Source 
The EPS power source employs: (1) a solar a r r ay  for light orbital periods 
and (2) batteries for eclipse periods and to accommodate peaking and emergency 
requirements. 
solar panels attached to cylindrical storage drums. Each drum is attached to a 
coinmon support structure which mounts to a bi-stem deployable boom actuator. 
The total a r ray  a rea  is l o 9  000 ft2 o r  2,500 ft2 per panel. Each panel is made up 
of two flexible blankets on which solar cells a r e  attached. Each blanket contains 
20 solar cell circuits for a total of 160 circuits in the a r ray ,  
The solar a r ray  configuration consists of four flexible rollout 
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Figure 7-1. Typical Fault Isolation Flow Diagram 
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The batteries are designed fo r  100 ampere-hour capacity. Each battery is 
made up of 25 three-cell modules connected electrically in ser ies  fo r  a total of 
75 cells per battery. The EPS requires twelve of these batteries. The cells are 
packaged in three cell modules to facilitate on-orbit maintenance. Each cell has 
provisions for bypassing a failed cell and for sensing voltage, current,  and 
pressure.  In addition, provisions for  a load resis tor  a r e  included for  recondi- 
tioning the cell. 
Operation of the solar a r rays  and batteries is controlled by the DMS and 
requires a minimum of crew supervision. Operational parameters are those 
required for controlling the bi-stem actuator motors and monitoring the extended 
length of panels. These operations a r e  required only when extending or retracting 
the solar panels. The solar panels are retracted pr ior  to replacement and are 
partially retracted prior to operation in the artificial gravity mode. They a r e  
deployed initially after orbit is achieved, and then after replacement or at the 
completion of artificial gravity operations. Initial deployment of the panels is 
performed automatically since the Space Station is unmanned. 
7 .6 .3 .2 .  1 Status Monitoring 
Continuous monitoring of batteries and solar panels is required to determine 
out-of -tolerance conditions that could lead to failure or reconditioning requirements. 
Cell voltages and pressures  are sampled at the rate of once per second and 
cell temperatures at the rate  of four t imes per hour. The temperature and pres- 
sure  are related functions and do not require the same sampling rates. These 
parameters a r e  sampled by the DMS computer to indicate the condition of each 
cell. If a cell is out of programmed tolerance, the cell is bypassed or  recondi- 
tioned under DMS control. Periodic reconditioning of off-line cells is also 
required. The cell state-of-charge signal, a small  output voltage, is sampled 
once per second. This value combined with the cell temperature, pressure,  and 
voltage values gives an indication of the state-of-charge of each cell. When pre-  
determined values are reached, the DMS commands the battery charger to reduce 
the charge rate  to a trickle charge rate since the cell is near full charge. 
Other battery parameters such as battery voltage and current a r e  sampled 
once per minute while coolant temperature is monitored at a rate  of four t imes 
per hour. These parameters are sampled to determine the overall status of each 
battery, 
A battery failure must be indicated to the crew whenever more than three 
cells have failed. This is accomplished by the DMS generating a caution signal. 
A l l  other solar a r ray  and battery status monitoring is noncritical. 
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The a r r ay  blanket temperatures, total panel currents, and panel boom tip 
deflections a r e  sampled once per minute. Blanket temperatures and panel currents 
a r e  sampled to determine the overall status of the solar panels. The boom tip 
deflections are used to determine the solar incidence angle on the a r ray  surface 
and to detect degradation of the optical properties of the panels and the bi-stem 
booms. 
9 . 6 . 3 . 2 . 2  Periodic Checkout 
Periodic checkout of solar  a r rays  and batteries is performed at intervals 
ranging from once per day to once per month depending upon the equipment or 
parameters to be checked. These a r e  summarized as follows: 
Equipment o r  Parameter Checkout Interval 
Panel extended length 
Array circuit voltages 
Array circuit currents 
Once per day 
Battery Controls Once per  week 
Battery on-off indications 
Battery cell recondition signals 
Battery cell by-pass control 
Battery cell by-pass indication 
Once per month 
The periodic tests are required to supplement the continuous status moni- 
toring to make a quantitative evaluation of system operating characteristics and 
to verify the operation of standby or inactive equipment. The checkout is relatively 
simple as it includes only readouts of parameters such as voltage and current,  
and verification of the operability of switches and signals. 
7.6.3.2.3 Trend Analysis 
Changes in the solar a r r ay  circuit I-V characteristics with time are neces- 
sary  to detect degradation trends. Therefore, each separate a r ray  circuit is 
periodically switched off the unregulated bus for the determination of the open- 
circuit voltage, short circuit current, and the current and voltage at several  other 
intermediate points on the I-V characteristic. This circuit characteristics curve 
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information fo r  each circuit is obtained once per orbit for the first week of the 
mission, then once per day f o r  one year ,  and finally once per week for  the remainder 
of the mission. These data a r e  transmitted to the ground to permit the calculation 
and extrapolation of solar a r r ay  damage. A system of auxiliary loads is required 
to determine the intermediate points on the I-V characteristics. 
Trend analysis is also necessary for the battery voltages of each of the 
twelve batteries fo r  detection of degradation trends, Initial voltage characteristics 
as well as the previous two weeks'data a r e  retained for  comparison. 
7.6.3.2.4 Fault Isolation 
Solar a r ray  and battery controls a r e  based on monitoring solar  a r r ay  circuit 
and battery cell performance. This monitoring is used f o r  detecting cell failures 
and initiating corrective action. A typical fault isolation flow diagram is shown in 
Figure 7-2 for a battery failure. 
A battery failure occurs when more than three cells in the battery have 
failed. The switching out of one battery is not .critical as the other batteries will 
take a share  of the load. A caution indication is used to show that a battery has 
failed. A failed battery must be removed from the system to avoid affecting 
other components and/or causing further battery damage. Therefore, the failed 
battery must be located and verification made of its isolation. For  continued 
operation the condition of the other batteries must be determined to prevent a 
severe drain on these batteries. This could require some loads to be rescheduled 
or reduced. 
7.7 INTEGRATED SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITION 
Changes required in the integrated tests defined for  the isotope/Brayton 
configuration have been identified. One additional integrated test was defined. 
7.7.1 DMS/EPS 
The DMS has a power management interface with the Electrical Power 
Subsystem. This function includes: 
0 Power switching of individual load equipment (power profile management) 
by means of computer-controlled solid-state circuit breakers (NAR 
baseline) 
e Automatic paralleling and load division control of inverter modules 
e Control of battery recharging and cell conditioning on a per-cell basis 
Fault isolation is performed by DMS self-checks that verify proper generation and 
transmission of control functions to the interface. 
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Figure 7-2. Typical Fault Isolation Flow Diagram 
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Active DMS control is also required f o r  orientation of solar a r r ay  panels. 
This function involves a DMS interface with both the Electrical Power and Structures 
Subsystems. It is assumed that wide angle sun sensors  a r e  incorporated as par t  
of the EPS ar ray  to determine solar panel position with respect to the sun. The 
DMS provides the logic required to position the panels during Earth occultation and 
to reacquire the sun when leaving the shadowed portion of the orbit. Panel orienta- 
tion then requires DMS control of the X-axis and Y/Z axis drive units in the 
Structures Subsystem based upon DMS monitoring of turret  head and torque shaft 
positions as well  as EPS sun sensor data. For fault localization, the DMS can 
verify receipt of proper sun and panel position data f rom the EPS by comparison of 
data f rom redundant sensors.  The DMS can then check its own capability to operate 
on and transform the data into appropriate drive unit commands, and verify the 
transmission of the control data to the Structures Subsystem. Verification of 
proper response and operation of the Structures Subsystem can be made by moni- 
toring individual drive unit performance. 
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Section 8 
DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on the checkout requirements derived as a result of Task 1, an  
analysis of the software requirements to  perform checkout of each subsystem 
was  completed in Task 2. Checkout programs were sized by combining the 
language element usage for each program module and the estimate of DMS re- 
quirements for each element. 
A measure of the parameters of performance of the DMS was  established. 
These include: 
0 Flexibility 
0 Functional Satisfaction 
0 Speed 
0 Memory sizing 
Based on the software sizing analysis from Task 2, the above parameters 
were evaluated against the sum of subsystems €or which onboard checkout has 
been considered, and conclusions have been drawn concerning the adequacy of the 
DMS to perform the checkout task. Finally, an  analysis w a s  performed to deter-  
mine i f  a role exists for preprocessors i n  the checkout task. 
8 .2  ADEQUACY OF THE DMS BASELINE 
The DMS adequacy w a s  analyzed with respect to  the following considerations: 
0 ~ Computer execution 
0 Memory size 
0 Data bus loading 
o Configuration flexibility 
0 
0 Checkout philosophy 
Effect of isotope/Brayton versus  solar array 
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From these, no inadequacies were found. The hardware specifications are reason- 
able and obtainable within the current state-of-the-art when space-qualified. 
However, certain alternate design approaches should be considered as a 
result of the checkout analysis. These changes a r e  suggested solely from an OCS 
point of view and other a reas  should be investigated before committing to the 
change. These suggested changes are: 
0 The process of dedicating memory to a processor (denying other pro- 
cessors  access) is undesirable. A failure of the dedicated memory 
renders the processor unusable at the same time. 
0 The configuration indicating a bus controller switch matrix and a 
memory switch matrix is undesirable. I t  is difficult to isolate to 
an  LRU which is a smaller unit than the switch matrix assembly. 
If the switch matrix assembly is a single LRU, then the entire DMS 
is disabled during a remove-and-replace of the matrix. 
0 For configuration control simplification, it would be desirable to  
consider the ''shared auxiliary" memory and "bulk" memory in the 
same manner (i. e.,  a peripheral device accessed via the data bus). 
e Interconnection between processor and memory and between processors 
and data bus controllers should be designed for multiple simultaneous 
corrections . 
8.3 DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
Based on the program module sizing information from Task 2 and the 
measurement and stimulus information derived earlier in Task 1, an  estimate 
of the DMS performance required to execute the OCS task was  made. Parameters  
analyzed include data bus utilization, processor utilization, and main memory 
r e  quire d . 
8.3.1 DATA BUS UTILIZATION 
Based on the Measurement and Stimulus List of Appendix I, an analysis was 
performed to estimate the data bus rates  required to acquire data for the onboard 
checkout task. Table 8- la  summarizes the data ra te  for each subsystem, and 
a-2 
Table 8-la. Subystem Data Rates 
Space Station System 
Analog Bilevel Total 
Meas/ Bits/ Meas/ Bits/ Bits/ 
Sec Sec Sec Sec Sec 
Hi Thrust Propulsion 41.00 3,608.00 12.00 96.00 3,704.00 
Lo Thrust Propulsion 94.00 8,272.00 78.00 624.00 8,896.00 
EC/LS 340.00 29,920.00 50.00 400.00 30,320.00 
Communications 0.96 84.48 0 0 84.48 
Structures 7. 00 616.00 0 0 616.00 
E PS-I/BR 22.07 1,942.16 0 0 1,942.16 
EPS(TDC) I/BR 
Baseline 
156.64 13,784.32 37.63 301.04 14,085.36 
DMS 1.10 96.80 2.23 17.84 114.64 
EC/LS Brayton Cycle 4.00 352.00 0 0 352.00 
EC/LS Solar Array 2.00 176.00 6.00 48.00 224.00 
Structure Solar Array  0 0 0 0 0 
EPS(TCD)-Solar Array 47.44 4,174.72 179.07 1,432.56 5,607.28 
EPS-Solar Array/Battery 2,702.40 237,811.20 12.00 96.00 237,907.20 
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subsystem delta considering the Solar A r r a y  and Isotope/Brayton Power Sub- 
systems. In'arriving at the data rates,  the following assumptions were made 
concerning the command and data word formats: 
o A command will  require 44 bits 
o A response will  consist of 26 bits 
for each analog word or 
plus 18 bits discrete word or 11 bilevel 
words 
Total 88 
This results in a worst case of 88 bits per analog or discrete word and 8 bits 
per bilevel measurement. The worst case w a s  used €or the data rates in  Tables 
8- la  and 8-lb. These bit rates represent a n  "average" rate and a r e  calculated 
using status monitoring and trend analysis parameters whose sample rates are 
one/minute or faster. Sample rates less than one/minute, periodic checkout and 
calibration tests, and fault isolation tes ts  occur s o  infrequently that no appreci- 
able effect on the average rate occurs. Periodic checkout and calibration tests 
a r e  scheduleable s o  that peaks can be avoided. Although fault isolation tests 
cannot be scheduled, other activities can be curtailed during periods of fault 
isolation to  avoid peak data rates.  
Table 8-1b, presents the same data with the concept of remote limit check- 
ing implemented. This concept is described in Section 4, Baseline Subsystem 
Descriptions. Data in Table 8-lb, is calculated assuming that no data is trans- 
mitted unless the data is required for operational or trend analysis purposes. 
Assuming a continuous requirement for status monitoring €or all subsystems 
and a scheduleable periodic checkout and fault isolation function, Table 8-2 
shows the data rates and utilization rates of the baseline one-megabit subsystem 
data channel of the Space Station data bus. 
A s  Table 8-2 indicates, a significant reduction in data bus utilization is 
achieved by the use of remote limit checking in the solar-powered Space Station 
c onfi gura ti on. 
Although there are obvious hardware penalties in implementing this 
concept in the RDAU, it is believed that this option should .be further considered 
in the Space Station DMS design. 
8.3.2 PROCESSOR UTILIZATION 
It was assumed that the average load on the processor was approximately 
represented by the status monitoring and trend analysis functions as the other 
functions, i. e. , periodic checkout? calibration, and fault isolation tes ts ,  occur 
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Analog Bilevel 
Meas/ Bits/ Meas/ Bits/ 
Space Station System S ec Sec Sec Sec 
Guidance, Navigation, 0.24 21.12 0 0 21.12 
and Control 
Total 
Bits/ 
Sec 
EC/LS 49.00 4,312.00 0 0 4,312.00 
C om muni cat ions .002 0. 18 0 0 0.18 
EPS(TED) I/BR 
Baseline 
60.12 5,290. 56 0 0 5,290.56 
DMS 0.34 29.92 0 0 29.92 
ESP(TED) Solar 0.067 5.'90 0 0 5.90 
A r r a y  
Table 8-2. Data Bus Utilization 
I 1 
Average Data Rate Data Bus Utilization 
Without With Without With 
Limit Limit Limit Limit  Check Check Check Check Spa c e Station C onf i gur at ion 
Isotope/Bra yton 62,830 9,430 6.28% .9% 
Solar A r r a y  285, 500 4,260 28.6% .4% 
infrequently and can be scheduled to avoid peak loads. Therefore, the analysis 
w a s  directed toward analyzing these functions with respect to  processor capability 
required for their execution. 
Table 8-3 shows the execution ra tes  and the number of points t o  be monitored 
for status for both the isotope/Brayton and solar a r r a y  Space Station configura- 
tions. Summing the requirements from Table 8-3, resul ts  in  a total of 3, 751, 621 
data points per hour to be monitored for the isotope/Brayton configuration and 
13, 581, 521 data points per hour to be monitored for the solar a r r a y  configuration. 
Based on the utilization formula 
P = E (t,) 
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where 
P = utilization 
A = arr ival  ra te  
E(ts) = estimated mean service time 
and assuming that for a multiprocessor of three E&,) = 200 microseconds, the 
processor time required to perform limit checking for one station monitoring 
1 /D 
3’ 751’ 621 x 200 x = .07 or 7% 1 
3 
tes t  point is: 
3600 PI /BR=-  x 
1 /H 4 ,‘H 1,‘M 2 %  6 /M 1 1‘s 5 /s 
and 
13’ 5819 521 x 200 x = .252 or 25.2% P s a = -  x 1 3 3600 
Table 8-3. IBR/EA Space Stations Status Monitoring 
GN&C 24/24 18:18 108/’108 
Propulsion 299/299 
EC/LS 8/8 368,’380 
R F  
Communications 
58 158 
Structures 7/7 
E lec tr i ca 1 Power 371962 40196 331/1164 26/74 118/2832 18/12 
Data Maingenielit 96 ’96 65/65 141/141 34/34 
Total 96/96 89/89 37/962 265/321 331/1164 26/74 934/3660 18/12 
A s  an  additional load, the two most frequently used trend analysis programs 
sum lo  an additional duty cycle of . l l%. 
When the RDAU performs limit checking and interrupts the multiprocessor 
only when an out-of-limit condition occurs, the only activity remaining is that to 
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assure proper RDAU operation. Assuming wrap and memory tes ts  require 
60 + 1172 = 1232 microseconds (Section 6) and a r e  executed once every 20 seconds 
(worst case) and that RDAU can access  40 test points, the utilizations become 
1 
PI/BR = 5 X 101 20 - X 1232 x l o m 6  - .0021 o r  .2l% 
- 236 x 1232 x = ,0048 or .48% 
20 
PSA = - 
3 
Based on these assumptions, Table 8-4 summarizes the multiprocessor 
utilization for each case considered. 
Table 8-4. Processor Utilization Summary 
Configuration 
Centralized Remote 
Limit Check Limit Check 
Isotope/Brayton 
Sales Array 
7,1% 0.3% 
25.3% 0.5% 
It  can be seen from Table 8-4 that the incorporation of the remote limit 
checking capability of the RDAU as described in the Baseline DMS Description 
results in a significant decrease in the utilization of the multiprocessor for 
checkout . 
8.3.3 MEMORY REQUIREMENTS 
Main memory requirements a r e  estimated as the sum of those programs 
requiring constant residence in main memory and the checkout program currently 
being executed. The EC/LS trend analysis module is the only program with a 
sufficiently rapid iteration rate  to warrant constant residence in main memory. 
The largest checkout module is estimated at about 19,000 words. Several are 
2,000 to 5,000 words long, but most a r e  smaller. I t  is estimated therefore, 
considering overlay capability, that an allocation of 8,000 words is sufficient for 
the checkout module being executed. The total main memory requirements, 
therefore, are:  
Checkout Executive 64,000 words 
Current Program Module 8,000 words 
EC/LS Trend Analysis Module 150 
72,150 words 
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This main memory requirement represents about 28 percent of the 256,000- 
word main memory capacity. 
The total memory required for all the checkout modules identified in  Task 2 
is 290,000 words. These must be stored in aufiliary memory when not in exe- 
cution. This auxiliary memory requirement represents about 11 percent of the 
2.6-million-word auxiliary memory capacity. 
8.4 USE OF PREPROCESSORS IN THE CHECKOUT TASK 
Considerations which, taken together, could dictate a need for preprocessors 
in the DMS are:  
0 Inadequate centralized computer speed capability to handle checkout 
pr oc e s  sing 
0 Inadequate main memory size for subsystem checkout programs 
0 Special unique instructions required for a given subsystem and 
not required for other subsystems 
0 Time critical simultaneous processing requirements between 
checkout and other processing requirements 
0 Access to checkout data not required by centralized processor for 
other reasons 
In the Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques no requirement to 
add preprocessors to aid the DMS computer in performance of the centralized 
Space Station checkout task was  identified. Given the addition of preprocessors 
for operational purposes, they could possibly be used to  advantage by the checkout 
function, This is not a requirement at present, however, and its cost effectiveness 
needs to be determined. 
Some criteria that may be used for a decision are: 
0 To the extent that checkout uses operational data available most readily 
to the preprocessors, it may be done by the preprocessors 
0 To the extent that checkout requires data from other interfacing 
subsystems, the DMS computer would be preferred 
0 Mode control, subsystem configuration, and redundancy management 
should be done in the DMS computer 
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0 Lower level checkout could be done in preprocessors, but integrated 
checkout should be assigned to the DMS computer. 
Special consideration was given t o  the use of the five GN&C preprocessors  
in the checkout of the GN&C Subsystem. Since no data was  available on the 
preprocessor memory, cycle time, or other performance characteristics, no 
decision could be made on the use of these preprocessors. However, some 
considerations for and against the use of these preprocessors for checkout were 
derived. These are: 
Splitting the checkout function between the DMS computer and GN&C 
preprocessors could mean programming the checkout function in two 
or more different languages, 
If the preprocessors a r e  sized to perform their respective operational 
loads only, they might be incapable of doing the checkout task, too. 
Current estimates indicate no need for checkout assistance from the 
preprocessors by the DMS computer; 
Splitting the checkout task between computers will result in some 
coordination and synchronization problems not found in a centralized 
concept. 
Assuming the preprocessors have easy access  to  all checkout data, 
they could perform checkout as easily as the DMS computer, and in 
addition, decrease the data bus load. 
Use of preprocessors lets some specialized checkout algorithms be 
assigned to their respective subsystems and allows more standard 
DMS software to be developed independently. 
Any checkout function transcending two or more preprocessors incurs 
the cost of complicated data transfer and synchronization through 
the data bus and DMS computer, 
Any preprocessor checkout data may also have to be available to  the 
crew via data bus, DMS computer, and display system. Any saving 
in use of the preprocessor is therefore subject t o  this added expense. 
Some utility routines may have to be repeated in the preprocessors i f  
checkout is done therein. 
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The option of delegating some checkout functions to preprocessors, taking 
the above into consideration, wil l  remain open for some time. A likely solution 
is to do some in both places. The Optical Reference and CMG preprocessors 
could do much of their respective subsystems' checkout. The IMU and RCS 
preprocessors should let the DMS do much of their subsystems' checkout. Since 
the IMU preprocessor smoothes out changes in vehicle rol l  rate and velocities 
and receives hardware status information, it could do some checkout, also. 
The Local Level Flight Mode Navigation function could be checked by the 
preprocessor, but Inertial Flight Mode Navigation, Space Station Attitude Control, 
Transposition and Docking,' and Orbital Maintenance should be done using the DMS 
computer to a large extent. 
It is interesting to note that the "Space Station IMS Trade-off Study Report", 
Section 6, Onboard Checkout (Enclosure 3 to  R F P  BG 721-7-0-318 P) considered 
the subsystem/experiment-oriented preprocessors the least attractive of several 
checkout control alternatives. Pr imary reasons for this rating were higher soft- 
ware development costs, additional hardware development and procurement costs, 
and increased power, weight and volume requirements. The principal advantage 
was  in reduced data bus traffic and reduced processor utilization. Since the 
largest loads on both the data bus and the DMS processor are due to status 
monitoring (primarily limit checking) which can be handled by Remote Data 
Acquisition Uni t s ,  this study seems to support the conclusions of the IMS trade 
study in that preprocessors would not be recommended for checkout purposes 
alone. 
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APPENDIX I 
SPACE S T A T I O N  ONBOAKD CHECKOUT MEASUREMENT & STIMULUS LIST 
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